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Big	Data	and	Personalised	Price	Discrimination	in	EU	Competition	Law	
Dr	Christopher	Townley,	Eric	Morrison	and	Professor	Karen	Yeung1	
1. Introduction	
The	 networked	 digital	 revolution	 is	 ushering	 in	 a	 new	 data-driven	 age,	 powered	 by	 the	
engine	of	Big	Data.2	We	generate	a	massive	volume	of	digital	data	in	our	everyday	lives	via	
our	 on-line	 interactions,	 which	 can	 now	 be	 tracked	 on	 a	 continuous	 and	 highly	 granular	
basis.	 This	 tracking	 ability,	 combined	with	 the	 power	 of	machine	 learning	 algorithms,	 has	
given	rise	 to	a	wide	and	varied	range	of	 ‘personalised’	 services,	 ranging	 from	personalised	
news	 content,	 advertising,	 energy	 management,	 fitness	 measurement	 and	 management,	
street	navigation	 through	 to	dating	and	mating	services.	These	 technologies	have	 radically	
disrupted	the	retail	sector,	following	the	founding	of	digital	retailer	Amazon	in	July	1994	by	
entrepreneur	Jeff	Bezos,	which	is	now	valued	at	$US	373	billion.	Amazon’s	success,	and	the	
reason	why	customers	return	to	 it	time	and	time	again,	 is	due	to	 its	ability	to	 improve	the	
shopping	 experience,	 whether	 through	 predicting	 what	 stocks	 to	 keep,	 understanding	
consumers’	 preferences	 and	 recommending	 other,	 complementary	 products,	 etc.	 through	
its	 collation,	 interpretation	 and	 utilisation	 of	 Big	 Data	 to	 personalise	 our	 digital	 shopping	
experience.	 However,	 this	 digital	 personalisation	 is	 no	 longer	 limited	 to	 shopping	
recommendations	and	advertising	delivered	to	our	smartphones,	 laptops	and	other	mobile	
devices,	but	may	extend	to	the	prices	at	which	goods	and	services	are	offered	to	customers	
in	 on-line	 environments,	 making	 it	 possible	 for	 two	 individuals	 to	 be	 offered	 exactly	 the	
same	product,	at	precisely	 the	same	time,	but	at	different	prices,	based	on	an	algorithmic	
assessment	 of	 each	 shopper’s	 predicted	 willingness	 to	 pay.	 For	 example,	 in	 2000,	
Amazon.com	sold	DVDs	 to	different	people	 for	different	prices,	prompting	a	public	outcry	
that	resulted	in	Amazon	claiming	it	was	merely	a	test	and	refunding	the	price	difference	to	
people	who	paid	more.	Yet	 in	2012,	an	Oregon	newspaper	 reported	 that	 consumers	were	
again	 finding	 that	 the	prices	 charged	 for	 items	on	Amazon.com	were	highly	 variable,	with	
one	 consumer	placing	a	 set	of	mahjong	 tiles	 in	her	 shopping	basket	offered	at	 a	price	 for	
$54.99,	but	a	few	minutes	later,	found	that	the	price	of	the	item	in	her	basket	had	jumped	
to	 $79.99,	 and	 when	 she	 cleared	 the	 cart	 and	 tried	 again,	 the	 item	 was	 then	 priced	 at	
$59.99.	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 a	 Wall	 Street	 Journal	 investigation	 found	 that	 Staples	 Inc.’s	
website	 displays	 different	 prices	 to	 people	 after	 estimating	 their	 locations.	 If	 rival	 stores	
were	 physically	 located	 within	 approximately	 20	 miles	 from	 that	 person’s	 estimated	
location,	Staples.com	usually	showed	a	discounted	price;	a	2015	study	into	price	differences	
																																								 																				
1	Dr	 Townley	 and	 Professor	 Yeung,	 The	 Dickson	 Poon	 School	 of	 Law,	 King’s	 College	 London.	 Eric	
Morrison,	 Financial	 Conduct	 Authority,	 also	 teaches	 competition	 economics	 at	 the	 Dickson	 Poon	
School	of	Law.	Thanks	to	Caron	Beaton-Wells,	Roger	Brownsword,	Adina	Claici,	David	Elliott,	Frances	
Hanks,	 Liza	 Lovdhal	 Gormsen,	 Renato	 Nazzini,	 David	 Osmon,	 Richard	Whish	 and	 Angela	 Zhang	 for	
helpful	comments.	
2	Although	there	are	many	definitions	of	Big	Data,	for	our	purposes	we	define	Big	Data	in	terms	of	the	
four	elements	identified	by	Bernhard	Rieder:	first,	the	steadily	increasing	production	and	availability	
of	 very	 large	 datasets	 that	 often	 comprise	 transactional	 data	 (logged	 behaviour)	 or	 other	 forms	 of	
non-traditional	data	such	as	social	 interactions,	cultural	tastes,	or	sensor	readings;	second,	they	rely	
on	algorithmic	techniques	for	data	analysis,	many	of	them	probabilistic	and	capable	of	learning	which	
have	 now	 become	 widely	 available;	 third,	 the	 rampant	 computerization	 of	 all	 aspects	 of	
contemporary	life	means	that	ever	more	practices	are	unfolding	in	online	environments	that	allow	for	
data	 collection	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 automation	 of	 decision-making	 and	 the	 performative	
implementation	of	 its	 results;	 and	 fourth,	more	broadly,	 the	 relentless	drift	 in	 economic	and	 social	
organization	 towards	market	 forms	makes	 techniques	 that	 can	 adapt	 to	 and	 control	 complex	 and	
dynamic	 situations	 increasingly	 attractive,	 Bernhard	 Rieder,	 'Big	Data	 and	 the	 Paradox	 of	Diversity'	
(2016)	2	Digital	Culture	&	Society	.		
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in	international	travel	bookings	for	US	hotel	and	car	rental,	showed	a	similar	pattern.3	These	
instances	all	mine	consumers’	digital	footprints,	using	machine	learning	algorithms	to	enable	
digital	retailers	to	predict	the	price	that	individual	consumers	(‘final	end	users’)	are	willing	to	
pay	for	particular	 items,	and	thus	offer	them	different	prices.	This	phenomenon,	which	we	
dub	‘algorithmic	consumer	price	discrimination’	(ACPD)	forms	the	focus	of	this	paper.		
The	practice	of	price	discrimination,	which	we	define	as	“…charging	different	customers	or	
different	 classes	 of	 customers	 different	 prices	 for	 goods	 or	 services	 whose	 costs	 are	 the	
same	or,	conversely,	charging	a	single	price	to	customers	for	whom	supply	costs	differ…”4	is	
hardly	 a	 new	 phenomenon.	 Familiar	 forms	 include	 loyalty	 discounts,	 volume	 or	multi-buy	
discounts,	and	 the	offering	of	 status	based	discounts	 for	 students,	old-age	pensioners	and	
the	 unemployed.	 However,	 the	 technological	 capacities	 of	 Big	 Data	 substantially	 enhance	
the	ability	of	digital	retailers	to	engage	in	much	more	precise,	targeted	and	dynamic	forms	
of	price	discrimination	that	were	not	previously	possible.	First,	it	allows	for	surveillance	and	
tracking	of	online	behaviour	via	the	collection	of	individuals’	‘digital	breadcrumbs’,	enabling	
firms	 to	 create	 detailed	 profiles	 of	 the	 tastes,	 habits	 and	 purchasing	 preferences	 of	
consumers	at	a	highly	personal	and	granular	level.	Secondly,	Big	Data	allows	for	personalised	
on-line	 strategic	 experimentation	 to	 acquire	 insight	 (information)	 concerning	 the	
preferences,	 behaviours	 and	 potential	 willingness	 to	 pay,	 of	 digital	 users	 (via	 online	 A/B	
testing).5 	Finally,	 the	 online	 environment	 allows	 firms	 to	 mine	 the	 resulting	 data	 to	
personalise	the	 informational	choice	environments	of	each	user,	 including	the	digital	 ‘shop	
floor’	 through	which	 they	make	 purchases.	 So,	 rather	 than	 products	 being	 displayed	 in	 a	
physical	space	offered	at	a	single	price	to	all	customers,	it	is	now	technologically	possible	to	
offer	 the	 same	 goods	 to	 different	 consumers	 at	 different	 prices	 (based	 on	 their	
algorithmically	predicted	individual	willingness	to	pay).	As	the	digital	consumer	only	sees	her	
own	‘personalised’	digital	shop	front,	she	may	be	unaware	that	price	discrimination	is	taking	
place.	Digital	 retailers	portray	the	shopping	experience	as	a	benefit	 to	consumers,	offering	
them	 a	 'bespoke'	 informational	 environment	 that	 supposedly	 makes	 the	 online	 shopping	
experience	more	efficient	 and	 'meaningful'	 to	 the	 individual.	As	we	 saw	with	our	Amazon	
example,	there	are	often	advantages;	but	whether	this	ultimately	benefits	consumers	is	an	
open	 question,	 particularly	 given	 the	 capacity	 to	 engage	 in	 highly	 personalised	 price	
discrimination	which	these	technologies	make	possible.		
There	 are	 many	 areas	 of	 law	 that	 might	 mount	 a	 response	 to	 rising	 public	 anxieties	
associated	 with	 these	 practices.	 Data	 protection	 law	 and	 consumer	 protection	 laws	 are	
obvious	 candidates,	 given	 that	 ACPD	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	 collection	 and	 algorithmic	
processing	 of	 personal	 data,	 and	 clearly	 affects	 the	 interests	 of	 consumers.	 Furthermore,	
other	areas	of	 law	might	also	be	brought	 to	bear,	 including	contract	 law,	e-commerce	 law	
and	 anti-discrimination	 law.	 However,	 our	 paper	 seeks	 instead	 to	 critically	 examine	 these	
																																								 																				
3	Rose	Michael	 and	 Rahman	Mohammed,	 'Who's	 Paying	More	 to	 Tour	 These	 United	 States?	 Price	
Differences	 in	 International	 Travel	 Bookings'	 (2015)	 Technology	 Science	 .	 For	 other	 examples	 see	
Akiva	Miller,	 'What	Do	We	Worry	About	When	we	Worry	About	Price	Discrimination?	The	Law	and	
Ethics	of	Using	Personal	Information	for	Pricing'	(2014)	19	Journal	of	Technology	Law	and	Policy	,	48-
54.	More	generally	see,	European	Data	Protection	Supervisor,	Privacy	and	Competitiveness	in	the	Age	
of	Big	Data:	the	 interplay	between	data	protection,	competition	 law	and	consumer	protection	 in	the	
digital	economy	(2014),	6-11.	
4	Case	C-209/10	Post	Danmark	A/S	v	Konkurrencerådet	[2012]	ECR	I-172,	para	30.	
5	The	so-called	 ‘Facebook’	emotional	contagion	experiments	 involved	A/B	testing,	which	provoked	a	
storm	of	outrage.	See	Adam	Kramer,	Jamie	Guillory	and	Jeremy	Hancock,	 'Experimental	Evidence	of	
Massive-Scale	Emotional	Contagion	through	Social	Networks'	 (2014)	24	Proceedings	of	 the	National	
Academy	 of	 Sciences	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 ;	 and	 Michelle	 Meyer,	 'Two	 Cheers	 for	
Corporate	 Experimentation	 -	 the	 A/B	 Illusion	 and	 the	 virtues	 of	 data-driven	 innovation'	 (2015)	 13	
Colorado	Technology	Law	Journal	.	
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practices	from	the	perspective	of	competition	law	through	which	we	seek	to	evaluate	ACPD	
by	 reference	 to	 two	 contrasting	 normative	 values:	 economic	 efficiency,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
and	 fairness	 or	 equity	 on	 the	 other. 6 	Competition	 law	 provides	 a	 unique	 lens	 for	
interrogating	 the	 social	 implications	 of	 ACPD	 due	 to	 its	 distinctive	 character	 as	 a	 form	 of	
‘economic	 law’	 that	 is	 intended	 to	 protect	 and	 strengthen	 the	 process	 of	 rivalry	 in	 the	
marketplace.	Although	‘traditional’	forms	of	price	discrimination	have	long	been	the	subject	
of	economic	analysis	to	evaluate	whether	they	are	economically	efficient,	algorithmic	price	
discrimination7	has	 hitherto	 attracted	 relatively	 little	 critical	 analysis	 despite	 concerns	
recently	expressed	by	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President.8	The	effects	of	market	practices	
on	economic	efficiency	are	a	matter	of	central	importance	to	competition	law,	because	this	
area	 of	 law	 rests	 on	 a	 fundamental	 tenet	 of	 economic	 theory:	 a	 belief	 that	 competitive	
markets	incentivise	firms	to	produce	better	quality	products	or	services	for	their	customers,	
and	 at	 lower	 costs,	 thereby	 enhancing	 collective	 welfare	 by	 facilitating	 the	 efficient	
allocation	 of	 society’s	 scarce	 resources.	 Accordingly,	 a	 rising	 belief	 by	 policy-makers	
worldwide	 in	the	positive	welfare	effects	of	markets	over	the	 last	40	years	has	also	seen	a	
rapid	proliferation	of	competition	laws	with	more	than	130	competition	law	regimes	now	in	
existence.	By	seeking	to	foster	the	competitive	processes	by	legal	intervention,	competition	
law	–	somewhat	paradoxically	–	 imposes	 legal	constraints	on	market	behaviour	 in	order	to	
address	problems	associated	with	market	 failure.	Our	concern	 is	with	EU	competition	 law,	
the	core	tenets	of	which	are	set	out	in	Articles	101	and	102	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	
																																								 																				
6	There	is	a	burgeoning	literature	on	big	data	and	competition	law	but	it	has	typically	focused	on	the	
relationship	between	big	data,	consumer	welfare	and	competition	law	more	generally,	rather	than	on	
the	specific	practices	that	Big	Data	makes	possible.	See	for	example:	Ariel	Ezrachi	and	Maurice	Stucke,	
'The	 Rise	 of	 Behavioural	 Discrimination'	 (2016)	 37	 European	 Competition	 Law	 Review	 ;	 Douglas	
Kochelek,	'Data	Mining	and	Antitrust'	(2009)	22	Harvard	Journal	of	Law	and	Technology	,	Daniel	Sokol	
and	 Roisin	 Comerford,	 'Does	 Antitrust	 Have	 a	 Role	 to	 Play	 in	 Regulating	 Big	 Data?'	 (2016)	 SSRN	 ,	
Darren	Tucker	and	Hill	Wellford,	'Big	Mistakes	Regarding	Big	Data'	(2014)	The	Antitrust	Source	;	(big	
data	and	market	power	assessments	 in	 competition	 law_;	Francisco	Costa-Cabral	and	Orla	 Lynskey,	
'The	 Internal	and	External	Constraints	of	Data	Protection	on	Competition	Law	 in	 the	EU'	 (2015)	LSE	
Law,	Society	and	Economy	Working	Papers	,	Neil	Averitt	and	Robert	Lande,	'Consumer	Sovereignty:	a	
unified	theory	of	antitrust	and	consumer	protection	 law'	(1997)	65	Antitrust	Law	Journal	 ,	Maureen	
Ohlhausen	and	Alexander	Okuliar,	 'Competition,	Consumer	Protection,	 and	 the	Right	 [Approach]	 to	
Privacy'	 (2015)	80	Antitrust	Law	Journal	 ,	 Supervisor,	Privacy	and	Competitiveness	 in	 the	Age	of	Big	
Data:	the	interplay	between	data	protection,	competition	law	and	consumer	protection	in	the	digital	
economy,	Oxera,	Behavioural	Economics	and	its	Impact	on	Competition	Policy	(2013),	Omer	Tene	and	
Jules	Polonetsky,	'Judged	by	the	Tin	Man:	individual	rights	in	the	age	of	big	data'	(2013)	11	Journal	on	
Telecommunications	 and	 High	 Technology	 Law	 ,	 Judith	 Mehta	 (ed),	 Behavioural	 Economics	 in	
Competition	 and	 Consumer	 Policy	 (2013),	 (exploring	 various	 intersections	 between	 big	 data,	
competition	 law,	 consumer	 law	 and	 privacy)	 -	 (the	 hidden	 costs	 of	 free	 goods).	 For	 a	 notable	
exception	see,	Miller,	 'What	Do	We	Worry	About	When	we	Worry	About	Price	Discrimination?	The	
Law	and	Ethics	of	Using	Personal	Information	for	Pricing'.	More	generally,	also	see	Pinar	Akman,	'To	
Abuse	or	Not	to	Abuse:	discrimination	between	consumers'	(2007)	European	Law	Review	.	As	regards	
the	 economics	 of	 privacy,	 for	 a	 recent	 and	 comprehensive	 review	of	 the	 literature	 see,	Alessandro	
Acquisti,	 Curtis	 Taylor	 and	 Liad	Wagma,	 'The	 Economics	 of	 Privacy'	 (2016)	 54	 Journal	 of	 Economic	
Literature	;	I	Png,	On	the	Value	of	Privacy	from	Telemarketing:	evidence	from	the	'Do	Not	Call'	registry	
(2007);	and	Scott	Savage	and	Donald	Waldman,	The	Value	of	Online	Privacy	(2013).	
7	It	 is	 theoretically	 possible	 to	 use	 ACPD	 to	 intentionally	 discriminate	 against	 certain	 individuals	 or	
groups,	this	is	not	the	focus	of	this	paper.	
8	Executive	Office	of	the	President	of	the	United	States	of	America,	Big	Data	and	Differential	Pricing,	
2015).	Cf	Miller,	'What	Do	We	Worry	About	When	we	Worry	About	Price	Discrimination?	The	Law	and	
Ethics	of	Using	Personal	Information	for	Pricing'.		
	 4	
of	 the	 European	 Union	 (the	 TFEU)9,	 focusing	 on	 whether	 ACPD	 would	 be	 regarded	 as	
unlawful	 under	 Article	 102	 TFEU,	 which	 prohibits	 ‘abuse’	 by	 particularly	 powerful	
(‘dominant’)	firms.10	
Given	 that	 the	 fundamental	 concern	 of	 competition	 law,	 today,	 is	 principally	 to	 promote	
economic	 efficiency,	 our	 analysis	 begins	 by	 applying	 economic	 theory	 to	 the	 practice	 of	
ACPD	to	 identify	whether	 it	enhances	or	diminishes	economic	efficiency.	For	 this	purpose,	
we	interpret	economic	efficiency	as	“consumer	surplus”11	which	is	“…the	aggregate	measure	
of	 the	 surplus	of	 all	 consumers.”12	The	 surplus	of	 an	 individual	 consumer	 is	 the	difference	
between	 what	 she	 is	 willing	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 good	 and	 the	 price	 of	 the	 good.	 Big	 Data	
techniques	 provide	 firms	 with	 the	 capacity	 to	 gather	 more	 information	 about	 their	
consumers’	willingness	to	pay.	If	firms	can	price	discriminate	between	consumers,	they	can	
charge	 lower	 prices	 to	 those	 with	 a	 lower	 willingness	 to	 pay	 compared	 with	 a	 regime	 in	
which	only	one	price	is	possible.	As	we	demonstrate	in	Section	2,	the	incentives	for	firms	to	
engage	 in	ACPD	often	exist.	We	find	that	consumers	are	 in	 the	aggregate	often	better	off,	
economically,	when	sellers	can	price	discriminate	in	this	way,	thereby	enhancing	consumer	
surplus.	However,	this	 is	not	always	the	case.	Furthermore,	whether	EU	competition	law	is	
solely	and	exclusively	concerned	with	economic	efficiency,	or	whether	it	provides	scope	for	
non-efficiency	 based	 considerations	 in	 the	 application	 of	 its	 provisions,	 is	 a	 matter	 of	
debate.	 Accordingly,	 in	 Section	 3	we	 evaluate	 ACPD	 by	 reference	 to	 its	 fairness	 or	 justice	
(which	we	also	call	equity)	understood	in	three	distinct	(and	sometimes	overlapping)	ways:	
(a)	the	perceived	fairness	of	pricing	practices;	(b)	unfair	dealing	between	online	retailers	and	
consumers	(corrective	justice);	and	(c)	fairness	as	a	requirement	of	distributive	(or	collective)	
justice.	For	each	of	these	understandings	of	fairness,	we	identify	points	of	convergence	and	
conflict	with	economic	evaluations	of	the	effects	of	ACPD	on	aggregate	consumer	welfare.		
No	 Article	 102	 cases	 have	 directly	 considered	 the	 legality	 of	 ACPD.	 Section	 4	 therefore	
interrogates	existing	Article	102	case	law	to	ascertain	whether	ACPD	would	likely	breach	this	
provision.	 Because	 the	 current	 legal	 position	 is	 unclear,	 Section	 5	 draws	 together	 the	
efficiency	 and	 fairness	 evaluations	 by	 considering	 whether	 ACPD	 should	 be	 regarded	 as	
unlawful	under	EU	competition	 law.	We	argue	 that	where	ACPD	 increases	both	 consumer	
surplus	and	fairness,	it	should	not	breach	Article	102.	Conversely,	where	ACPD	undermines	
both	consumer	welfare	and	 fairness,	 then	 such	practices	 should	be	unlawful	under	Article	
102.	However,	because	economic	and	fairness	evaluations	of	ACPD	may	conflict	 in	specific	
cases,	 Section	5	also	 considers	whether,	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	underlying	 justifications	 for	EU	
competition	law	and	the	EU’s	foundational	principles,	ACPD	should	be	considered	a	violation	
of	Article	102	where	it	undermines	justice	or	equity,	even	though	it	may	enhance	consumer	
surplus,	and	vice	versa.	We	deal	with	the	clashes	between	these	goals	in	two	ways:	first,	we	
offer	a	partial	reconciliation	between	these	goals,	by	supplementing	conventional	economic	
analysis	 with	 insights	 from	 behavioural	 economics,	 thus	 enabling	 some	 fairness	
																																								 																				
9	The	 Treaty	 on	 European	 Union	 (TEU)	 and	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 European	 Union	
(TFEU)	establish	the	European	Union	(EU).	They	should	be	read	together.	TEU	establishes	the	Union	
(Article	 1),	 provides	 for	 its	 democratic	 principles,	 institutional	 structure,	 etc.	 The	 TFEU	 “…organises	
the	functioning	of	the	Union	and	determines	the	areas,	the	scope	of,	and	arrangements	for	exercising	
its	competences.”,	Article	1(1).		
10	Article	 102	 TFEU’s	 text	 reads:	 “Any	 abuse	 by	 one	 or	 more	 undertakings	 of	 a	 dominant	 position	
within	the	 internal	market	or	 in	a	substantial	part	of	 it	shall	be	prohibited	as	 incompatible	with	the	
internal	market	in	so	far	as	it	may	affect	trade	between	Member	States.”	
The	EU’s	 competition	 rules	 are	 in	Articles	 101-109	TFEU.	Although	both	Articles	 101	 and	102	TFEU	
have	 been	 applied	 to	 mergers,	 the	 EU	 has	 operated	 a	 special	 merger	 regulation	 since	 1989.	 The	
current	merger	regulation	is	Council,	on	the	control	of	concentrations	between	undertakings	(2004).	
11	We	use	the	term	‘consumer	surplus’	and	‘consumer	welfare’	interchangeably.	
12	Massimo	Motta,	Competition	Policy:	theory	and	practice	(Cambridge	University	Press	2004),	18.	
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considerations	that	affect	consumer	welfare	to	be	taken	into	account.	Secondly,	we	suggest	
that	fairness	should	have	a	secondary	role	when	Article	102	is	applied	to	ACPD,	in	the	form	
of	a	‘defence’	to	an	allegation	of	abuse	of	market	power.	On	our	suggested	account,	ACPD	
which	reduces	consumer	surplus	may	nonetheless	avoid	falling	foul	of	Article	102	if	it	can	be	
justified	 on	 grounds	 of	 fairness.	 Section	 6	 concludes,	 suggesting	 that	 EU	 competition	 law	
may	have	a	valuable	but	 limited	role	 to	play	 in	 redressing	some	of	 the	adverse	 impacts	of	
ACPD,	 primarily	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 consumer	 welfare	 effects	 of	 ACPD,	 and	 in	 which	
considerations	 of	 fairness	 and	 justice	 play	 a	 relevant,	 but	 nonetheless	 subsidiary,	 role.	
Competition	 law	 cannot,	 and	 should	 not,	 seek	 to	 solve	 all	 the	 social	 problems	 associated	
with	market	behaviour,	including	data-driven	forms	of	personalised	pricing.	Our	conclusions	
should	not,	however,	be	interpreted	as	suggesting	that	such	concerns	do	not	warrant	a	legal	
response:	 merely	 that	 competition	 law	 is	 not	 in	 our	 view	 the	 most	 appropriate	 legal	
instrument	through	which	to	address	them.	Identifying	other	avenues	for	legal	intervention	
to	redress	these	concerns,	or	a	close	consideration	of	the	interaction	between	competition	
law	and	other	areas	of	law	that	may	have	a	role	to	play	in	responding	to	ACPD,	are	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	paper.	
2. The	Economics	of	ACPD	
The	 advent	 of	 Big	 Data	 provides	 firms	 with	more	 opportunities	 to	 obtain	 information	 on	
consumer	 preferences	 and	 their	 willingness	 to	 pay.	 This	 information	 may	 be	 public	 or	
private,	and	could	be	based	both	on	the	observed	characteristics	of	the	individual	e.g.	their	
location,	age,	gender,	employment	status,	or	on	their	observed	behaviour,	e.g.	whether	they	
have	 previously	made	 a	 purchase,	 their	 responsiveness	 to	 previous	 price	 offers	 and	 their	
search	histories.13	This	 information,	together	with	the	greater	technical	ability	for	sellers	to	
offer	 consumers	 personalised	 prices,	may	 lead	 to	more,	 and	more	 refined	 forms	 of	 price	
discrimination.		
When	firms	have	more	information	on	consumer	preferences	it	can	provide	them	with	more	
opportunities	to	extract	consumer	surplus	using	ACPD.	While	this	may	lead	to	a	reduction	in	
aggregate	 consumer	 surplus,	 consumers	 may	 also	 benefit	 from	 ACPD	 and	 aggregate	
consumer	surplus	may	increase.		
One	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 consumers	 are	 not	 necessarily	 passive	 or	 powerless	 in	 this	
relationship.	Consumers	may	choose	not	to	reveal	their	information,	or	they	may	choose	to	
act	 strategically,	 for	example,	delaying	purchases	 in	 the	expectation	 that	 sellers	will	 lower	
prices	at	a	later	date.	Sellers	may	therefore	have	to	offer	incentives	to	consumers	to	reveal	
information	about	their	preferences	and	willingness	to	pay.		
But	a	more	fundamental	reason	is	that	when	suppliers	have	more	information	on	consumer	
preferences	 this	 can	 change	 the	 nature	 of	 competition.	 In	many	models,	 this	 can	 lead	 to	
more	intensive	cut-throat	competition,	although	it	may	also	dampen	competition	depending	
upon	the	type	of	information	that	is	used	to	condition	prices.	
The	 relationship	 between	 information,	 ACPD,	 and	 consumer	 outcomes	 is	 therefore	 a	
complex	one.	In	this	section	we	seek	to	draw	out	the	main	insights	that	economic	theory	has	
to	offer	on	this	 issue.	We	begin	by	examining	classic	models	of	price	discrimination,	which	
are	 based	 on	 a	 monopolist	 (single	 seller)	 acting	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 publicly	 available	
information.	 We	 then	 examine	 how	 the	 conclusions	 of	 these	 models	 change	 once	
consumers	can	choose	between	competing	sellers.	We	then	consider	the	 incentives	sellers	
may	 need	 to	 offer	 consumers	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 collect	 private	 information	 on	 consumer	
																																								 																				
13	Thomas	 Gehrig,	 Oz	 Shy	 and	 Rune	 Stenbacka,	 'A	 Welfare	 Evaluation	 of	 History-Based	 Price	
Discrimination'	(2012)	12	Journal	of	Industry,	Competition	&	Trade	.	
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preferences	 and	 willingness	 to	 pay.	 Finally,	 we	 consider	 some	 policy	 implications	 of	 this	
analysis.	We	highlight	three	issues:		
(i)	 Is	price	discrimination	only	harmful	to	consumers	where	sellers	have	substantial	market	
power?;	
(ii)	Should	there	be	any	restrictions	on	sellers	collecting	customer	information?;	and		
(iii)	What	distributional	issues	does	ACPD	raise?	
2.1	 Classic	models	–	price	discrimination	by	a	single	firm	monopolist	
Standard	textbook	treatments	of	price	discrimination,	such	as	Varian14,	consider	the	welfare	
effects	 of	 price	 discrimination	 as	 practised	 by	 a	 monopolist.	 Three	 main	 types	 of	 price	
discrimination	 are	 identified	 which	 differ	 in	 the	 information	 assumed	 to	 be	 held	 by	 the	
monopolist:	
i. 1st	 degree	 price	 discrimination	 –	 where	 the	 monopolist	 has	 perfect	 information	
about	each	individual	consumers’	willingness	to	pay.	
ii. 2nd	degree	price	discrimination	–	where	the	monopolist	has	no	ex	ante	 information	
about	 an	 individual	 consumers’	 willingness	 to	 pay,	 but	 consumers	 reveal	 (some)	
information	 about	 their	 preferences	 through	 their	 purchase	 decisions,	 e.g.	 a	
business	traveller	may	identify	themselves	as	having	a	relatively	high	willingness	to	
pay	by	booking	close	to	departure	time	or	by	choosing	an	unrestricted	fare.	
iii. 3rd	 degree	 price	 discrimination	 –	 where	 a	 monopolist	 has	 imperfect	 information	
about	an	individuals’	willingness	and	charges	prices	to	different	individual	customers	
(or	groups	of	customers)	based	on	their	observed	characteristics	or	behaviour,	e.g.	
discounts	to	senior	citizens,	or	lower	prices	to	new	customers.		
Arguably	 ACPD	 most	 closely	 resembles	 3rd	 degree	 price	 discrimination	 in	 that	 suppliers	
observe	consumer	characteristics	and	behaviour	that	 is	correlated	with	their	willingness	to	
pay.15	They	 can	 then	 use	 this	 information	 to	 offer	 personalised	 prices	 and/or	 present	
customers	with	an	individually	tailored	digital	‘shop	floor’.	While	Big	Data	allows	suppliers	to	
obtain	 better	 estimates	 of	 individual	 consumer	 preferences	 and	 willingness	 to	 pay,	
inevitably	personalised	prices	are	based	on	imperfect	(3rd	degree	price	discrimination)	rather	
than	perfect	(1st	degree	price	discrimination)	information.		
Price	 discrimination	 (as	 practised	 by	 a	 monopolist)	 has	 three	 main	 effects	 on	 aggregate	
consumer	surplus	(compared	to	uniform	pricing):	
i. A	rent	transfer	effect	–	if	a	monopoly	supplier	can	price	discriminate	it	has	a	wider	
range	of	pricing	options	which	it	can	use	to	increase	its	profits	(rents)	at	the	expense	
of	consumers.		
ii. A	 (mis-)allocation	 effect	 –	 under	 price	 discrimination,	 output	 is	 not	 necessarily	
allocated	to	those	consumers	that	value	it	the	most.		
																																								 																				
14	Hal	 Varian,	 Intermediate	Microeconomics:	 a	modern	approach	 (Nineth	 Edition	 edn,	W.W.	Norton	
and	Co.	2014).	
15	This	 view	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 definition	 adopted	 by	 the	 OFT	 see:	 “The	 economics	 of	 online	
personalised	 pricing”,	 OFT	 (2013)	 para.	 2.9	 “we	 take	 personalised	 pricing	 to	 mean	 direct	 price	
discrimination	that	is	imperfect	but	sophisticated.	In	other	words,	for	the	purposes	of	this	report,	we	
take	personalised	pricing	to	mean	sophisticated	third-degree	price	discrimination.”	
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iii. An	output	effect	–	price	discrimination	will	often,	but	not	 invariably,	16	result	 in	an	
increase	 in	 output	 by	 allowing	 the	 seller	 to	 offer	 lower	 prices	 to	 consumers	 (or	
markets)	that	were	previously	not	served	at	the	uniform	price.	
The	rent	transfer	and	allocation	effects	tend	to	reduce	consumer	surplus,	while	the	output	
effect	usually	increases	it.	The	overall	impact	of	3rd	degree	price	discrimination	on	consumer	
surplus	 is	 therefore	 ambiguous.	 However,	 Cowan	 argues	 that	 3rd	 degree	 monopoly	 price	
discrimination	will	typically	reduce	consumer	surplus,	but	there	are	plausible	circumstances	
in	which	it	can	increase.17	Bergemann	et	al	reach	a	similar	conclusion.18	
We	know	from	the	1st	degree	price	discrimination	model	that	when	a	monopolist	has	perfect	
information	on	consumer	willingness	to	pay,	output	and	total	economic	surplus	(consumer	
surplus	 plus	 producer	 surplus)	 increase	 compared	 to	 uniform	 pricing,	 but	 this	 is	 at	 the	
expense	of	consumer	surplus	which	is	entirely	eliminated.	This	gives	rise	to	the	intuition	that	
information	 benefits	 firms	 and	 harms	 consumer.	 As	 Armstrong	 notes,	 “It	 is	 consumers’	
private	information	that	protects	them	against	giving	up	their	surplus	to	a	monopoly”.	19	
These	 classic	 models	 have	 been	 highly	 influential	 in	 shaping	 economic	 thinking	 on	 price	
discrimination.	But,	in	our	view	they	have	very	little	to	say	about	the	likely	impact	of	ACPD	
on	consumers	as:		
i. ACPD	tends	to	occur	in	imperfectly	competitive	rather	than	monopolistic	markets.	In	
imperfectly	 competitive	markets,	 the	 type	of	 information	 used	 to	 condition	 prices	
can	be	very	different	to	that	in	monopoly	markets,	and	this,	in	turn,	can	lead	to	very	
different	consumer	outcomes.	
	
ii. Classic	models	 assume	 that	 the	 type	 and	 accuracy	 of	 information	 available	 to	 the	
monopolist	 is	exogenous.	This	neglects	perhaps	one	of	the	most	 important	aspects	
of	ACPD,	namely	that	firms	often	choose	to	collect	substantial	additional	amounts	of	
information	on	consumer	preferences	in	order	to	meet	their	customer	needs	and/or	
secure	a	competitive	advantage.	
	
iii. Classic	models	assume	that	consumers	are	passive.	However,	an	important	aspect	of	
markets	in	which	ACPD	is	practised	is	that	consumers	may	choose	to	act	strategically	
through	actively	 sharing	or	hiding	 their	 information	or	 through	delaying	purchases	
to	entice	the	supplier	to	offer	a	lower	price.	
These	 three	 features	 greatly	 complicate	 the	 relationship	 between	 information,	 price	
discrimination	 and	 consumer	 surplus,	 so	 that	 the	 intuition	 that	 more	 information	 on	
consumer	preferences	benefits	firms	and	harms	consumers	will	not	always	hold.	We	look	at	
each	of	these	features	in	turn.	
	
																																								 																				
16	For	example,	if	demand	functions	are	linear,	output	with	3rd	degree	price	discrimination	is	identical	
to	that	where	uniform	prices	are	charged,	see,	A	Pigou,	The	Economics	of	Welfare	(Macmillan	1920)	
17	The	net	effect	on	consumer	surplus	depends	primarily	on	the	curvature	of	the	consumer	demand	
function,	 see	 Iñaki	 Aguirre,	 Simon	 Cowan	 and	 John	 Vickers,	 'Monopoly	 Price	 Discrimination	 and	
Demand	Curvature'	(2010)	100	The	American	Economic	Review	1601.	
18	Dirk	Bergemann,	Benjamin	Brooks	and	Stephen	Morris,	 'The	Limits	of	Price	Discrimination'	 (2015)	
105	American	Economic	Review	921.	
19	Mark	 Armstrong,	 'Recent	 Developments	 in	 the	 Economics	 of	 Price	 Discrimination'	 in	 Richard	
Blundell,	Whitney	Newey	and	Torsten	Persson	(eds),	Advances	in	Economics	and	Econometrics:	theory	
and	applications:	Ninth	World	Congress,	vol	II	(Advances	in	Economics	and	Econometrics:	theory	and	
applications:	Ninth	World	Congress,	Cambridge	University	Press	2006).	
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2.2	 Price	discrimination	in	imperfectly	competitive20	markets	
In	 imperfectly	 competitive	 markets	 the	 relationship	 between	 information,	 ACPD,	 and	
consumer	surplus	is	considerably	more	complex.	A	key	insight	of	the	economic	literature	is	
that,	 in	 these	markets,	 price	 discrimination	 can	 either	 increase	 or	 reduce	 the	 intensity	 of	
price	 competition,	 depending	 upon	 the	 particular	 type	 of	 information	 used	 as	 a	 basis	 for	
offering	personalised	prices.	
As	we	saw	above,	in	monopoly	markets,	price	discrimination	is	usually	based	on	estimates	of	
a	consumers’	willingness	to	pay	i.e.	the	maximum	price	an	individual	is	prepared	to	pay	for	
an	 additional	 unit	 of	 a	 good	 or	 service.	 However,	 this	 form	 of	 price	 discrimination	 is	 not	
feasible	where	there	is	competition	as	consumers	may	simply	switch	to	an	alternative	brand.		
Price	discrimination	in	imperfectly	competitive	markets	has	therefore	to	be	conditioned	on	a	
different	type	of	consumer	information.	Two	main	types	may	be	distinguished:		
i. The	 additional	 value	 a	 consumer	 receives	 from	purchasing	 a	 good	or	 service	 from	
one	particular	supplier	over	another	(brand	preference	/	switching	costs);	and	
	
ii. The	cost	incurred	by	consumers	in	comparing	differing	brands	(search	costs).21	
Access	 to	 both	 types	 of	 consumer	 information	 allows	 sellers	 the	 possibility	 of	 charging	
higher	prices	to	those	customers	that	are	relative	price	inelastic	(i.e.	 insensitive	to	changes	
in	 price).	 This	 price	 insensitivity	 may	 arise	 for	 example	 where	 a	 customer	 has	 a	 strong	
preference	for	a	particular	suppliers’	brand	or	where	they	would	incur	costs	in	switching	to	a	
rivals’	brand.		
Alternatively,	price	insensitivity	may	result	from	higher	search	costs.	Consumers	that	do	not	
search,	 for	 example,	 because	 they	 have	 high	 search	 costs	 or	 because	 they	 are	 impulsive,	
inattentive	or	otherwise	economically	unsophisticated	purchasers,	mark	themselves	out	as	
being	 price	 insensitive.	 Accordingly,	 they	 may	 be	 charged	 a	 higher	 price	 than	 those	 that	
search	more	widely	and	make	more	considered	purchases.		
Although	these	two	types	of	consumer	information	appear	similar,	the	economic	effects	on	
competition	 and	 consumers	 can	 be	 very	 different:	 price	 discrimination	 based	 on	 brand	
preference	 tends	 to	 intensify	 competition22	(and	 increase	 aggregate	 consumer	 surplus),	
whereas	 price	 discrimination	 based	 on	 search	 costs	 tends	 to	 weaken	 competition	 (and	
reduce	 consumer	 surplus).	 The	 intuition	 underlying	 this	 is	 that	 with	 respect	 to	 brand	
preferences,	 each	 seller	 has	 a	 “strong”	 group	 of	 customers	 that	 prefer	 its	 brand,	 and	 a	
“weak”	 group	 of	 potential	 customers	 that	 prefers	 the	 brand	 of	 a	 rival	 seller.	 The	 strong	
																																								 																				
20	In	 imperfect	competitive	markets	there	 is	rivalry	between	two	or	more	firms,	but	 individual	 firms	
may	retain	some	degree	of	market	power,	i.e.	an	ability	to	raise	price	above	marginal	cost.	
21	In	 the	 standard	Hoteling	model	 consumer	utility	depends	upon	 the	valuation	of	 the	product,	 the	
price,	and	 the	“transport	cost”	between	 the	good	 that	best	matches	a	consumer’s	preferences	and	
the	 goods	 that	 are	 available.	 The	 “transport	 cost”	 is,	 itself,	 decomposed	 into	 a	 distance	 (d)	 and	 a	
cost/unit	 of	 distance	 (t)	 parameter.	 Armstrong,	 'Recent	 Developments	 in	 the	 Economics	 of	 Price	
Discrimination'	refers	to	the	former	as	“brand	preference”	and	the	 latter	as	“choosiness”.	We	think	
that	“cost	of	search”	is	perhaps	a	more	intuitive	notion	of	the	t	parameter.	
22	An	 exception	 to	 this	 is	 the	 dynamic	 model	 presented	 by	 Shy	 et	 al,	 which	 shows	 that	 price	
discrimination	 can	 reduce	 the	 intensity	 of	 competition	 in	 declining	 markets.	 In	 growing	 markets	
however	they	obtain	the	standard	result	that	price	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	brand	preferences	
or	 switching	 costs	 intensifies	 competition,	 Oz	 Shy,	 Rune	 Stenbacka	 and	David	 Hao	 Zhang,	 'History-
Based	 versus	Uniform	Pricing	 in	Growing	 and	Declining	Markets'	 (2016)	 48	 International	 Journal	 of	
Industrial	Organisation	.	
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customers	for	one	seller	are	the	weak	customers	of	its	rival.23	Each	seller	will	seek	to	charge	
higher	 prices	 to	 those	 that	 prefer	 its	 brand,	 while	 discounting	 heavily	 to	 attract	 the	
customers	of	rival	brands.	It	is	these	targeted	price	cuts	–	aimed	at	winning	customers	from	
rival	 suppliers	 –	 that	 lead	 to	 an	 intensification	 of	 competition,	 lower	 average	 prices	 and	
higher	aggregate	consumer	surplus	compared	to	uniform	pricing.	
The	 opposite	 situation	 applies	 when	 price	 discrimination	 is	 based	 on	 information	 on	
customer	search	costs.	Here	all	sellers	want	to	charge	low	prices	to	(“weak”)	customers	who	
search	 out	 the	 lowest	 price	 and	 high	 prices	 to	 “strong”	 consumers	who	 have	 high	 search	
costs	 e.g.	 those	 that	 do	 not	 shop	 around	 and	 those	 that	 make	 impulsive	 purchasing	
decisions.	 The	 “strong”	 customers	 are	 the	 same	 for	 both	 sellers.24	But,	 because	 these	
customers	are	price	insensitive	there	is	limited	incentive	to	compete	aggressively	by	offering	
lower	prices.	As	a	result,	this	type	of	price	discrimination	can	weaken	competition	compared	
to	uniform	pricing.	
Most	attention	in	the	academic	literature	on	price	discrimination	in	imperfectly	competitive	
markets	has	focused	on	price	discrimination	based	on	brand	preference	(including	switching	
costs).	Thisse	and	Vives	set	out	what	has	become	a	benchmark	model	to	analyse	this	effect.	
Their	model	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 first-degree	 price	 discrimination	model,25	in	 that	 sellers	 have	
perfect	and	publically	available	information	on	each	individual	consumer’s	willingness	to	pay	
(including	 their	brand	preferences).	However,	 rather	 than	 there	being	a	monopolist,	 there	
are	two	competing	sellers.	The	authors	show	that	where	customers’	brand	preferences	are	
uniformly	distributed	between	the	two	firms,	not	only	are	consumers	better	off	in	aggregate	
with	 price	 discrimination	 (compared	 to	 uniform	 pricing)	 but	 all	 consumers	 are	 at	 least	 as	
well	off.26	
Chen	 presents	 a	 similar	 model,	 but	 where	 price	 discrimination	 is	 based	 on	 customer	
switching	costs	rather	than	brand	preferences.27	This	generates	a	similar	result	to	Thisse	and	
Vives	with	 all	 consumers	 being	 at	 least	 as	well	 off	with	 price	 discrimination	 compared	 to	
uniform	pricing.		
In	 the	 above	 models,	 there	 are	 two	 conflicting	 effects:	 sellers	 would	 like	 to	 price	
discriminate	to	earn	more	rents	from	customers	with	a	relatively	high	brand	preference	(the	
rent-seeking	effect),	but	they	would	also	prefer	to	avoid	price	discrimination	as	it	intensifies	
competition	 (the	 intensification	 of	 competition	 effect).	 In	 all	 of	 the	 above	 models,	 the	
intensification	of	competition	effect	dominates	the	rent-seeking	effect.		
In	 a	 more	 general	 model,	 Ulph	 and	 Vulcan	 show	 that	 the	 intensification	 of	 competition	
effect	typically	dominates	the	rent-seeking	effect.28	As	a	result,	prices	are	lower	for	nearly	all	
consumers	 under	 price	 discrimination	 based	 on	 brand	 preferences	 compared	 to	 uniform	
prices.	 Only	 where	 consumers	 have	 extremely	 strong	 preferences	 for	 one	 seller	 over	
another	does	the	rent-seeking	effect	dominate.		
However,	the	above	models	assume	that	the	strong	customers	for	one	seller	are	the	weak	
customers	 for	 their	 rival	 (referred	 to	 in	 the	 technical	 literature	 as	 ‘best-response	
asymmetry’).	This	 is	typically	the	case	with	price	discrimination	based	on	brand	preference	
																																								 																				
23	This	is	known	as	best-response	asymmetry,	see	Kenneth	Corts,	'Third-Degree	Price	Discrimination	in	
Oligopoly:	all-out	competition	and	strategic	commitment'	(1998)	29	Rand	Journal	of	Economics	.	
24	This	is	known	as	best-response	symmetry,	ibid.		
25	See	text	around	footnote	14.	
26	J.-F.	 Thisse	 and	 X	 Vives,	 'On	 the	 Strategic	 Choice	 of	 Spatial	 Price	 Policy'	 (1988)	 78	 American	
Economic	Review	122.	
27	Y	Chen,	'Paying	Customers	to	Switch'	(1997)	6	Journal	of	Economics	and	Management	Strategy	877.	
28	David	Ulph	and	Nir	Vulkan,	Electronic	Commerce	and	Competitive	First-Degree	Price	Discrimination,	
2000).	
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(including	switching	costs).	However,	if	instead	the	strong	customers	for	each	seller	are	the	
same	(‘best-response	symmetry’)	–	as	we	may	expect	when	price	discrimination	is	based	on	
search	costs	–	then	price	discrimination	can	weaken	competition	making	consumers	worse	
off	 in	 aggregate.	Armstrong	 and	Vickers	 show	 this	 formally.	 In	 their	model,	when	 there	 is	
best-response	symmetry	price	discrimination	reduces	aggregate	consumer	surplus	provided	
that	there	is	sufficient	competition	in	the	market.29	
A	 somewhat	 different	 type	 of	 price	 discrimination	 arises	 where	 sellers	 charge	 different	
prices	depending	upon	a	buyer’s	search	history.	For	example,	a	seller	may	offer	a	potential	
buyer	a	relatively	low	initial	price	if	they	were	to	buy	immediately	and	a	higher	price	if	they	
return	 to	 make	 a	 purchase	 having	 unsuccessfully	 searched	 for	 a	 better	 offer	 from	 rival	
suppliers.	This	closely	resembles	the	mahjong	tiles	example	in	the	introduction.	In	a	recent	
paper30,	Armstrong	and	Zhou	show	that	 this	 type	of	price	discrimination	–	a	 form	of	best-
response	 symmetry	 –	 can	 dampen	 competition	 through	 deterring	 search.	 In	 their	 model	
price	discrimination	always	reduces	aggregate	consumer	surplus.	 Interestingly,	 this	 type	of	
price	discrimination	is	capable	of	raising	the	search	costs	of	all	types	of	consumers,	even	the	
most	 rational,	 well-informed,	 and	 engaged.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 all	 consumers	
could	be	made	worse	off	with	this	form	of	price	discrimination	when	compared	to	uniform	
pricing.31	
	
2.3	 Price	discrimination	with	more	detailed	information	on	consumer	preferences		
In	 standard	 (monopoly)	 models	 of	 price	 discrimination,	 the	 more	 detailed	 and	 accurate	
information	 a	 supplier	 has	 on	 consumer	 preferences,	 the	 greater	 are	 the	 profits	 it	 can	
extract	and	the	 lower	 is	aggregate	consumer	surplus.	But	does	 this	hold	 in	markets	where	
there	is	imperfect	competition?	
One	 approach	 to	 this	 question	 is	 to	 simulate	 how	 consumer	 outcomes	 change	 when	
suppliers	 have	more	detailed	 and	 accurate	 information	on	 consumer	preferences.	 Esteves	
provides	 one	 of	 the	most	 intuitive	models	 of	 this	 type.	32	In	 this	model,	 all	 suppliers	 have	
private	 information	 on	 their	 own	 consumers’	 preferences.	 However,	 the	 accuracy	 of	 this	
information	can	vary:	at	one	extreme,	 there	 is	no	usable	 information;	at	 the	other	perfect	
information.	 The	more	 accurate	 is	 the	 information,	 the	 greater	 are	 the	 opportunities	 for	
sellers	 to	 earn	 rents	 at	 the	 expense	of	 consumers,	 but	 also	 the	 greater	 is	 the	 intensity	 of	
competition.	 The	 competition	 effect	 dominates,	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 aggregate	 consumer	
surplus	increases	as	information	on	consumer	preferences	becomes	more	accurate.		
Shy	and	Stenbacka	examine	whether	consumer	outcomes	are	better	where	information	on	
individual	consumer	preferences	 is:	a)	available	to	all	sellers,	b)	available	only	to	the	seller	
the	 consumer	 previously	 purchased	 from,	 or	 c)	 not	 available	 to	 any	 seller.	 In	 this	model,	
consumers	 do	 best	 where	 no	 seller	 has	 information	 on	 individual	 consumer	 preferences.	
However,	 if	 the	 consumers’	 previous	 supplier	 has	 collected	 information	 on	 their	
																																								 																				
29	Mark	 Armstrong	 and	 John	 Vickers,	 'Competitive	 Price	 Discrimination'	 (2001)	 32	 Rand	 Journal	 of	
Economics	579.	
30	Mark	Armstrong	and	Jidong	Zhou,	'Search,	Deterrence'	(2016)	83	Review	of	Economic	Studies	26.	
31	All	of	the	above	models	are	based	on	the	assumption	that	suppliers	choose	to	compete	rather	than	
to	collude	(or,	equivalently,	that	collusion	is	infeasible).	Ezrachi	and	Stucke,	however,	argue	that	ACPD	
may	make	collusion	more	 feasible	 through	providing	additional	mechanisms	to	monitor	compliance	
with	 a	 collusive	 agreement	 and	 to	 make	 punishment	 strategies	 by	 suppliers	 more	 credible	 and	
effective,	Ariel	Ezrachi	and	Maurice	Stucke,	Virtual	Competition	(Harvard	University	Press	2016),	Part	
II.	This	form	of	anti-competitive	behaviour	is	not	part	of	this	paper’s	Article	102	focus.	
32	Rosa-Branca	 Esteves,	 'Price	 Discrimination	 with	 Private	 and	 Imperfect	 Information'	 (2014)	 116	
Scandinavian	Journal	of	Economics	.	
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preferences,	consumers	are	better	off	where	this	information	is	shared	with	all	sellers	in	the	
market.33		
The	 Shy	 and	 Stenbacka	 results	 emphasises	 a	 common	 finding	 of	 the	 literature	 that	
consumers	 can	 both	 benefit	 and	 be	 harmed	where	 information	 on	 their	 preferences	 and	
willingness	 to	 pay	 is	 made	 available	 to	 sellers,	 depending	 largely	 upon	 whether	 this	
information	 increases	or	reduces	price	competition.	This	 in	turn	depends	upon	the	type	of	
information	collected,	and	the	economic	model.34	
Although	the	above	models	provide	important	insights,	they	retain	the	assumption	in	classic	
price	 discrimination	 models	 that	 information	 is	 exogenous.	 This	 arguably	 ignores	 a	 key	
feature	of	Big	Data,	namely	that	suppliers	make	strategic	choices	as	to	how	much,	and	what	
type	of	 information	on	 consumer	preferences	 to	 collect,	 or	 indeed	whether	 to	 collect	 any	
information	at	all.	These	strategic	choices	matter	as	they	have	the	potential	to	influence	the	
nature	of	price	competition	and	with	it,	consumer	outcomes.	
The	 economic	 literature	 analyses	 this	 issue	 using	 dynamic	 models	 which	 allow	 the	
information	available	to	sellers	to	evolve	over	time.	Suppliers	are	able	to	choose	how	much	
data	to	collect,	which	they	can	do	through	a	variety	of	means.	Examples	 include	providing	
incentives	to	consumers	to	share	their	data	(e.g.	through	offering	discounts,	additional	‘free’	
services	or	the	opportunity	to	win	prizes),	through	the	use	of	tracking	devices	with	different	
levels	of	accuracy,	or	through	observing	how	consumers	respond	to	different	price	offers.	
One	of	the	most	well-known	of	these	dynamic	models	is	by	Fudenberg	and	Tirole.	They	use	a	
two-period	model	in	which	in	the	first	period	the	two	competing	sellers	have	no	information	
about	consumers’	brand	preferences	and	so	charge	a	single	price	to	all	consumers.	However,	
customers	 that	 make	 a	 purchase	 in	 the	 first	 period	 reveal	 their	 brand	 preference,	 while	
those	 that	do	not	buy	 reveal	a	 low	willingness	 to	pay	 for	any	brand.	 In	 the	 second	period	
sellers	set	three	different	prices:	a	price	to	their	previous	customers;	a	“poaching”	price	for	
those	 that	 previously	 bought	 from	 their	 rival;	 and	 a	 price	 to	 consumers	 who	 made	 no	
purchase.	 In	 this	 model,	 this	 type	 of	 price	 discrimination	 intensifies	 competition	 and	 all	
consumers	are	at	least	as	well	off	compared	to	uniform	pricing.35		
Other	dynamic	 approaches	by	Villas-Boas,	 and	by	Caminal	 and	Matutes	use	 very	different	
models	 but	 generate	 similar	 results	 with	 price	 discrimination	 increasing	 competition	 and	
reducing	 profits.36	In	 these	 models,	 aggregate	 consumer	 surplus	 is	 higher	 with	 price	
discrimination	 compared	 to	 uniform	pricing,	 although	 not	 every	 consumer	 is	made	 better	
off.37	However	 this	 is	 not	 a	 general	 result.	 For	 example,	 Chen	 and	 Zhang	 show	 that	
consumers	in	aggregate	can	be	made	worse	off	where	sellers	are	able	to	price	discriminate	
																																								 																				
33	Oz	Shy	and	Rune	Stenbacka,	 'Customer	Privacy	and	Competition'	(2015)	Journal	of	Economics	and	
Management	Strategy	.	
34	For	an	example	of	where	increased	quality	of	 information	increases	competition,	see:	Q	Liu	and	K	
Serfes,	'Quality	of	Information	and	Oligopolistic	Price	Discrimination'	(2004)	13	Journal	of		Economics	
and	Management	 Strategy	 671;,	 and	 S	 Colombo,	 'Imperfect	 Behaviour-based	 Price	 Discrimination'	
(2015)	 25	 Journal	 of	 Economics	 and	 Management	 Strategy	 .	 For	 a	 counter	 example	 where	 more	
information	 dampens	 competition	 see:	Q	 	 Liu	 and	 J	 Shuai,	 'Multi-dimensional	 Price	 Discrimination'	
(2013)	31	International	Journal	of	Industrial	Organisation		
35	D	Fudenberg	and	Jean	Tirole,	'Customer	Poaching	and	Brand	Switching.'	(2000)	31	RAND	Journal	of	
Economics	634.	
36	J	 Villas-Boas,	 'Dynamic	 Competition	 with	 Customer	 Recognition'	 (1999)	 30	 RAND	 Journal	 of	
Economics	 604;	 and	 R	 Caminal	 and	 C	Matutes,	 'Endogenous	 Switching	 Costs	 in	 a	 Duopoly	Model'	
(1990)	8	International	Journal	of	Industrial	Organisation	353.	
37	Customers	 with	 high	 brand	 loyalty	 may	 lose	 out,	 together	 with	 those	 that	 take	 the	 strategic	
decision	 to	 defer	 purchases	 (and	 thereby	 purchasing	 one	 rather	 than	 two	 units)	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 a	
lower	price.	
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based	on	purchase	history.	In	their	model,	sellers	set	high	prices	to	screen	out	price	sensitive	
customers,	and	in	doing	so,	they	moderate	competition.38		
In	the	above	dynamic	models	the	information	on	consumer	preferences	is	public	knowledge.	
Choe	 et	 al.39	make,	 arguably,	 the	more	 realistic	 and	 relevant	 assumption	 (for	 ACPD),	 that	
firms	 use	 tracking	 devices	 to	 obtain	 (private)	 and	 detailed	 information	 about	 their	 own	
customers’	brand	preferences	but	have	only	limited	information	on	the	preferences	of	other	
consumers.	 In	 their	 model,	 the	 use	 of	 tracking	 devices	 increases	 competition,	 reduces	
profits,	and	increases	aggregate	consumer	surplus.	Nearly	all	consumers	benefit	 from	their	
preferences	 being	 revealed	 –	 only	 a	 small	 fraction	 of	 customers	with	 the	 strongest	 brand	
preferences	pay	more.		
This	model	is	very	similar	to	that	of	Fudenberg	and	Tirole	above,	the	key	difference	being	in	
the	information	available	to	suppliers.	Whereas	in	the	Fudenberg	and	Tirole	model	suppliers	
are	only	able	to	distinguish	between	broad	categories	of	customers	(loyal,	switchers,	new),	
in	Choe	et	al.	 the	use	of	 tracking	devices	allows	suppliers	 to	charge	personalised	prices	 to	
customers	based	on	precise	estimates	of	their	willingness	to	pay.40	This	more	refined	form	of	
price	discrimination	allows	more	scope	for	suppliers	to	extract	rents	from	consumers.	But,	it	
also	 results	 in	 more	 intensive	 price	 competition.	 The	 competition	 effect	 dominates,	 with	
aggregate	consumer	surplus	being	greater	where	suppliers	have	more	precise	estimates	of	
consumer	preferences	and	willingness	to	pay.		
So,	 in	 this	 model,	 more	 information	 harms	 firms41	and	 benefits	 consumers	 –	 the	 precise	
opposite	of	the	standard	conclusion	in	monopoly	models.42	
2.4	 The	role	of	consumers	
The	effectiveness	of	ACPD	depends	upon	 the	 information	 that	 sellers	have	on	 consumers’	
willingness	to	pay,	much	of	which	comes	from	observed	consumer	behaviour,	e.g.	through	
tracking	 devices.	 However,	 consumers	may	 be	 able	 to	 act	 strategically	 to	 distort	 or	 block	
that	 information	 through,	 for	 example,	 deferring	 purchases	 (mimicking	 the	 behaviour	 of	
buyers	 with	 a	 low	 willingness	 to	 pay),	 deleting	 cookies	 or	 using	 alternative	 IP	 or	 email	
addresses.		
Do	buyers	obtain	lower	prices	by	acting	strategically	in	this	way,	or	would	they	do	better	by	
willingly	allowing	their	data	to	be	shared	with	suppliers?	
In	 a	 thought-provoking	 paper,	 Acquisti	 and	 Varian	 consider	 the	 effects	 of	 price	
discrimination	in	markets	where	firms	are	able	to	track	consumer	behaviour	using	cookies.43	
In	 their	 model	 consumers	 can	 choose	 to	 accept	 or	 delete	 cookies,	 so	 sellers	 must	 offer	
incentives	 to	 customers	 to	 get	 them	 to	 reveal	 information	 about	 their	willingness	 to	 pay.	
They	do	this	by	offering	value	added	services,	such	as	preferential	access	to	new	products	to	
consumers	 that	 register	 on	 line	 for	 products.	 Often	 such	 value-added	 services	 may	 be	
																																								 																				
38	Y	Chen	and	Z	Zhang,	 'Dynamic	Targeted	Pricing	with	Strategic	Consumers'	 (2009)	27	 International	
Journal	of	Industrial	Organization	43.	
39	Choe,	C.,	King,	S.,	and	Matsushima,	N.,	“Pricing	with	Cookies:	Behavior	Based	Price	Discrimination	
and	Spatial	Competition”,	Management	Science	(forthcoming)	cussion	Paper		ISSN	1441-5429	
40	In	effect,	Choe	et	al	consider	1st	degree	and	Fudenberg	and	Tirole	3rd	degree	price	discrimination.	
41	This	is	a	standard	result	in	models	where	ACPD	increases	competition.	Individually	firms	earn	more	
profits	when	they	have	information	on	their	consumers’	preferences	while	its	rivals	do	not.	However,	
when	all	firms	have	this	information,	collectively	profits	are	lower	compared	to	where	no	information	
is	available.	Firms	are	caught	therefore	in	a	type	of	Prisoners’	Dilemma.			
42	See	for	example,	P	 	Belleflamme	and	W	Vergote,	 'Monopoly	Price	Discrimination	and	Privacy:	the	
hidden	cost	of	hiding'	(2016)	149	Economic	Letters	141.	
43	A	Acquisti	and	H	Varian,	'Conditioning	Prices	on	Purchase	History'	(2005)	24	Marketing	Science	367.	
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costless	 to	 provide.	 For	 example,	 consumers	 typically	 get	 more	 value	 from	 a	 continuing	
relationship	with	 their	 hairdresser	 because	 the	 hairdresser	 gets	 to	 know	how	 they	 like	 to	
have	their	hair	done.		
In	this	model,	customers	that	attach	high	value	to	value	added	services	should	reveal	their	
information	by	accepting	 cookies,	while	other	 customers	may	do	better	by	deleting	 them.	
Both	 types	 of	 customer	 typically	 benefit	 from	 price	 discrimination	 in	 this	 model:	 loyal	
customers	pay	higher	prices	but	benefit	 from	value-added	 services,	while	 new	 customers,	
and	 those	 that	 present	 themselves	 as	 being	 new	 by	 deleting	 their	 cookies,	 pay	
comparatively	lower	prices.		
Montes	et	 al.	 present	a	model	 in	which	 consumers	 can	prevent	data	on	 their	preferences	
being	 revealed	 to	 suppliers	 by	 paying	 a	 privacy	 charge.44	Accordingly,	 when	 the	 cost	 of	
privacy	 increases,	 more	 consumers	 choose	 to	 reveal	 data.	 In	 this	 setting,	 this	 intensifies	
competition,	and	increases	aggregate	consumer	surplus.		
Belleflamme	and	Vergote	explore	a	similar	issue	but	in	a	monopoly	context.45	In	their	model	
suppliers	 use	 tracking	 technology	 to	 detect	 consumer	 preferences,	 but	 consumers	 can	
choose	 to	 deny	 the	 supplier	 access	 to	 this	 data.	 In	 this	 model,	 while	 consumers	 can	
individually	benefit	 from	not	 revealing	 their	data,	 this	 causes	prices	 to	other	customers	 to	
rise,	and	 in	aggregate	consumers	would	be	better	off	 if	 they	all	permitted	their	data	to	be	
revealed.	
2.5	 Policy	implications	
In	 this	 section,	we	ask	whether	we	can	 reach	any	broad	conclusions	on	whether	 the	price	
discrimination	that	results	from	use	of	Big	Data	harms	or	benefits	consumers	understood	in	
terms	of	aggregate	consumer	welfare.	
2.5.1 Is	ACPD	only	a	problem	where	there	is	market	power?	
It	is	now	widely	recognised	that	market	power	is	not	a	pre-requisite	for	price	discrimination,	
and	 that	 as	 a	 consequence	 ACPD	 can	 occur	 both	 in	 highly	 competitive	 and	 monopolistic	
markets.	46	But,	 are	 there	 any	 grounds	 to	 believe	 that	 ACPD	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 harmful	
when	practised	by	sellers	with	substantial	market	power?	
In	monopoly	markets,	 recent	research	has	shown	that	while	consumers	are	typically	made	
worse	 off	 in	 aggregate	 when	 a	 monopolist	 price	 discriminates,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	
plausible	circumstances	where	the	contrary	may	be	true.47	For	example,	 if	the	curvature	of	
demand	 functions	 is	 such	 that	 when	 a	 monopolist	 practices	 ACPD,	 the	 prices	 offered	 to	
customers	 with	 a	 relatively	 low	 willingness	 to	 pay	 fall	 by	 more	 than	 those	 with	 a	 higher	
willingness	 to	 pay	 rise,	 then	 price	 discrimination	 may	 lead	 to	 higher	 output	 and	 lower	
average	prices	compared	to	uniform	pricing.48	
																																								 																				
44	R		Montes,	W	Sand-Zantman	and	T	Valletti,	'The	Value	of	Information	in	Markets	with	Endogenous	
Privacy'	(2017)	Tolouse	School	of	Economics,	working	paper	.		
45	Op	cit.		
46	Micheal	Levine,	'Price	Discrimination	Without	Market	Power'	(2002)	19	Yale	Journal	on	Regulation	
1.	
47	See,	Simon	Cowan,	'Third-Degree	Price	Discrimination	and	Consumer	Surplus'	(2012)	60	The	Journal	
of	Industrial	Economics	.	
48	This	 is	 true	 in	most	 practical	 circumstances	where	 the	monopolist	 has	 imperfect	 information	 on	
consumer	preferences	and	practices	3rd	degree	price	discrimination.	Where	a	monopolist	has	perfect	
information,	(1st	degree)	price	discrimination	will	always	reduce	consumer	surplus.	
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From	 a	 policy	 perspective,	 this	 suggests	 that	while	 it	may	 be	 reasonable	 to	 presume	 that	
price	discrimination	practised	by	a	monopolist	 is	 likely	to	harm	consumers	this	should	be	a	
rebuttable	presumption.		
In	markets	where	there	is	some	degree	of	competition	the	key	insight	from	the	economics	
literature,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 is	 that	 price	 discrimination	 can	 change	 the	 intensity	 of	
competition	 in	 a	market.	Where	 the	market	 is	 characterised	 by	 best-response	 asymmetry	
(brand	preference)	ACPD	 typically	 increases	 the	 intensity	of	 competition,	while	 in	markets	
with	best-response	symmetry	(high	search	costs),	it	weakens	it.		
One	immediate	implication	of	this	is	that	the	level	of	market	power	has	limited	relevance	in	
determining	whether	ACPD	leads	to	better	or	worse	outcomes	for	consumers	compared	to	
uniform	pricing	–	whatever	the	level	of	pre-existing	market	power,	ACPD	can	either	improve	
or	worsen	consumer	outcomes	depending	largely	upon	whether	the	market	is	characterised	
by	best-response	asymmetry	or	symmetry.	
For	example,	in	best-response	asymmetry	models	(typically	where	prices	are	conditioned	on	
brand	 preferences	 or	 switching	 costs),	 ACPD	 typically	 gives	 rise	 to	 higher	 aggregate	
consumer	surplus	than	uniform	pricing,	and	this	gap	widens	the	greater	 is	market	power.49	
In	other	words,	in	these	models,	market	power	leads	to	better	outcomes	for	consumers.	
In	 contrast,	 in	 best-response	 symmetry	 models	 (often	 where	 prices	 are	 conditioned	 on	
search	 costs	 or	 search	 history),	 consumers	 typically	 do	 better	 with	 uniform	 prices	 than	
ACPD.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 discernible	 link	 between	 consumer	 outcomes	 and	 market	
power.	For	example,	in	Armstrong	50	if	sellers	engage	in	ACPD	consumer	surplus	is	lower	the	
greater	 is	 market	 power,	 whereas,	 in	 Armstrong	 and	 Zhou’s	 search	 deterrence	 history	
model,	51	consumer	surplus	is	higher	the	greater	is	market	power.	
In	terms	of	policy,	this	suggests	that,	other	than	in	monopoly,	the	level	of	market	power	is	of	
little	 consequence	 for	 assessing	 whether	 ACPD	 is	 likely	 to	 harm	 consumers.	 In	 markets	
where	 there	 is	 substantial	 market	 power	 (which	 falls	 short	 of	 monopoly),	 we	 cannot	
therefore	 presume	 a	 loss	 of	 aggregate	 consumer	 surplus	we	must	 evaluate	whether,	 as	 a	
matter	of	fact,	consumer	loss	occurs.	In	this	evaluation,	a	key	factor	is	to	determine	whether	
the	market	 is	 best	 characterised	 by	 best-response	 symmetry	 or	 asymmetry.	Other	 factors	
may	 also	 be	 relevant	 for	 this	 assessment.	 For	 example,	 while	 best-response	 asymmetry	
typically	intensifies	competition,	consumers	may	still	suffer	harm	if	their	observed	loyalty	to	
a	 seller	 –	which	 results	 in	 them	paying	 relatively	high	prices	–	 reflects	 a	 lack	of	 consumer	
engagement	 or	 knowledge	 rather	 than	 genuine	 brand	 preference	 from	which	 they	 derive	
value.		
2.5.2 Should	there	be	any	restrictions	on	sellers	collecting	consumer	information?	
The	theoretical	discussion	in	Section	2.3	above	highlighted	a	sharp	distinction	between	the	
collection	 of	 more	 detailed	 information	 on	 consumer	 preferences	 in	 monopoly	 and	
imperfectly	competitive	markets.		
Typically,	 in	 monopoly	 markets,	 ACPD	 based	 on	 more	 accurate	 and	 refined	 consumer	
preference	 data	 reduces	 aggregate	 consumer	 surplus.	 In	 imperfectly	 competitive	markets	
however	 the	 relationship	between	 information	and	 consumer	outcomes	 is	more	nuanced:	
the	availability	of	more	accurate	data	on	individual	consumer	preferences	can	both	intensify	
or	 dampen	 price	 competition	 depending	 largely	 on	 whether	 competition	 is	 best	
characterised	as	best-response	asymmetry	(typically	where	prices	are	conditioned	on	brand	
																																								 																				
49	See,	for	example,	Thisse	and	Vives,	op.	cit.	
50	Mark	Armstrong	(2006)	op.	cit.	
51	Mark	Armstrong	and	Jidong	Zhou	(2016)	op.	cit.	
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preferences	 or	 switching	 costs),	 or	 best-response	 symmetry	 (often	 where	 prices	 are	
conditioned	on	search	costs	or	search	history).		
A	 related	question	 is	whether	consumers	should	have	the	choice	over	whether	 to	consent	
to,	 or	 deny,	 sellers	 access	 to	 information	 on	 their	 preferences	 and	 willingness	 to	 pay.	
Although	 there	 is	 a	 limited	 literature	on	 this,	 the	discussion	 in	 Section	2.4	 above	 suggests	
that	consumers	do	best	individually	(although	not	necessarily	collectively)	where	they	have	
the	choice	to	share	or	not	to	share	data.	Even	 in	a	monopoly	context,	allowing	consumers	
the	 opportunity	 to	 deny	 suppliers	 access	 to	 data	 on	 their	 individual	 preferences	 may	 be	
sufficient	to	prevent	the	exploitation	of	market	power.		
Accordingly,	with	the	exception	of	where	a	seller	has	a	pure	monopoly,	there	is	very	limited	
economic	evidence	 to	 support	a	blanket	 restriction	on	 sellers	 collecting	data	on	 individual	
consumer	 preferences	 and	 using	 this	 to	 implement	 ACPD.52	However,	 objections	 could	 be	
raised	to	the	exploitation	of	certain	types	of	customer	data,	particularly	prices	conditioned	
on	 search	 history.	 Emerging	 economic	 evidence	 also	 provides	 support	 for	 a	 policy	 of	
ensuring	 that	 consumers	 are	 able	 to	 make	 an	 active	 choice	 as	 to	 whether	 data	 on	 their	
individual	preferences	is	collected	and	shared.	
2.5.3 Distributional	issues	
So	far,	we	have	focused	on	aggregate	consumer	surplus	as	a	measure	of	consumer	welfare.	
However,	the	distribution	of	that	surplus	amongst	consumers	may	also	raise	policy	concerns.		
As	 is	 well	 known	 price	 discrimination	 creates	 winners	 and	 losers	 –	 consumers	 that	 are	
relatively	price	elastic	will	pay	lower	prices	than	those	who	have	inelastic	demands.	This	may	
create	a	policy	concern	in	circumstances	where	the	inelastic	customers	that	pay	the	highest	
prices	 are	not	 those	 that	 value	products	 the	most,	 or	 those	 that	 could	 search	 for	 a	 lower	
price	 but	 choose	 not	 do	 so,	 but	 those	 who	 have	 fewer	 options	 to	 switch	 to	 alternative	
suppliers.53	This	 may	 be,	 for	 example,	 because	 they	 are	 unable	 to	 access	 credit,	 have	 no	
internet	access,	or	have	lower	cognitive	abilities.	
These	 issues	 arise	with	 all	 forms	 of	 price	 discrimination.	 But	 does	 ACPD	 create	 additional	
distributional	 issues?	 One	 reason	 it	 might	 is	 that	 a	 distinctive	 feature	 of	 ACPD	 is	 that	 it	
provides	 additional	 opportunities	 to	 price	 discriminate	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 search	 costs	 and	
search	 history.	 This	 benefits	 not	 just	 those	 consumers	 with	 lower	 search	 costs,	 but	 also	
those	 that	 have	 more	 opportunities	 to	 benefit	 from	 searching.	 Those	 that	 have	 fewer	
options,	e.g.	because	they	have	poor	credit	records,	or	no	internet	access,	may	do	less	well.	
In	 contrast,	 in	 markets	 with	 uniform	 pricing,	 markets	 can	 work	 well	 even	 where	 only	 a	
proportion	 of	 customers	 are	 well	 informed	 and	 economically	 sophisticated	 provided	 that	
competition	 for	 these	 informed	 customers	 sets	 the	 market	 price.	 Here,	 more	 vulnerable	
consumers	 are	 effectively	 ‘protected’	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 informed	 customers.	 So,	 markets	
which	are	characterised	by	ACPD	may	work	 less	well	 for	vulnerable	consumers	 than	 those	
with	uniform	pricing.	
Another	 feature	 of	 ACPD	 in	 that	 because	 prices	 are	 set	 by	 an	 algorithm	 there	may	 be	 no	
price	transparency.	This	increases	the	complexity	of	consumer	decision	making	(in	terms	of	
their	 response	 to	 it),	 and	 consumers	 that	 are	 better	 able	 to	 operate	 in	 more	 complex	
																																								 																				
52	Remember	 our	 focus	 is	 purely	 consumer	welfare	 here;	 other	 logics,	 such	 as	 privacy	motivations,	
might	drive	a	different	response.	
53	See	 for	 example,	 Financial	 Conduct	 Authority,	 “Our	 mission	 2017:	 how	 we	 regulate	 financial	
services”,	p.24.	available	at:	https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/our-mission-2017.pdf		
	 16	
environments	 may	 do	 better	 than	 those	 that	 cannot.	 This	 lack	 of	 transparency	 may	 also	
undermine	market	confidence.54	
	
Perhaps	the	most	distinctive	aspect	of	ACPD	is	that	consumers	can	act	strategically	through	
choosing	either	 to	 reveal	 information	on	 their	 personal	 preferences	or	 to	hide	or	disguise	
them.	This	may	mean	deleting	cookies	or	browser	history,	or	presenting	yourself	as	having	a	
low	willingness	 to	 pay	 by	 strategically	 delaying	 purchases	 or	 using	 alternative	 IP	 or	 email	
addresses.		
The	 discussion	 of	 the	 economic	 literature	 in	 Section	 2.4	 found	 that	 consumers	 will	
sometimes	benefit	from	sharing	their	information	and	at	other	times	from	hiding	it.	But,	the	
emerging	 view	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 that	 consumers	 always	 benefit	 from	 being	 given	 the	
choice.	 This	 suggests	 that	 consumers	 that	 are	 either	 unaware	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 this	
choice,	or	who	cannot	make	an	effective	choice	may	pay	relatively	high	prices.	In	particular,	
customers	with	 no	 internet	 access	may	have	no	way	of	 communicating	 their	 preferences,	
even	when	it	is	in	their	interest	do	so	(e.g.	to	take	advantage	of	personalised	offers).		
However,	 the	 distributional	 effects	 of	 ACPD	 may	 have	 important	 feedback	 effects	 which	
impact	on	aggregate	consumer	surplus	indirectly.	One	way	this	can	arise	is	via	the	impact	of	
ACPD	on	the	complexity	of	consumer	decision	making.	For	example,	if	ACPD	leads	to	greater	
search	 costs,	 and	 more	 complex	 decision	 making	 more	 generally	 (including	 whether	 to	
accept	or	delete	cookies,	buy	now	or	defer	purchases	to	wait	for	a	lower	price)	consumers	
may	respond	either	by	greater	use	of	heuristics	to	make	decisions,	or	by	engaging	 in	more	
search.	Both	of	these	can	have	negative	effects	on	consumer	surplus,	the	former	by	inducing	
mistakes,	and	the	latter	by	increasing	the	costs	of	shopping.		
2.6	 Conclusions	
Our	examination	of	 the	economic	 implications	of	ACPD	on	consumer	welfare	as	measured	
by	aggregate	consumer	surplus	indicates	that:	
i. Where	 a	 seller	 has	 a	 100%	monopoly,	 ACPD	 is	 likely	 to	 reduce	 consumer	 surplus	
(compared	to	uniform	pricing).	However,	depending	on	the	shape	of	demand	curve,	
it	is	plausible	that	consumers	could,	in	aggregate,	be	better	off	with	ACPD.	
ii. In	 imperfectly	 competitive	 markets	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 generalise	 about	 ACPD’s	
effect	on	aggregate	consumer	welfare.	An	assessment	in	each	case	is	required.	The	
type	of	price	discrimination	matters:	price	discrimination	based	on	brand	preference	
or	switching	costs	is	likely	to	increase	the	intensity	of	competition	(leading	to	better	
consumer	outcomes),	whereas	price	discrimination	based	on	search	costs	is	likely	to	
weaken	competition	(leading	to	poorer	consumer	outcomes).	
iii. Price	 discrimination	 based	 on	 search	 history	 (e.g.	 “buy-now”	 discounts)	 can	 deter	
consumer	search	and	dampen	competition,	leading	to	poorer	consumer	outcomes.	
iv. There	 is	 very	 limited	 theoretical	 relationship	 between	 ex	 ante	market	 power	 and	
consumer	outcomes.		
v. ACPD	may	 increase	 the	complexity	of	 consumer	decision	making.	This	may	 lead	 to	
poorer	 consumer	 outcomes	 if	 it	 increases	 the	 cost	 of	 search	 or	 if	 it	 induces	
consumers	to	make	more	mistakes.	
																																								 																				
54	See,	OFT,	op.	cit.		
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vi. It	will	sometimes	be	in	consumers’	interest	to	give	up	and	at	other	times	to	protect	
the	privacy	of	 their	preference	 information.	But,	 consumers	are	better	off	 through	
having	the	choice	of	revealing	or	hiding	their	data.		
vii. ACPD	may	 raise	distributional	 issues.	 In	particular,	 it	may	 result	 in	consumers	who	
are	 vulnerable	 either	 because	 they	 have	 difficulties	 in	 searching	 (e.g.	 no	 internet	
access,	or	low	cognitive	abilities)	or	who	are	less	able	to	benefit	from	searching	(e.g.	
because	 of	 a	 	 poor	 credit	 history),	 paying	 more	 than	 they	 would	 with	 uniform	
pricing,	where	they	may	benefit	from	the	protection	of	informed	customers.		
3. Is	Price	Discrimination	Unfair	or	Unjust?	
We	 now	 turn	 our	 attention	 to	 a	 rather	 different	 normative	 benchmark	 by	 examining	 the	
fairness	 of	 ACPD.	 Although	 concepts	 of	 fairness	 (and	 justice)	 have	 been	 subject	 to	
philosophical	debate	since	ancient	times,	for	present	purposes,	fairness	can	be	understood	
in	three	distinct	and	sometimes	overlapping	ways:	the	perceived	fairness	of	pricing	practices	
(Section	 3.1);	 fair	 dealing	 between	 online	 retailers	 and	 consumers	 (corrective	 justice)	
(Section	 3.2);	 and	 fairness	 as	 a	 requirement	 of	 distributive	 (or	 collective)	 justice	 (Section	
3.3).	 In	 the	 following	discussion,	each	of	 these	understandings	of	 fairness	 is	applied	to	the	
practice	of	ACPD,	before	comparing	these	evaluations	with	the	efficiency-based	assessment	
from	Section	2.		
3.1	 Subjective	perceptions	of	unfair	or	unjust	pricing	
Studies	in	marketing	and	social	psychology	demonstrate	that	price	discrimination	directed	at	
consumers	(whether	in	the	form	of	ACPD	or	less	high-tech	forms	of	price	discrimination)	can	
evoke	strong	subjective	perceptions	of	unfairness,	although	these	responses	are	not	always	
consistent.55	Drawing	 on	 experimental	 studies	 of	 individuals’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 pricing	
fairness	that	have	identified	various	factors	that	systematically	influence	people’s	subjective	
perceptions	 of	 the	 fairness	 of	 price	 discrimination,	 we	 discuss	 three	 models	 of	 pricing	
fairness	which	these	studies	have	spawned:	(a)	‘distributive	justice	theories’,	which	maintain	
that	 those	 in	an	exchange	 relationship	with	others	are	entitled	 to	 receive	a	 reward	 that	 is	
proportional	 to	 their	 investment	 in	 the	 relationship;56	(b)	equity	 theories,	which	posit	 that	
individuals	who	are	similar	to	one	another	gauge	the	fairness	(or	equity)	of	an	exchange	by	
comparing	the	ratios	of	their	contributions	to	that	of	others	in	their	peer	or	reference	group.	
If	 the	 ratios	 are	 not	 equal,	 the	 individual	 will	 perceive	 the	 prices	 as	 unfair;57	and	 (c)	
procedural	justice	theories,	which	focus	on	the	influence	of	the	underlying	procedures	used	
																																								 																				
55	Lan	 Xia,	 Kent	 Monroe	 and	 Jennifer	 Cox,	 'The	 Price	 is	 Unfair!	 A	 Conceptual	 Framework	 of	 Price	
Unfairness	Perceptions'	(2004)	68	Journal	of	Marketing	,	1-15	and	Appendix;	Max	Bazerman	and	Don	
Moore,	 Judgement	 in	 Managerial	 Decision	 Making	 (7th	 edn,	 John	 Wiley	 &	 Sons	 2008)	 (hereafter	
‘Bazerman	and	Moore’),	Chapter	7.	Studies	of	this	kind	have	also	demonstrated	that	 individuals	are	
not	motivated	wholly	by	rational	self-interest	when	setting	prices,	and	that	considerations	of	equity	
affect	 an	 individual’s	 pricing	 decisions.	 For	 example,	 studies	 sought	 to	 investigate	 how	 people	
respond	to	the	‘ultimatum	game’	in	which	a	proposer	divides	a	known,	fixed	sum	of	money	any	way	
s/he	chooses	which	the	responder	can	either	accept	and	receive	her	portion,	or	reject	and	thus	leave	
both	parties	with	nothing.	Traditional	rational	actor	models	predict	that	the	proposer	will	offer	only	
slightly	more	than	zero,	and	that	the	responder	will	accept	any	offer	greater	than	zero.	But	the	results	
show	that	the	average	demand	by	the	proposer	was	for	less	than	70%	of	the	total	sum,	both	for	first	
time	 players	 and	 players	 repeating	 the	 game	 one	 week	 later.	 The	 most	 frequent	 offer	 from	 the	
proposer	was	an	even	split	of	the	money:	Bazerman	and	Moore,	117.	
56	Homans,	G	C.	Social	Behavior:	Its	Elementary	Forms.	New	York:	Harcourt,	Brace	&	World,	1961	cited	
by	 Xia,	 Monroe	 and	 Cox,	 'The	 Price	 is	 Unfair!	 A	 Conceptual	 Framework	 of	 Price	 Unfairness	
Perceptions'.	
57	Sarah	Spiekermann,	 'Individual	Price	Discrimination	–	an	 Impossibility?'	 (International	Conference	
for	Human-Computer	Interaction).	
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to	 determine	 the	 outcomes,	 rather	 than	 the	 substantive	 reasons	 that	 are	 understood	 as	
explaining	differential	pricing	policies.58		
3.1.1	 Socially	acceptable	forms	of	price	discrimination	
Although	many	people	may	instinctively	regard	non-uniform	pricing	policies	as	unfair,	many	
commonly	 practised	 forms	 of	 price	 discrimination	 are	 conventionally	 regarded	 as	 socially	
acceptable,	which	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 one	 or	more	 of	 the	 above	 theories.59	Consider	 for	
example:		
(i) status	based	discounts:	The	practice	of	offering	price	discounts	to	classes	of	persons	
who	 are	 not	 typically	 expected	 to	 draw	 a	 substantial	 income,	 such	 as	 students,	
children,	the	elderly,	the	unemployed	and	other	recipients	of	social	welfare	benefits,	
are	generally	considered	fair.60	Customers	in	the	classes	to	whom	such	discounts	are	
conventionally	offered	may	be	understood	as	falling	into	a	different	reference	group	
to	 adults	who	 are	 assumed	 to	 earn	 a	 regular	 and	 substantial	 income,	 so	 that	 the	
practice	of	offering	discounts	to	those	perceived	as	low	income	earners	may	be	seen	
as	progressive	and	thus	socially	acceptable;	
(ii) volume	 based	 or	 multi-buy	 discounts:	 many	 sellers	 offer	 discounted	 prices	 to	
customers	who	order	 larger	quantities.	The	acceptability	of	 these	discounts	can	be	
understood	 in	 terms	 of	 either	 distributive	 justice	 theory	 or	 equity	 theory,	 with	
Spiekerman	suggesting	that	differential	pricing	due	to	different	purchasing	volumes	
of	 the	 same	 good	 are	 perceived	 as	 fair	 because	 they	 involve	 the	 allocation	 of	
rewards	based	on	their	individual	contribution	to	the	exchange	relationship;61	
(iii) loyalty	 discounts:	 customers	 who	 demonstrate	 loyalty	 to	 sellers	 through	 repeat	
purchases	 may	 be	 offered	 price	 discounts,	 often	 in	 the	 form	 of	 retailer	 loyalty	
programmes.	 These	 discounts	 are	 widely	 perceived	 as	 fair	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 equity	
theory,	 because	 this	 customer	 loyalty	 is	 being	 ‘rewarded’.62 	Consumer	 loyalty	
programmes	also	satisfy	 ‘procedural	 justice’	accounts	of	perceived	pricing	 fairness:	
because	 the	 terms	 upon	 which	 a	 loyalty	 discount	 is	 offered	 are	 transparent	 and	
universally	 available,	 each	 consumer	 can	 then	 decide	 whether	 to	 make	 further	
purchases	from	that	seller	in	order	to	benefit	from	the	discount;	
(iv) new	customer	discounts:	 retailers	 sometimes	offer	discounts	 to	new	customers	 in	
order	to	encourage	them	to	give	their	product	a	try.	Equity	theory	posits	that	to	the	
extent	that	new	customers	are	regarded	as	placed	in	a	different	reference	group	as	
																																								 																				
58	Thibaut,	 J	W,	 and	 L	Walker.	 Procedural	 Justice:	 A	 Psychological	 Analysis.	 Hillsdale,	 NJ:	 Lawrence	
Erlbaum	Associates,	1975	cited	by	Xia,	Monroe	and	Cox,	'The	Price	is	Unfair!	A	Conceptual	Framework	
of	 Price	 Unfairness	 Perceptions',	 1;	 and	 Spiekermann,	 'Individual	 Price	 Discrimination	 –	 an	
Impossibility?',	2.	
59	All	 the	examples	of	price	discrimination	discussed	 in	 this	section	 involve	the	unilateral	offering	of	
discounts	by	retailers,	with	the	result	that	consumers	are	offered	differential	prices,	but	these	do	not	
result	 from	 a	 process	 of	 individual	 bargaining	 and	 negotiation	 between	 retailer	 and	 consumer.	
Accordingly,	although	haggling	in	street	markets	results	 in	consumers	paying	different	prices	for	the	
same	 item,	 it	 is	 excluded	 from	 this	 discussion	 because	 the	 differential	 prices	 are	 the	 result	 of	 the	
bargaining	process	between	the	individual	retailer	and	individual	consumer.	
60 	Xia,	 Monroe	 and	 Cox,	 'The	 Price	 is	 Unfair!	 A	 Conceptual	 Framework	 of	 Price	 Unfairness	
Perceptions',	3.	Whether	the	perceived	fairness	of	these	discounts	is	contingent	on	the	magnitude	of	
the	discount	offered	does	not	appear	to	have	been	the	subject	of	systematic	study.		
61	Spiekermann,	'Individual	Price	Discrimination	–	an	Impossibility?',	2.		
62 	Xia,	 Monroe	 and	 Cox,	 'The	 Price	 is	 Unfair!	 A	 Conceptual	 Framework	 of	 Price	 Unfairness	
Perceptions',	9.	
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existing	customers,	then	these	discounts	would	be	widely	perceived	as	fair	(but	see	
below	discussion	of	inconsistency);	
(v) peak	pricing:	price	discrimination	based	on	whether	the	service	is	consumed	during	
peak	 or	 off-peak	 periods	 is	 typically	 regarded	 as	 fair,	 at	 least	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
provision	of	 ‘club’	 goods	–	a	 species	of	quasi-public	 goods	 that	 are	excludable	but	
non-rivalrous	(the	cost	of	providing	the	good	to	an	additional	consumer	is	zero),	at	
least	 until	 reaching	 a	 point	 where	 congestion	 occurs.	 Because	 periods	 of	 high	
demand	 can	 create	 congestion,	 distributive	 justice	 theory	 might	 posit	 that	 it	 is	
legitimate	 for	 service	 providers	 to	 offer	 lower	 prices	 during	 periods	 of	 reduced	
demand	 in	 order	 to	 incentivise	 consumers	 to	 consume	 during	 off-peak	 periods,	
serving	 to	 reward	consumers	who	are	prepared	 to	 forego	 the	consumption	during	
the	 most	 popular	 peak	 times,	 which	 thereby	 smooths	 out	 demand,	 reducing	
congestion	 for	 others	 during	 peak	 times.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 conventionally	 regarded	 as	
acceptable	 to	 vary	prices	 for	peak	vs	off	peak	 train	 travel,	 access	 to	 club	 facilities,	
gym	membership	and	for	home	delivery	slots	occurring	outside	normal	office	hours;	
(vi) Timing	 based	 discounts:	 For	 some	 services,	 particularly	 passenger	 transport	
services,	 the	 price	 offered	 varies	 depending	 upon	 the	 dynamic	 interplay	 between	
demand	 and	 supply,	 including	 proximity	 to	 the	 time	 at	 which	 the	 service	 will	 be	
provided.	 Kimes	 suggests	 that	 consumers	 regard	 dynamic	 price	 variation	 in	 airline	
pricing	as	broadly	acceptable	 to	 the	extent	 that	 it	 constitutes	a	 form	of	 legitimate	
product	differentiation.	Hence	the	customer	who	purchases	a	ticket	many	months	in	
advance	 perceives	 the	 product	 she	 acquires	 as	 qualitatively	 different	 from	 that	
acquired	by	the	customer	who	purchases	a	ticket	3	weeks	before	she	 is	due	to	fly,	
particularly	 if	 the	 former	 ticket	 is	 subject	 to	numerous	 restrictions	on	cancellation,	
date	 change	and	 so	 forth	while	 the	 latter	 is	not.63	In	 the	case	of	 tickets	purchased	
well	 in	 advance	 of	 departure,	 it	might	 be	 thought	 legitimate	 to	 offer	 lower	 prices	
because	this	helps	airlines	to	plan	ahead	and	to	reduce	the	business	risk	associated	
with	 scheduled	 flights	 carrying	 fewer	 passengers.	 Cheaper	 prices	 may	 also	 be	
understood	as	an	appropriate	 ‘reward’	 for	 customers	who	are	willing	 to	 ‘lock	 in’	a	
price	earlier,	 and	 thereby	 lose	 the	 flexibility	associated	with	waiting	until	 closer	 to	
their	 departure	 date	 (thus	 retaining	 the	 flexibility	 to	 choose	 not	 to	 fly	 on	 that	
particular	 flight).64	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 equity	 theory,	 those	who	 book	well	 in	
advance	and	are	willing	 to	accept	 restrictive	 conditions	with	 their	 ticket	 fall	 into	a	
different	reference	group	to	those	who	do	not	purchase	well	advance,	or	who	buy	
tickets	which	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 stringent	 restrictions.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 so-called	
‘last	 minute’	 discounts	 are	 generally	 perceived	 as	 legitimate	 because	 consumers	
recognise	the	desirability	of	avoiding	waste;	and	that	the	supplier’s	incentive	to	sell	
at	a	reduced	price	is	greatest	to	avoid	the	loss	associated	with	the	perishable	nature	
of	 an	 airline’s	 inventory,	 as	 an	 empty	 seat	 represents	 an	 opportunity	 lost.	65	
Similarly,	consumers	typically	accept	the	legitimacy	of	supermarkets	reducing	prices	
on	 ‘sell-by’	dates	 in	order	 to	avoid	 the	waste	associated	with	having	 to	dispose	of	
these	items	once	that	date	has	passed.	
Taken	 together,	 these	 examples	 illustrate	 how	 each	 of	 the	 models	 helps	 to	 explain	
subjective	perceptions	of	pricing	fairness.	These	models	ultimately	rest	on	two	criteria,	one	
substantive,	the	other	procedural.	First,	pricing	discrimination	is	more	likely	to	be	perceived	
as	fair	if	individuals	can	identify	a	substantive	explanation	for	the	price	difference	which	they	
																																								 																				
63	Sheryl	Kimes,	'Perceived	Fairness	of	Yield	Management'	(1994)	35	The	Cornell	HRA	Quarterly	728.	
64	Yet,	studies	of	perceived	pricing	justice	 indicate	that	people	are	 less	willing	to	regard	such	pricing	
practices	as	fair	when	they	concern	the	price	of	hotel	rooms,	rather	than	the	price	of	airfares,	ibid.	
65	Ibid.	
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regard	as	legitimate.	Thus,	if	a	person	is	willing	to	regard	herself	as	not	situated	in	a	position	
of	 substantive	 equality	 relative	 to	 the	 person	 in	 receipt	 of	 the	 nominally	more	 attractive	
price,	then	the	first	person	is	more	likely	to	perceive	the	price	differential	as	fair.66	While	the	
range	 of	 substantive	 justifications	 upon	 which	 consumers	 rely	 is	 invariably	 a	 product	 of	
social	 conventions	 (and	 so	 can	 change	 over	 time,	 e.g.	 the	 general	 perception	 about	 the	
fairness	of	airline	pricing	has	changed	considerably	over	time	in	response	to	the	emergence	
of	 yield	 management	 techniques67)	 the	 theories	 identified	 in	 the	 marketing	 and	 social	
psychology	 literature	 as	 ‘equity	 theory’	 and	 ‘distributive	 justice’	 theory	 both	 rest	 on	 a	
perceptions	 that	 the	 substantive	 reasons	 underpinning	 any	 given	 pricing	 policy	 can	 be	
judged	as	fair	or	unfair.	Secondly,	price	discrimination	is	more	likely	to	be	regarded	as	fair	if	
the	process	by	which	prices	are	determined	and	offered	to	consumers	is	regarded	as	fair.68	
This	typically	requires,	at	minimum,	that	the	pricing	policy	is	clear,	transparent	and	offered	
on	 a	universal	basis	 to	 all	 those	who	 satisfy	 the	 stipulated	 requirements.	 The	 greater	 the	
freedom	for	customers	to	‘self-select’	the	price	at	which	they	choose	to	purchase	the	good,	
the	more	likely	the	pricing	process	will	be	perceived	as	fair.69		
Although	 these	 studies	 demonstrate	 that	 people	 often	 have	 strong	 affective	 responses	 to	
pricing	 practices	 they	 perceive	 are	 unfair,	 they	 also	 show	 that	 such	 judgments	 are	 often	
inconsistent.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 series	 of	 experiments	 by	 Kahnemann,	 Knetsch	 and	 Thaler,	
participants	were	asked	to	evaluate	two	scenarios	in	which	a	shortage	has	developed	for	a	
popular	model	of	car	so	that	customers	must	now	wait	two	months	for	delivery.70	In	the	first	
scenario,	 a	dealer	who	has	been	 selling	 these	 cars	 at	 list	 price	 increase	his	prices	 to	$200	
above	 the	 list	price	as	a	 result	of	 the	 shortage,	while	 in	 the	 second	scenario,	a	dealer	has	
been	selling	 these	cars	at	a	discount	of	$200	below	 list	price	now	prices	 this	model	at	 list	
price.	In	both	cases,	the	result	of	the	shortage	is	to	prompt	the	dealer	to	raise	prices	by	the	
same	amount,	yet	the	majority	of	individuals	(71%)	viewed	the	action	in	the	first	scenario	as	
unfair	 while	 only	 a	 minority	 (42%)	 considered	 the	 action	 in	 the	 second	 scenario	 to	 be	
unfair.71	This	 finding	 suggests	 that	 some	consumers	appear	 to	accord	 special	 status	 to	 the	
																																								 																				
66	As	Xia	et	al	put	it,	when	customers	perceive	two	transactions	as	similar,	the	effect	of	observed	price	
differences	 on	 perceptions	 of	 price	 injustice	 is	 greater	 than	 for	 other	 situations.	 Therefore,	
perceptions	 of	 price	 injustice	 can	 be	mitigated	 by	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 similarity	 of	 transactions.	 The	
practice	of	yield	management	sets	different	prices	for	seemingly	similar	products	or	services,	such	as	
a	hotel	 room	or	an	airplane	 seat,	but	additional	benefits	or	 restrictions	are	attached	 to	each	offer,	
which	makes	 the	products	or	 services	 less	comparable.	These	 restrictions	decrease	 the	similarity	of	
the	 transactions	 and	 the	attention	 that	 customers	place	on	price	differences,	 thereby	 reducing	 the	
likelihood	of	price	 injustice	perceptions.	Contrary	 to	 this	principle,	as	discussed	 in	 the	 Introduction,	
Amazon.com	charged	different	customers	different	prices	for	the	same	product	on	the	basis	of	their	
purchasing	 histories.	 There	 was	 no	 differentiation	 between	 the	 products	 or	 services	 in	 the	 two	
transactions.	 As	 a	 result,	 Amazon.com	 received	 negative	 customer	 and	 media	 response	 when	 the	
practice	was	discovered,	Xia,	Monroe	and	Cox,	'The	Price	is	Unfair!	A	Conceptual	Framework	of	Price	
Unfairness	Perceptions',	8.	
67	Kimes,	'Perceived	Fairness	of	Yield	Management'.		
68	Although	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 theory	 may	 fail	 if	 price	 differentials	 are	 very	 large	 does	 not	
appear	to	have	been	studied.		
69	Spiekmann	comments	that	as	long	as	all	customers	have	the	same	access	to	better	prices,	and	it	is	
only	the	individually	chosen	purchase	process	(i.e.	self-selection)	by	which	conditions	are	determined,	
this	type	of	price	differentiation	was	shown	to	be	perceived	as	fair	by	consumers,	meeting	peoples’	
perception	of	procedural	justice:	Spiekermann,	'Individual	Price	Discrimination	–	an	Impossibility?',	2,	
citing	J	Cox	‘Can	differential	prices	be	fair?’	(2001)	The	Journal	of	Product	and	Brand	Management,	vol	
10,	264-276.	
70	Daniel	 Kahneman,	 Jack	 	 Knetsch	 and	 Richard	 Thaler,	 'Fairness	 as	 a	 Constraint	 on	 Profit	 Seeking:	
Entitlements	in	the	Market'	(1986)	76	American	Economic	Review	,	728-41.	
71	Ibid,	732.	
	 21	
manufacturer’s	list	price,	even	if	they	do	not	expect	to	pay	that	amount,	which	operates	as	a	
critical	anchor	for	assessments	of	fairness.	Similarly,	a	majority	of	respondents	regarded	it	as	
unfair	to	reduce	wages	of	employees	in	times	of	recession,	yet	it	was	not	considered	unfair	
to	refrain	from	awarding	pay	rises	to	employees	in	boom	times.72	
Yet	 these	 finding	 are	 consistent	 with	 experiments	 in	 cognitive	 psychology	 which	
demonstrate	 that	 individuals	 systematically	 make	 decisions	 that	 depart	 from	 the	 rational	
actor	model	 of	 decision	making	 due	 to	 their	 pervasive	 reliance	 on	 cognitive	 heuristics	 or	
mental	 short	 cuts,	 including	 the	 influence	 of	 ‘framing	 effects’,	 ‘anchoring’,	 ‘loss	 aversion’	
and	‘status	quo	bias’.73	The	inconsistent	responses	to	the	car	shortage	scenarios	suggest	that	
consumers	are	particularly	concerned	with	departures	from	the	status	quo	(reflected	in	list	
prices	 or	 current	 prices),	 so	 that	 economically	 rational	 actions	 will	 often	 be	 perceived	 as	
unfair.74		
This	reliance	on	cognitive	heuristics	leading	to	inconsistent	outcomes	may	help	explain	why	
consumers	typically	regard	both	loyalty	discounts	and	new	customer	discounts	as	legitimate,	
even	 though	 the	 latter	 results	 in	 loyal	 customers	 paying	 higher	 prices,	 whilst	 the	 former	
results	 in	 loyal	 customers	 paying	 lower	 prices.	 Likewise,	 peak	 pricing	 schemes	 in	 which	
services	 consumed	during	off-peak	periods	 are	 cheaper	 than	 the	 same	 services	 consumed	
during	 peak	 consumption	 periods	 in	 order	 to	 alleviate	 congestion	may	 seem	 inconsistent	
with	 the	 findings	of	 studies	 in	which	 a	 significant	majority	of	 people	 consider	 it	 unfair	 for	
sellers	 to	 raise	 their	 prices	 in	 times	 of	 scarcity.75	Recognising	 the	 effect	 of	 these	 heuristic	
‘frames’	 on	 consumers’	 subjective	 perceptions	 of	 fairness,	 Ezrachi	 and	 Stucke	 argue	 that	
retailers	deliberately	 frame	price	discrimination	 in	terms	of	discounts	on	offer,	 rather	than	
the	fact	that	this	results	in	some	consumers	paying	more.76	
3.1.2	 Subjective	perceptions	of	fairness	vs	economic	efficiency	
Economic	evaluations	of	the	efficiency	(and	hence	desirability)	of	price	discrimination	clash	
directly	 with	 the	 perceived	 unfairness	 of	 price	 discrimination	 in	 circumstances	 where	
individuals	cannot	identify	a	legitimate	substantive	explanation	for	the	price	difference.	This	
is	because	efficiency,	as	measured	by	aggregate	consumer	 surplus,	 is	 concerned	only	with	
delivering	the	best	outcomes	for	consumers	as	a	whole,	and	not	on	whether	any	particular	
outcome	is	equitable.	For	example,	if	two	identical	consumers	value	a	good	at	(say)	£1	and	
the	marginal	cost	of	producing	the	good	is	zero,	efficiency	dictates	only	that	both	consumers	
are	 charged	 a	 price	 of	 £1	 or	 less	 (so	 that	 both	 purchase	 the	 good).	 Aggregate	 consumer	
surplus	would,	for	example,	be	identical	if	one	consumer	was	charged	£1	and	the	other	£0,	
																																								 																				
72	Bazerman	and	Moore,	supra,	Chapter	7.	Note	that	 in	both	the	car	pricing	and	wage	experiments,	
the	 list	price	and	current	wage	appear	to	be	regarded	as	a	benchmark	for	fairness.	However,	 in	the	
car	experiment,	prices	 rise	 in	both	 scenarios,	whilst	 the	wage	experiment	compares	 responses	 to	a	
wage	 increase	with	a	wage	reduction,	so	that	the	difference	 in	response	might	be	explained	on	the	
basis	of	the	cognitive	heuristic	known	as	‘loss	aversion’.	
73	Amos	 Tversky	 and	 Daniel	 Kahneman,	 'Judgment	 under	 Uncertainty:	 heuristics	 and	 biases'	 (1974)	
185	Science	 ,	1124-30;	and	Amos	Tversky	and	Daniel	Kahneman,	 'The	Framing	of	Decisions	and	the	
Psychology	of	Choice'	(1981)	211	Science	,	453-58.	See	discussion	below,	in	text	just	before	footnote	
93,	concerning	whether	we	are	currently	 in	a	period	of	transition	 in	which	social	conventions	about	
fair	pricing	may	be	in	a	state	of	flux,	as	big	data	analytics	makes	new	forms	of	pricing	possible.	
74	Bazerman	and	Moore,	supra,	115-116.	
75	For	example,	such	as	raising	the	price	of	snow	shovels	the	morning	after	a	blizzard,	which	82%	of	
respondents	 regarded	 as	 unfair,	 Kahneman,	 Knetsch	 and	 Thaler,	 'Fairness	 as	 a	 Constraint	 on	 Profit	
Seeking:	Entitlements	 in	the	Market',	729.	Alternatively,	 the	social	acceptability	of	peak	pricing	may	
be	restricted	to	‘club	goods’	and	not	to	ordinary	consumption	goods,	which	do	not	suffer	from	such	
congestion	problems.		
76	Ezrachi	and	Stucke,	Virtual	Competition,	111-112.	
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or	 if	 both	 were	 charged	 £0.50.	 Having	 said	 that,	 there	 is	 scope	 for	 alignment	 between	
efficiency	 considerations	 and	 so-called	 distributive	 justice	 theories	 of	 perceived	 pricing	
fairness	because	these	theories	rest	on	a	belief	that	consumers	should	be	rewarded	for	their	
investment	 in	 the	 exchange	 relationship	 which	 they	 form	 with	 sellers.	 In	 some	
circumstances,	the	opportunity	for	reciprocal	exchange	provides	incentives	for	consumers	to	
act	 in	 ways	 that	 promote	 economic	 efficiency.	 Peak	 period	 pricing	 provides	 a	 good	
illustration	 of	 this.	 Typically,	 it	 is	 economically	 efficient	 in	 that	 it	 switches	 demand	 from	
costly	 peak	 supply	 to	 low	 cost	 off-peak	 supply.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 peak	 pricing	might	 be	
regarded	as	distributively	fair	because	it	compensates	consumers	who	are	prepared	to	(say)	
travel	 at	 less	 convenient	 off-peak	 times	 for	 their	 contribution	 to	 reducing	 the	 overall	
economic	cost	of	supply.	In	a	different	but	related	vein,	consumers	typically	perceive	the	use	
of	the	price	mechanism	to	allocate	demand	to	be	fair	where	there	is	excess	supply,	reflected	
in	perceptions	that	it	is	fair	to	lower	prices	to	reduce	waste.	Yet	findings	from	psychological	
studies	which	demonstrate	that	individuals	often	consider	it	unfair	to	adjust	prices	upwards	
in	times	of	shortage	(i.e.	when	there	is	excess	demand,	such	as	demand	for	shovels	following	
a	snowstorm).	In	both	cases,	the	use	of	the	price	mechanism	promotes	economic	efficiency,	
yet	this	is	often	only	considered	fair	in	cases	of	excess	supply.	In	cases	of	excess	demand,	it	
appears	that	efficiency	and	perceptions	of	fairness	often	come	into	direct	conflict.	
In	 relation	 to	 procedural	 fairness	 accounts	 that	 seek	 to	 explain	 the	 perceived	 fairness	 of	
price	 discrimination,	 economic	 efficiency	 is	 largely	 silent.	 Put	 simply,	 aggregate	 consumer	
surplus	measures	outcomes	and	not	the	process	by	which	those	outcomes	are	attained.	But	
while	 certain	 aspects	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 such	 as	 equality	 of	 opportunity	 have	 no	
resonance	with	efficiency,	other	aspects,	most	notably	transparency,	do.	In	particular,	price	
transparency	 can	 increase	 consumer	 surplus	 directly	 by	 reducing	 the	 likelihood	 that	
consumers	will	make	mistakes,	i.e.	purchase	too	much	or	too	little.	Price	transparency	may	
also	 increase	 consumer	 surplus	 indirectly	 through	 increasing	 the	 intensity	 of	 competition	
between	 sellers. 77 	So,	 procedural	 justice	 and	 efficiency	 will	 often	 be	 aligned	 when	
considering	 price	 transparency.	 But,	when	 considering	 other	 aspects	 of	 procedural	 justice	
such	 as	 equality	 of	 opportunity,	 their	 efficiency	 might	 or	 might	 not	 generate	 converging	
policy	conclusions	–	on	some	occasions	efficiency	might	suggest	that	equality	of	opportunity	
is	 desirable	 on	 the	basis	 that	 it	 is	 efficiency-enhancing,	 but	 not	 on	others.	 For	 example,	 a	
buyer	may	be	obliged	 to	put	a	contract	out	 to	 tender	 to	promote	equality	of	opportunity.	
This	 could	however	have	a	positive	 (increase	 in	price	 competition)	or	 a	negative	 (reduced	
incentives	on	 the	 incumbent	 to	 invest)	effect	on	economic	efficiency,	depending	upon	 the	
specific	context	in	which	it	occurs.		
3.2	 Price	discrimination	as	unfair	dealing	
Although	the	studies	referred	to	above	demonstrate	that	some	forms	of	price	discrimination	
evoke	 strong	 perceptions	 of	 unfairness,	 this	 fact	 alone	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 legal	
intervention	 –	 at	 least	 intervention	 of	 a	 coercive	 kind.	 Within	 liberal	 democratic	
communities,	something	more	than	moral	distaste	(however	strongly	felt)	is	required.78	For	
John	 Stuart	 Mill,	 the	 only	 acceptable	 justification	 for	 coercive	 legal	 intervention	 was	 the	
prevention	 of	 harm	 to	 others	 (the	 so-called	 ‘harm	 principle’).79	Although	 the	 concept	 of	
																																								 																				
77	Price	transparency	can,	in	some	circumstances,	help	facilitate	collusion.	Accordingly,	the	impact	of	
price	transparency	on	consumer	surplus	is	not	invariably	positive.	
78	Unless,	of	course,	the	relevant	provision	is	directly	trying	to	assess	the	surplus	of	these	consumers,	
and	this	surplus	is	affected	by	their	perceptions	about	ACPD.	In	this	case,	their	perceptions	would	be	
important,	 although	 we	 would	 have	 to	 ensure	 that	 we	 collate	 the	 perceptions	 of	 all	 relevant	
consumers	 (remember	 there	will	 be	winners	 and	 losers,	 and	 they	might	 have	different	 views).	 See	
discussion	in	Section	3.2.1(c)	on	efficiency	and	price	transparency.	
79	John	Stuart	Mill,	On	Liberty	(2nd	edn,	John	W	Parker	&	Son	1859).	
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‘harm’	 is	 notoriously	 indeterminate,	 harm	 is	 conventionally	 understood	 within	
contemporary	 liberal	 theory	 to	 require	 tangible	 harm	 in	 the	 form	 of	 harm	 to	 health	 or	
property.	With	the	rise	of	rights	discourse	from	the	mid	20th	century	onwards,	this	principle	
has	been	further	refined	and	elaborated	through	the	idea	of	rights:	in	which	the	interference	
with	 moral	 rights	 constitutes	 a	 moral	 harm	 and	 raises	 a	 prima	 facie	 claim	 for	 legal	
protection.	Fundamental	rights	are	recognised	as	a	species	of	moral	right	that	are	regarded	
as	essential	to	basic	human	needs	such	that	the	state	has	an	obligation	to	protect	them,	if	
necessary	by	force.80		
Accordingly,	the	following	discussion	considers	whether	there	might	be	some	kind	of	moral	
right	 to	 non-discrimination	 in	 the	 pricing	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 that	 might	 justify	 legal	
intervention	 in	 order	 to	 redress	 price	 discrimination	 directed	 at	 consumers	 as	 a	 form	 of	
‘unfair	dealing’.	We	suggest	 that	 it	may	be	possible	 to	 identify	such	a	 right,	but	 this	arises	
not	 from	 the	 basic	 principle	 of	 equality.	 Rather,	 we	 suggest	 that	 because	 ACPD	 can	 be	
understood	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 'contextual	 integrity',	 it	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 a	 form	 of	
unfair	 dealing.	We	 therefore	 suggest	 that	 mandatory	 disclosure	 might	 be	 an	 appropriate	
legal	response,	discussed	more	fully	at	section	3.4	below.	
3.2.1	 Equality,	perceptions	of	fairness	and	the	evolution	of	social	norms	
One	 of	 the	 most	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 justice,	 defined	 by	 Aristotle	 more	 than	 two	
thousand	years	ago,	is	the	principle	that	‘equals	should	be	treated	equally.’	But	although	it	is	
well	accepted	that,	within	liberal	democratic	communities,	every	individual	has	a	moral	right	
to	equal	concern	and	respect,81	this	does	not	translate	into	a	general	obligation	of	equality	
of	treatment.	 Indeed,	one	of	the	fundamental	problems	with	the	ideal	of	equality	 is	that	 it	
does	not	provide	a	 theory	of	 legitimate	difference.82	Rather,	 the	way	 in	which	we	 identify	
people	as	equally	or	differently	situated	in	ways	that	are	regarded	as	legitimate	is	essentially	
a	 product	 of	 social	 norms.	 Consumer	 perceptions	 of	 fairness/unfairness	 associated	 with	
price	 differentiation	 are	 partly	 a	 product	 of	 both	 their	 general	 knowledge	 about	 the	
marketplace	and	social	norms	of	economic	exchange83	which	serve	as	guides	to	behaviour	to	
parties	in	exchange	transactions.84	Because	these	social	norms	evolve	and	change	over	time,	
the	 perceived	 unfairness	 of	 a	 pricing	 practice	 or	 procedure	may	 also	 change	 over	 time.85	
Thus,	individual	perceptions	of	fair	and	unfair	price	discrimination	are	ultimately	subjective,	
unstable	 and	 contingent.	 Attempts	 to	 regulate	 such	 practices	 on	 grounds	 of	 perceived	
fairness	 would	 inevitably	 encounter	 considerable	 difficulties	 in	 defining	 in	 advance	 which	
kinds	of	practices	are	inherently	unfair.86		
(a)	 Price	discrimination,	informational	privacy	and	contextual	integrity	
Although	 the	 right	 to	equal	 concern	and	 respect	 is	unlikely	 to	provide	a	basis	upon	which	
forms	of	price	discrimination	which	are	often	perceived	as	unfair	might	be	legally	restricted,	
at	 least	 in	 western	 capitalised	 economies,	 there	may	 be	 other	moral	 rights	 implicated	 in	
																																								 																				
80	Peter	 Jones,	 'Rights'	 in	 Peter	 Jones	 and	 Albert	 Weale	 (eds),	 Issues	 in	 Political	 Theory	 (Issues	 in	
Political	Theory,	Macmillan	1994).	
81	Ronald	M	Dworkin,	A	Matter	of	Principle	(Harvard	University	Press	1985).	
82	Paul	Brest,	'The	Empty	Idea	of	Equality'	(1982)	95	Harvard	Law	Review	.	
83 	Xia,	 Monroe	 and	 Cox,	 'The	 Price	 is	 Unfair!	 A	 Conceptual	 Framework	 of	 Price	 Unfairness	
Perceptions',	6.	
84	Sarah	Maxwell,	 'The	Social	Norms	of	Discrete	Consumer	Exchange'	 (1999)	58	American	Journal	of	
Economics	and	Sociology	.	
85	Akiva	Miller,	'What	Do	We	Worry	About	When	We	Worry	About	Price	Discrimination?	The	Law	and	
Ethics	of	Using	Personal	Information	for	Pricing'	(2014)	Journal	of	Technology	Law	&	Policy	,	41-59,	88.	
86	Hence	Miller	argues	that	the	difficulty	in	defining	unfairness	in	the	abstract	is	a	significant	counter	
argument	against	adopting	sweeping	market	regulations	on	these	grounds,	ibid.	
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algorithmic	 online	 price	 discrimination.	 Nissenbaum’s	 concept	 of	 contextual	 integrity	 can	
illuminate	 the	 social	 conventions	 that	 inform	 people’s	 perceptions	 of	 the	 fairness	 or	
unfairness	 of	 various	 forms	 of	 price	 discrimination. 87 	Nissenbaum	 emphasises	 the	
importance	of	recognising	that	people	have	substantive	expectations	about	appropriate	and	
inappropriate	 practices	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 personal	 information.	 These	 substantive	
expectations	are	shaped	by	norms	(or	standards	of	good	behaviour)	within	the	social	context	
in	which	 those	 interactions	 take	 place	 (for	 our	 purposes	 the	 ‘relevant	market’).88	It	 is	 this	
difference	 in	 social	 context	 and	 convention	 which	 may	 account	 for	 the	 contrasting	
perceptions	concerning	price	discrimination	in	business	to	business	transactions	on	the	one	
hand,	and	business	to	consumer	transactions	on	the	other.	In	a	business-to-business	context,	
equivalent	 transactions	which	 result	 in	 dissimilar	 conditions,89	are	 conventionally	 regarded	
as	 acceptable	 because,	 when	 dealing	 with	 each	 other,	 firms	 negotiate	 the	 best	 price	 for	
themselves	and,	as	a	result,	the	prices	ultimately	settled	upon	will	result	in	different	prices	
being	offered	(as	long	as	the	firms	are	dealing	in	their	core	area	of	activity,	and	of	a	similar	
size	 and	 sophistication).	 In	 contrast,	 within	 contemporary	 ‘off-line’	 retail	 environments,	
consumers	 do	 not	 negotiate	 (and	 are	 often	 seen	 as	 having	 little	 or	 no	 bargaining	 power	
relative	 to	 major	 retailers	 whose	 stores	 they	 frequent).90	Absent	 any	 of	 the	 justifications	
identified	 above,	 consumers	 are	 conventionally	 offered	 the	 same	 price	 as	 all	 other	
consumers	 for	 identical	 goods	when	 they	visit	 the	physical	 store	at	which	 the	goods	were	
offered	 for	 sale.	 Consumers	 understand	 that	 the	 price	 of	 consumer	 goods	may	 vary	 over	
time	 in	store	 (discounts	might	be	offered	during	seasonal	sales,	 in	 response	to	rising	costs	
and	 so	 forth).	 However,	 prices	 are	 nevertheless	 offered	 on	 a	 uniform,	 universal	 and	
transparent	basis	at	each	moment	in	time.		
(b)		 Mistaken	 assumptions	 that	 off-line	 shopping	 conventions	 apply	 to	 on-line	
purchases	
In	online	retail	environments,	however,	 it	becomes	technologically	possible	 for	 retailers	 to	
offer	customers	 (whether	businesses	or	consumers)	different	prices	 for	 the	same	goods	at	
precisely	 the	 same	 time,	 because	 online	 shoppers	 only	 see	 the	 personalised	 digital	 shop	
front	offered	to	them.91	Hence	online	consumer	prices	are	neither	universal	nor	transparent	
(in	terms	of	what	other	consumers	are	paying),	and	it	 is	these	considerations	which	largely	
explain	 why	 people	 often	 regard	 ACPD	 as	 highly	 unfair,	 violating	 well-established	 social	
conventions	associated	with	consumer	purchasing	in	the	off-line	world.	Indeed,	it	might	be	
argued	 that	 the	moral	 legitimacy	 of	market	 transactions	 ultimately	 rests	 on	 the	 informed	
																																								 																				
87	Helen	 Nissenbaum,	 'A	 Contextual	 Approach	 to	 Privacy	 Online'	 (2011)	 140	 Daedalus	 ,	 32-48.	
Nissenbaum	develops	her	conception	of	contextual	integrity	in	seeking	to	identify	what	informational	
privacy	requires	in	networked	online	contexts,	but	it	seems	equally	appropriate	in	our	context.	
88	In	relation	to	social	norms	concerning	fair	pricing,	Xia	et	al	claim	that	buyers’	perceptions	of	price	
justice	stem	both	 from	economic	comparisons	and	 from	social	norms	comparisons.	Social	norms	of	
economic	exchange	are	the	understood	rules	of	behaviour,	Xia,	Monroe	and	Cox,	'The	Price	is	Unfair!	
A	Conceptual	Framework	of	Price	Unfairness	Perceptions',	6.	Maxwell	demonstrates	that	many	price	
justice	judgments	stem	from	buyers’	considerations	of	how	the	seller	determines	price	and	whether	
the	price	 is	affordable	to	everyone,	particularly	 in	reference	to	necessities	such	as	pharmaceuticals.	
Thus	consumers	may	also	rely	on	their	beliefs	about	exchange	norms	to	refine	their	justice	judgment,	
Sarah	Maxwell,	 'What	Makes	a	Price	Increase	Seem	'Fair'?'	(1995)	3	Pricing	Strategy	&	Practice	,	21-
27.	
89	Maxwell,	'The	Social	Norms	of	Discrete	Consumer	Exchange'.		
90	Friedrich	Kessler,	 'Contracts	of	Adhesion	 -	 Some	Thoughts	About	 Freedom	of	Contract'	 (1943)	54	
Columbia	Law	Review	,	631.	
91	See	Karen	Yeung,	 'Hypernudge:	Big	Data	 as	 a	Mode	of	Regulation	by	Design'	 (2016)	 Information,	
Communication	&	Society	,	20:	118-136.		
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consent	of	the	transacting	parties92	so	that	if	a	consumer	would	not	have	purchased	an	item	
at	a	particular	price	 if	she	had	known	of	the	willingness	of	the	retailer	to	sell	precisely	the	
same	 good	 at	 lower	 prices	 to	 others,	 then	 the	 consensual	 basis	 of	 her	 contract	 with	 the	
seller	has	been	undermined.	 In	consumer	welfare	 terms,	a	consumer	who	 is	unaware	that	
ACPD	 is	 occurring	might	 claim	 that	 her	 willingness	 to	 enter	 the	 contract	 was	 based	 on	 a	
mistaken	 assessment	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	 goods	 and	 services	 offered.	 On	 this	 line	 of	
reasoning,	 this	 results	 in	 a	 mismatch	 between	 widely	 shared	 social	 conventions	 about	
acceptable	 retail	 practice	 in	 the	off-line	world,	 and	 the	 technological	possibilities	 for	price	
discrimination	 in	 networked,	 online	 retail	 environments.	 In	 circumstances	 in	 which	
consumers	regard	ACPD	as	intuitively	unfair,	this	may	be	because	it	violates	social	and	moral	
conventions	 that	 apply	 in	 off-line	 retail	 environments	 and	 which	 many	 consumers	
unthinkingly	 assume	 continue	 to	 apply	 in	 the	 online	 retail	 context.93	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 imagine	that,	over	 time,	as	on-line	consumers	become	aware	of	such	practices	
and	begin	 to	understand	how	they	work,	 they	may	become	 increasingly	 savvy,	 learning	 to	
use	 digital	 tools	 (such	 as	 on-line	 price	 comparison	 websites,	 identifying	 online	 discount	
coupons,	 or	 anticipating	 the	 timing	 of	 on-line	 ‘flash	 sales’)	 and	 thus	 develop	 strategies	 to	
outsmart	 or	 at	 least	 reduce	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 online	 retailers	 may	 price	 discriminate	
against	them	in	ways	that	result	in	them	paying	higher	prices.94		
(c)	 Efficiency	and	price	transparency		
In	conventional	microeconomics,	consumer	surplus	(and	efficiency)	only	depends	upon	the	
(absolute)	price	that	an	 individual	pays	for	a	good	–	the	prices	offered	to	other	consumers	
(i.e.	 relative	 prices)	 are	 irrelevant.95	According	 to	 this	 perspective,	 an	 individual	 consumer	
would	not	therefore	be	induced	to	make	a	mistake	(in	her	valuation	of	a	product	or	service)	
if	non-transparent	discounts	are	offered	to	other	consumers;	and	so	there	is	assumed	to	be	
no	 loss	 of	 aggregate	 consumer	 surplus.	 However,	 even	 before	 the	 advent	 of	 behavioural	
economics,	 traditional	economic	analysis	has	 long	recognised	that	 relative	prices	 (or,	what	
																																								 																				
92	According	to	‘consent	theories’	of	contract	associated	with	various	writers	such	as	Charles	Fried	and	
Randy	 Barnett,	 Contract	 as	 Promise:	 A	 Theory	 of	 Contractual	 Obligation	 (Havard	 University	 Press	
1981);	and	Randy	Barnett,	 'A	Consent	Theory	of	Contract'	 (1986)	Columbia	Law	Review	 ,	269.	For	a	
discussion	of	autonomy-based	theories	of	contrast,	see	Anthony	Duggan,	Michael	Bryan	and	Frances	
Hanks,	 Contractual	 Non-Disclosure:	 An	 Applied	 Study	 in	 Modern	 Contract	 Theory	 (Longman	
Professional	Publishing	1994),	chapter	3.	
93 	OFT,	 Personalised	 Pricing:	 increasing	 transparency	 to	 improve	 trust	 (2013),	 5:	 ‘where	
personalisation	takes	place,	it	is	less	likely	to	be	harmful	where	consumers	know	that	it	is	happening,	
understand	 how	 it	 works,	 and	 can	 exercise	 an	 effective	 choice.	 E.g.	 where	 consumers	 receive	
personalised	discounts	as	a	result	of	membership	of	a	loyalty	scheme.	We	think	there	is	potential	for	
harm	if	consumers	receive	a	personalised	price	without	knowing	this	is	so.	OFT	1489:	Research	found	
that	consumers	are	more	likely	to	be	concerned	(i)	when	the	fact	that	it	is	occurring	is	not	transparent	
to	 consumers;	 (ii)	 when	 it	 is	 not	 expected	 by	 consumers	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 products	 they	 are	
purchasing.’	Analogous	arguments	have	been	made	 to	 justify	 imposing	 criminal	 sanctions	 for	 cartel	
behaviour,	 characterising	 such	 conduct	 as	 deceptive	 or	 as	 tantamount	 to	 cheating	 because	
consumers	 are	 operating	 on	 the	 mistaken	 assumption	 that	 prices	 are	 being	 set	 independently:	 P	
Whelan	 The	 Criminalization	 of	 European	 Cartel	 Enforcement:	 Theoretical,	 Legal	 and	 Practical	
Challenges	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2014);	 B	 Wardhaugh	 ‘A	 normative	 approach	 to	 the	
criminalisation	of	cartel	activity’	(2012)	32	Legal	Stud	369	(or	his	book:	B	Wardhaugh	Cartels,	Markets	
and	Crime:	A	Normative	 Justification	 for	 the	Criminalisation	of	Economic	Collusion	 (Cambridge,	UK:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2014)).	We	are	indebted	to	Caron	Beaton-Wells	for	drawing	our	attention	
to	this	literature.	
94	Ezrachi	and	Stucke,	Virtual	Competition,	115.	
95	See,	for	example,	Varian,	Intermediate	Microeconomics:	a	modern	approach.		
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we	 term,	 inter-personal	 effects)	 can	 and	 do	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 consumer	 surplus.96	For	
example:	
i. Where	the	value	of	a	good	is	uncertain,	consumers	may	look	to	the	prices	charged	
to	other	consumers	 to	 inform	their	 judgment	about	 the	 true	value	of	 the	product,	
e.g.	common	value	auctions.		
ii. Prestige	or	status	goods,	such	as	perfumes	and	designer	clothing,	may	derive	some	
of	 their	 value	 from	 being	 exclusive	 –	 if	 prestige	 goods	 are	 offered	 to	 other	
consumers	 at	 a	 discount,	 it	 can	 undermine	 the	 value	 a	 consumer	 places	 on	 that	
good.	
iii. Consumer	valuations	may	be	interdependent.	For	example,	knowing	that	the	person	
sitting	next	to	me	on	the	plane	has	paid	only	half	as	much	as	me	might	reduce	the	
surplus	I	get	from	my	own	ticket	purchase.	
In	 each	of	 these	 examples,	 a	 lack	 of	 transparency	 about	 the	prices	 offered	 to	others	may	
induce	consumers	to	make	mistakes,	leading	to	either	under-purchasing	or	over-purchasing.	
Mistakes	 of	 this	 kind	 cause	 a	 misallocation	 of	 resources,	 reducing	 aggregate	 consumer	
surplus	with	implications	for	policy	that	are	consistent	with	our	argument	that	unfair	dealing	
can	arise	in	online	retail	environments	due	to	mistaken	assumptions	made	by	consumers.		
However,	 an	 absence	of	 price	 transparency	 can,	 in	 some	 circumstances,	 be	used	 to	boost	
sales,	 leading	to	an	offsetting	positive	effect	on	consumer	surplus.	For	example,	flash	sales	
are	 often	 deliberately	 opaque	 so	 that	 excess	 supplies	 can	 be	 sold	 at	 a	 discount	 without	
making	consumers	who	paid	the	full	price	feel	that	they	have	made	a	mistake.	That	said,	in	
general,	 price	 transparency	 tends	 to	 help	 markets	 work	 more	 efficiently	 and	 is	 likely	 to	
increase	or	have	a	neutral	 impact	on	 sales.	 In	 short,	 there	 is	 typically	 is	no	 clash	between	
efficiency	and	justice	evaluations	of	the	desirability	of	price	transparency.		
Accordingly,	one	 legal	policy	response	may	be	to	require	transparency	 in	the	use	of	ACPD,	
requiring	all	firms	that	engage	in	ACPD	to	ensure	that	customers	are	meaningfully	informed	
that	variable	pricing	is	in	operation,	in	which	the	price	offered	is	based	on	an	evaluation	of	
each	user’s	digital	profile	created	from	the	continuous	tracking	of	their	online	behaviour.97	
While	the	details	of	such	a	regime	need	careful	consideration,	its	animating	concern	would	
be	 to	 ensure	 that	 consumers	 are	 adequately	 informed	 that	 prices	 are	 determined	 on	 a	
differential	basis	rather	than	on	a	uniform	and	universal	basis,	and	of	the	range	of	variables	
that	affect	how	prices	are	 individually	determined	(which	should	also	allow	them	to	assess	
whether	 discrimination	 is	 taking	 place	 on	 legally	 protected	 grounds).98	Only	 then	 can	
																																								 																				
96	There	is	a	long	tradition	of	these	and	similar	types	of	inter-personal	effects	being	incorporated	into	
models	 of	 consumer	 decision	making	 and	 economic	welfare,	 e.g.	 Harvey	 Leibenstein,	 'Bandwagon,	
Snob,	 and	 Veblen	 Effects	 in	 the	 Theory	 of	 Consumer	 Demand'	 (1950)	 64	 Quarterly	 Journal	 of	
Economics	183.	It	is	however	difficult	to	estimate	these	effects	empirically,	which	is	one	reason	why	
these	types	of	effects	are	routinely	ignored	in	evaluations	of	consumer	surplus.	
97	Footnote	146	notes	 that	 the	ECJ	has	held	 that	 a	 lack	of	price	 transparency	 (allowing	a	dominant	
firm	to	transfer	surplus	from	one	customer	to	another)	may	be,	in	itself,	an	unfair	abuse,	Article	102.		
98	This	proposal	is	consistent	with	the	EU	Data	Protection	Directive,	article	12(a)	which	provides	data	
subjects	 with	 a	 right	 to	 ‘knowledge	 of	 the	 logic	 involved	 in	 any	 automated	 processing	 of	 data	
concerning	 him	 at	 least	 in	 the	 case	 of	 automated	 decisions	 referred	 in	 to	 article	 15(1)	 which	
establishes	 the	 ‘right	 to	 every	 person	 not	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 decision	which	 produces	 legal	 effects	
concerning	him	or	significantly	affects	him	and	which	is	based	solely	on	automated	processing	of	data	
intended	 to	 evaluate	 certain	 personal	 aspects	 relating	 to	 him,	 such	 as	 his	 performance	 at	 work,	
creditworthiness,	reliability,	conduct	etc.’	The	new	data	protection	regulation	(which	enters	into	force	
in	May	2018)	has	similar	provisions	Regulation	(EU)	2016/679	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	
Council	 of	 27	 April	 2016,	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 natural	 persons	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 processing	 of	
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consumers	make	more	 informed	decisions	about	whom	they	wish	 to	 transact	with	and	on	
what	terms.	Hence,	we	suggest	that	a	disclosure	regime	must,	at	minimum,	oblige	firms	that	
wish	to	engage	in	ACPD	to	inform	consumers	in	advance:		
i. that	prices	offered	online	 to	any	 customer	may	differ	 from	 those	offered	 to	other	
customers;	
ii. that	their	personal	digital	data,	including	data	acquired	from	continuous	tracking	of	
their	 online	behaviour,	may	be	used	 to	 construct	 consumer	profiles	 that	 form	 the	
operative	basis	 for	determining	 the	prices	at	which	goods	will	be	offered	 to	 them,	
and	
iii. of	the	full	range	of	variables	which	affect	the	algorithmic	determination	of	how	the	
prices	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 are	 calculated	 (this	 need	 not	 entail	 disclosure	 of	 the	
underlying	algorithm	itself,	nor	the	costs	associated	with	production	of	the	relevant	
good/service	-	only	of	the	algorithmic	variables	and	the	directions	in	which	they	can	
be	expected	to	move).99	
Because	 this	 would	 not	 prohibit	 firms	 from	 engaging	 in	 ACPD,	 some	 consumers	 might	
continue	 to	 perceive	 ACPD	 as	 unfair	 and	 unjust,	 particularly	 given	 that	 disclosure	 of	 the	
variables	 that	 inform	algorithmic	pricing	strategies	 is	unlikely	 to	provide	consumers	with	a	
clear	 and	 comprehensible	 understanding	 of	 the	 intuitive	 logic	 upon	which	 these	 practices	
rest.100	We	have	suggested,	however,	that	the	perceived	unfairness	of	algorithmic	pricing	is	
not,	 in	 and	 of	 itself,	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 substantive	 legal	 intervention	 prohibiting	 such	
practices.	A	mandatory	disclosure	regime	recognises	the	importance	of	contextual	integrity,	
highlighting	 the	 role	 played	by	 social	 conventions	 that	 inform	people’s	 perceptions	 of	 the	
fairness	or	unfairness	of	price	discrimination.	In	contemporary	on-line	business	to	consumer	
transactions,	 consumers	often	assume	 that	prices	 are	offered	on	a	uniform,	universal	 and	
transparent	 basis,	 at	 each	 relevant	moment	 in	 time	 (i.e.	 allowing	 for	 seasonal	 sales,	 etc.).	
Under	 ACPD,	 firms	 can	 depart	 from	 this	 assumption,	 yet	 many	 consumers	 do	 not	 even	
realise	this	is	happening,	believing	that	the	normal	conventions	offline,	also	operate	online,	
if	they	even	consider	the	issue	at	all.	So,	ACPD	risks	violating	widely	shared	social	and	moral	
conventions.	 If	such	a	shift	 if	not	communicated	to	and	supported	by	consumers,	 this	may	
undermine	the	perceived	moral	legitimacy	of	(online)	markets	in	which	on-line	retailers	are	
able	 successfully	 to	 exploit	 consumers’	mistaken	 assumptions	 and	 expectations	 about	 the	
basis	of	their	on-line	dealings	and	is	therefore	unfair.101	
3.3	 Collective	fairness	and	distributive	justice	
Allegations	 that	 price	 discrimination	 is	 unfair	 to	 those	 individuals	 who	 pay	 higher	 prices	
relative	 to	other	 consumers	 for	 the	 same	goods	or	 services	 rest	 on	 a	 notion	of	 corrective	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
personal	 data	 and	 on	 the	 free	movement	 of	 such	 data,	 and	 repealing	 Directive	 95/46/EC,	 OJ	 2016	
L119/1.		
99	Any	 mandatory	 disclosure	 policy	 must	 establish	 criteria	 to	 identify	 what	 would	 constitute	 an	
acceptable	policy.	Although	specification	of	the	content	and	parameters	of	such	a	policy	is	beyond	the	
scope	 of	 this	 article,	 we	 suggest	 such	 policies	 must	 provide	 sufficient	 detail	 in	 order	 to	 provide	
adequate	guidance	to	consumers	who	wish	to	order	their	affairs	in	order	to	secure	the	cheapest	offer.	
Hence	 vaguely	 worded	 policies	 that	 merely	 indicate	 that	 the	 price	 of	 goods	 is	 determined	 by	 an	
algorithm	 that	 takes	 into	 account	 a	 consumer’s	 past	 online	 purchasing	 behaviour	 and	 overall	
customer	interest	in	that	item	would	not	be	sufficient.	Policies	must	also	be	clear	and	transparent.	
100		 See	generally	Sandra	Wachter,	Brent	Mittelstadt,	Luciano	Floridi;	Why	a	Right	to	Explanation	
of	 Automated	 Decision-Making	 Does	 Not	 Exist	 in	 the	 General	 Data	 Protection	 Regulation,	
International	 Data	 Privacy	 Law,	 Volume	 7,	 Issue	 2,	 1	 May	 2017,	 Pages	 76–99,	
https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipx005.	
101	As	 pointed	 out	 above,	 see	 footnote	 93,	 the	UK’s	 competition	 authority	was	 also	worried	 about	
consumers	losing	“…significant	trust	in	online	markets	due	to	concerns	about	price	discrimination…”		
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justice	 or	 unfair	 dealing,	 in	 which	 discriminatory	 pricing	 is	 characterized	 as	 a	 form	 of	
individual	wrongdoing.102	But	 the	 fairness	 of	 price	discrimination	 can	 also	be	 evaluated	by	
reference	 to	 collective	understandings	 of	 fairness,	 viewed	 through	 the	 lens	 of	distributive	
justice	(or	‘social	justice’)103	which	is	particularly	concerned	with	the	distribution	of	benefits	
and	 burdens	 between	 and	 across	 members	 of	 a	 political	 community,	 including	 different	
societal	groups.104		
3.3.1	 ACPD	as	unfair	social	sorting	
ACPD	 may	 have	 other	 significant	 and	 troubling	 distributive	 consequences,	 by	 providing	
online	 retailers	 with	 the	 technological	 capacity	 to	 segment	 the	 consuming	 public	 into	
different	 groups,	 based	 on	 their	 relative	 value	 and	 profitability	 to	 the	 retailer.	 In	 other	
words,	retailers	may	be	rationally	 inclined	to	engage	 in	a	form	of	social	sorting,	seeking	to	
cultivate	 and	 attract	 the	 choicest	 customers	 (the	 “strong	market”)	 and	 exclude	 low-value	
consumers	(the	“weak	market”).105	Miller	claims	that	if	a	large	part	of	the	information	used	
as	a	basis	 for	ACPD	pertains	 to	persistent	qualities,	 such	as	 the	neighbourhood	consumers	
live	 in,	 their	 income	 level,	 and	 their	 level	 of	 education,	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 result	 in	 some	
individuals	routinely	suffering	the	same	treatment	across	different	sellers.	He	fears	that,	 in	
the	 long	run,	this	 threatens	to	create	a	market	divided	between	a	class	of	consumers	who	
receive	 lavish	 personal	 attention	 and	 preferential	 treatment	 including	 offers	 for	 the	 best	
products,	 services	 and	 prices,	 and	 a	 class	 of	 consumers	 algorithmically	 assessed	 as	 ‘low	
value’	who	are	systematically	ignored,	under-served,	and	over-charged.	As	Miller	puts	it:	
“It	is	one	thing	when	people	are	treated	differently	in	the	market	as	a	result	of	their	
different	 buying	 power;	 it	 is	 another	 thing	 entirely	 when	 people	 are	 treated	
differently	as	a	 result	of	deliberate	data-driven	 judgments	by	 the	sellers	about	 the	
kind	of	people	their	clients	are.”106	
In	 the	 off-line	 retail	 environment,	 the	 segmentation	 of	 consumer	 groups	 may	 generate	
beneficial	forms	of	retail	innovation,	with	retailers	tailoring	their	offerings	towards	particular	
kinds	 of	 consumers,	 such	 as	 supermarket	 chains	 focused	 on	 affluent	 consumers	 with	 a	
preference	 for	 organic	 and	 high	 quality	 fresh	 and	 gourmet	 products,	 whilst	 other	
supermarket	chains	such	as	Aldi	and	Lidl	focus	on	price-sensitive	shoppers	with	an	emphasis	
on	 low	 prices	 and	 basic	 groceries	 and	 a	 more	 streamlined	 product	 range.	 But	 the	 social	
sorting	and	resulting	‘digital	red-lining’	that	algorithmic	price	discrimination	makes	possible	
																																								 																				
102	The	 classic	 formulation	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 corrective	 justice	 is	 provided	 by	 Aristotle’s	 treatment	 of	
justice	in	Nichomachean	Ethics,	Book	V,	2-5,	1130a14-1133b28.	
103	On	 Aristotle’s	 account,	 distributive	 justice	 concerns	 the	 distribution	 of	 benefits	 and	 burdens	
among	participants	of	a	political	community,	Nichomachean	Ethics	III.9.1280a7–22.	
104	John	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice	(Clarendon	Press	1972).	
105 	Concerns	 about	 the	 distributive	 consequences	 of	 online	 pricing	 were	 also	 raised	 in	 OFT,	
Personalised	 Pricing:	 increasing	 transparency	 to	 improve	 trust,	 13:	 ‘The	 research	 and	 evidence	 we	
have	collected	indicates	that	businesses	are	trying	to	identify	different	sorts	of	customer	and	segment	
their	customer	base	into	fine	groups,	rather	than	seeking	to	identify	who	individuals	are.”	“Even	if	the	
overall	 benefit	 of	 price	discrimination	were	positive,	we	would	 still	 be	 concerned	 if	 the	 group	who	
were	disadvantaged	by	personalized	pricing	were	considered	vulnerable	(vulnerability	may	relate	to	
the	capacity	of	 the	consumer	–	e.g.	poor	 literacy	or	numeracy	 skills	 (individual	vulnerability)	or	 the	
nature	of	 the	product/service,	or	 the	way	 it	 is	 sold	–	e.g.	high	pressure	 tactics.	Also,	 “Oscar	Gandy	
argued	 over	 20	 years	 ago	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 this	 ‘panoptic’	 technologies	 is	 to	 victimize	 through	
avoidance	 of	 certain	 groups	 of	 people,	 who	 are	 persistently	 disfavoured	 because	 of	 their	 race,	
gender,	age,	class,	culture,	and	consciousness.	This	exclusion	goes	beyond	the	mere	disadvantages	of	
not	having	enough	money	to	pay,	and	amounts	to	an	entrenchment	of	social	classes	already	victim	to	
past	biases.”	[Are	all	of	these	quotes	from	the	OFT?	If	not,	can	you	provide	references?]	
106	Miller,	'What	Do	We	Worry	About	When	we	Worry	About	Price	Discrimination?	The	Law	and	Ethics	
of	Using	Personal	Information	for	Pricing',	96.	
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is	distinguishable	because	the	online	digital	environment	can	be	readily	personalized	in	ways	
that	physical	retail	environments	cannot.	In	off-line	retail	environments,	the	consumer	who	
regularly	shops	at	discount	stores	 is	free	to	browse	in	high-end	retail	stores	aimed	at	well-
heeled,	 affluent	 clientele,	 and	 to	 purchase	 goods	 at	 a	 uniform,	 universal	 and	 transparent	
price.	In	other	words,	she	is	not	excluded	from	high-end	retail	products	on	the	same	terms	
as	others,	because	she	can	enter	the	physical	store	and	purchase	them	on	uniform	terms	as	
the	affluent	(leaving	aside	any	discounts	offered	for	loyal	customers).	But	in	the	online	retail	
environment,	 although	 the	 same	 consumer	may	 browse	 retail	 websites	 aimed	 at	 affluent	
consumers,	she	has	no	way	of	knowing	whether	the	prices	at	which	goods	are	being	offered	
to	her	are	the	same	as	those	offered	to	others,	since	she	sees	only	her	own	‘personalised’	
version	of	the	retailer’s	online	store.		
Yet	 we	 are	 only	 just	 beginning	 to	 wrestle	 with	 the	 collective	 justice	 implications	 of	
algorithmic	discrimination	of	this	kind,	of	which	ACPD	is	but	one	example.107	In	our	view,	if	
there	 is	 clear	 evidence	 that	 online	 price	 discrimination	 perpetuates	 or	 reinforces	 social	
injustice,	then	legal	intervention	of	a	substantive	kind	may	well	be	justified	given	that	within	
a	free	society,	the	law	is	properly	concerned	with	the	task	of	securing	distributive	justice,	in	
addition	to	the	task	of	harm	prevention.108	At	present,	there	 is	 little	 in	terms	of	systematic	
attempts	 to	 evaluate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 ACPD	 is	 occurring,	 let	 alone	 an	 empirical	
evaluation	of	its	implications	for	distributive	justice.	Accordingly,	there	is	an	urgent	need	for	
further	systematic	research	and	investigation	to	generate	a	solid	evidence	base	from	which	
to	 consider	 whether	 substantive	 legal	 intervention	 is	 required	 and,	 the	 kind	 of	 legal	 and	
political	 institutions	 that	 might	 best	 be	 enrolled	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 algorithmic	
discrimination	that	serves	to	perpetuate	social	injustice.	
3.3.2	 ACPD	as	efficient	social	sorting?	
From	an	efficiency	perspective,	price	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	social	groupings	typically	
increases	aggregate	consumer	surplus	provided	it	is	based	on	economic	criteria,	especially	a	
consumer’s	 willingness	 to	 pay,	 rather	 than	 the	 consumer’s	 social	 status.	 In	 some	
circumstances,	 status-based	 discounts	 may	 provide	 a	 reasonable	 proxy	 for	 willingness	 to	
pay,	 so	 that	any	 resulting	price	discrimination	might	be	 judged	both	 fair	and	economically	
efficient.	 For	 example,	 discounts	 on	 train	 fares	 offered	 to	 students	might	 be	 regarded	 as	
both	fair	and	efficient,	since	they	result	in	lower	prices	being	offered	to	those	that	can	least	
afford	to	pay	and,	assuming	that	these	groups	also	have	relatively	elastic	demand	(which	is	
typically,	but	not	 invariably	 true109)	–	 such	status	discounts	can	also	 lead	 to	an	 increase	 in	
output	increasing	economic	efficiency.110	On	the	other	hand,	group-based	differential	pricing	
																																								 																				
107	For	example,	researchers	at	Carnegie	Mellon	built	a	tool	to	simulate	Google	users	that	started	with	
no	 search	history	 and	 then	 visited	 employment	websites.	 Later,	 on	 a	 third-party	 news	 site,	Google	
showed	an	ad	for	a	career	coaching	service	advertising	“$200k+”	executive	positions	1,852	times	to	
men	 and	 318	 times	 to	women:	Amit	Datta,	Michael	 	 Car	 Tschantz	 and	Anupam	Datta,	 'Automated	
Experiments	on	Ad	Privacy	Settings'	(2015)	1	Proceedings	on	Privacy	Enhancing	Technologies	92.	The	
reason	for	the	difference	is	unknown.	It	could	have	been	that	the	advertiser	requested	that	the	ads	
be	targeted	toward	men,	or	that	the	algorithm	determined	that	men	were	more	likely	to	click	on	the	
ads.	Google	declined	to	say	how	the	ad	showed	up,	but	said	in	a	statement,	“Advertisers	can	choose	
to	target	the	audience	they	want	to	reach,	and	we	have	policies	that	guide	the	type	of	interest-based	
ads	 that	 are	 allowed.”	 See	Claire	Cain,	 'When	Algorithms	Discriminate'	The	New	York	 Times	 (9	 July	
2015).	
108	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice.	
109	A	counter	example	would	be	where	low	income	groups	are,	on	average,	less	financially	literate	and	
more	financially	constrained.	
110	Status	discounts	have	two	effects	on	consumer	surplus:	an	output	effect,	and	a	distribution	effect.	
The	output	effect	tends	to	be	positive	as	status	discounts	allow	consumers	who	value	the	good	above	
the	 marginal	 cost	 of	 production	 but	 below	 the	 non-discounted	 price	 to	 make	 a	 purchase.	 The	
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might	be	regarded	as	unfair	yet	generate	economically	efficient	outcomes.	For	example,	the	
ECJ	 has	 prohibited	 the	 practice	 of	 gender-based	 insurance	 pricing	 largely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
equity	and	procedural	 justice.	However,	 the	weight	of	economic	evidence111	is	 that	gender	
based	 pricing	 can	 increase	 economic	 efficiency	 and	 reduce	 the	 average	 cost	 of	 insurance	
provided	 that	 prices	 reflect	 the	 different	 risks	 (and	 therefore	 costs)	 of	 insuring	 different	
genders.		
Conversely,	 price	 discrimination	 on	 non-economic	 criteria	 often	 reduces	 economic	
efficiency.	One	concern	raised	by	justice	theorists	is	that	ACPD	may	result	in	a	form	of	social	
sorting,	 with	 some	 groups	 routinely	 discriminated	 against,	 particularly	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
gender,	race,	or	geographic	location.	Miller	suggests	that	this	may	result	in	some	groups	not	
being	 supplied,	or	being	 charged	higher	prices.	But	 it	 is	 unclear	whether	discrimination	of	
this	 kind	 would	 result	 in	 a	 social	 group	 being	 routinely	 discriminated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
economic	 criteria.	 For	 example,	 prohibitions	 on	 gender-based	 price	 discrimination	 in	 the	
pension	 annuities	 market	 results	 in	 women	 paying	 higher	 prices	 for	 these	 products	 on	
account	 of	 their	 greater	 life	 expectancy,	 but	 lower	 prices	 for	 car	 insurance,	 due	 to	 their	
lower	 risk	 of	 accidents.	 Similarly,	 while	 some	 social	 groups	 may	 have	 relatively	 inelastic	
demand	for	some	products	 (and	pay	higher	prices)	they	are	 likely	to	have	relatively	elastic	
demand,	and	pay	lower	prices,	for	other	products.	Indeed,	lower	income	social	groups	have	
often	found	to	be	more	price	elastic	–	and	therefore	potentially	beneficiaries	of	ACPD	–	than	
other	consumers	for	products	such	as	breakfast	cereals	and	cigarettes.112	
However,	there	is	one	social	group	of	customers	that	may	be	routinely	discriminated	against	
through	ACPD	–	 consumers	 that	 have	 difficulty	 in	making	 good	decisions	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	
knowledge,	poor	computational	abilities,	or	by	being	disengaged.	Although	these	so-called	
‘sleepers’113	might	fail	to	shop	around	and	search	for	better	deals	through	sheer	laziness	or	
apathy,	many	such	customers	are	likely	to	be	correlated	with	some	of	the	more	vulnerable	
groups	 in	 society,	 including	 the	 low	 income,	 the	 elderly,	 and	 the	 illiterate.	 As	 Section	 2	
highlighted,	 this	 group	may	 superficially	 appear	 to	 have	 a	 low	 price	 elasticity	 of	 demand	
because	 they	 fail	 to,	 search	 out	 the	 best	 deal,	 or	 switch	 providers,	 when	 prices	 rise.	
Accordingly,	 with	 ACPD,	 this	 group	 may	 pay	 higher	 prices	 than	 the	 well	 informed	 and	
financially	savvy	consumers	who	regularly	switch	providers.	They	may	also	pay	higher	prices	
than	 they	 would	 under	 uniform	 pricing	 where	 prices	may	 be	 set	 by	 competition	 to	 well-
informed	consumers.	
Although	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 ACPD	 promotes	 economic	 efficiency	 by	 charging	 higher	
prices	to	this	group	on	the	basis	of	their	lower	observed	price	elasticity	of	demand,	this	is	a	
potentially	erroneous	analysis.	It	is	wrong	in	two	distinct	ways.		
First,	the	efficiency	rationale	for	charging	higher	prices	to	customers	that	are	price	inelastic	
is	 that	 these	 customers	 have	 a	 high	willingness	 to	 pay	 either	 because	 they	 have	 a	 strong	
preference	 for	 staying	with	 their	 existing	provider	or	 that	 they	would	 incur	 relatively	high	
switching	 costs	 in	 changing	 supplier.	 However,	 consumers	 who	 stay	 with	 their	 existing	
provider	 not	 out	 of	 brand	 preference,	 but	 because	 they	 lack	 the	 computational	 skills,	 the	
information	 or	 the	 engagement	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 better	 deals	 elsewhere	 do	 not	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
distribution	 effect	 is	 negative	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 price	 discrimination	 results	 in	 some	 goods	 being	
supplied	to	those	that	value	them	less	than	consumers	who	fail	to	make	a	purchase.	The	output	effect	
tends	 to	dominate	 the	distribution	effect	 so	 that	 the	net	effect	of	 status	discounts	on	efficiency	 is,	
most	often,	positive.	
111	See,	for	example	a	review	of	evidence	by	Oxera	(2015).	
http://www.oxera.com/oxera/media/oxera/the-use-of-gender-in-insurance-pricing.pdf?ext=.pdf		
112	http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/26645/1/25010082.pdf,		
	http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25430738		
113	Ezrachi	and	Stucke,	Virtual	Competition,	114.	
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necessarily	have	a	high	willingness	to	pay.	On	the	contrary,	they	make	economic	mistakes	–	
they	purchase	from	the	wrong	supplier	and	possibly	also	over-consume.		
Second,	 the	 finding	 in	 the	 economics	 literature	 that	 price	 discrimination	 in	 competitive	
markets	tends	to	intensify	competition	and	increase	aggregate	consumer	surplus	is	based	on	
the	 assumption	 that	 some	 consumers	 prefer	 one	 brand	 and	 other	 groups	 prefer	 another	
(best-response	asymmetry).	As	 a	 result,	 individual	 consumers	or	 consumer	groups	are	not	
routinely	 discriminated	 against.	 However,	 for	 consumers	 that	 have	 a	 preference	 for	 their	
status	 quo	 providers	 because	 they	 lack	 the	 computational	 powers,	 information	 or	
engagement	to	search	for	and	take	advantage	of	better	deals	can	find	themselves	routinely	
discriminated	against.	Under	these	conditions	(best-response	symmetry),	ACPD	can	reduce	
economic	 efficiency	 in	 competitive	 markets.	 So,	 intriguingly,	 economic	 efficiency	 and	
collective	 justice	 could	 reinforce	each	other	where	 a	 group	of	 consumers	 routinely	makes	
mistakes	in	consumer	decision-making.		
3.4	 Summary	
The	preceding	discussion	demonstrates	 that	whether	price	discrimination,	 including	ACPD,	
may	 be	 considered	 fair	 is	 not	 straightforward,	 partly	 due	 to	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	
fairness	might	be	understood	(in	terms	of	perceptions	of	unfairness,	as	unfair	dealing,	or	as	
collective	 injustice).	 While	 consumers	 often	 regard	 price	 discrimination	 in	 general	 as	
intuitively	 unfair,	 studies	 of	 consumer	 perceptions	 of	 pricing	 fairness	 reveal	 that	 these	
evaluations	 are	 often	 inconsistent.	 In	 any	 event,	 the	 mere	 fact	 that	 people	 subjectively	
regard	 conduct	 as	morally	 undesirable	 or	 unfair	 does	 not,	 in	 and	 of	 itself,	 justify	 coercive	
legal	 intervention.	We	have	also	seen	that,	 in	general,	conventional	economics	has	 little	to	
say	on	issues	of	fairness	–	it	offers	a	theory	of	efficiency	and	not	a	theory	of	justice.		
Nevertheless,	we	 have	 identified	 two	 circumstances	 in	which	 the	 values	 of	 efficiency	 and	
fairness/equity	converge	 in	 their	assessment.	Firstly,	 if	consumers	who	currently	make	on-
line	purchases	typically	do	so	on	the	mistaken	belief	that	the	assumption	of	uniform	pricing	
which	 typically	 applies	 in	 the	 off-line	world	 also	 applies	 in	 the	 on-line	 environment,	 then	
ACPD	might	in	this	context	constitute	a	form	of	unfair	dealing	and	reduce	consumer	surplus	
because	it	 leads	to	mistakes	 in	the	valuation	of	on-line	goods	and	services.	To	address	this	
problem,	 we	 have	 suggested	 that	 mandatory	 disclosure	 by	 retailers	 that	 they	 engage	 in	
ACPD	is	an	appropriate	legal	response.		
Secondly,	we	saw	that	ACPD	may	mean	that	vulnerable	groups	of	consumers	who	lack	the	
digital	 literacy	 and	 sophistication	 required	 to	 search	 for	 the	 best	 deal,	 and	 fail	 to	 switch	
providers	 in	circumstances	where	 it	would	otherwise	be	economically	 rational	 for	 them	to	
do	 so,	 pay	 more.	 In	 some	 circumstances,	 the	 failure	 of	 consumers	 of	 this	 kind	 to	 shop	
around	or	 switch	providers	may	be	misinterpreted	by	on-line	 suppliers	 as	 an	 indication	of	
brand	 preference	 and	willingness	 to	 pay,	 and	 so	 they	may	 be	 charged	 higher	 prices	 than	
those	offered	to	more	informed,	savvy	consumers.	Proposing	solutions	is	more	difficult	here.	
One	 problem	 is	 that	 sellers	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 distinguish	 between	 these	 vulnerable	
consumers	 and	 consumers	 positively	 demonstrating	 brand	 preference;	 observationally,	
these	 two	 groups	 of	 consumers	 respond	 in	 the	 same	way.	We	may	want	 to	 intervene	 to	
protect	the	vulnerable,	but	not	the	latter.	One	possibility	is	to	define	a	separate	market	for	
these	vulnerable	consumers	and	 then	apply	Article	102	 in	 the	normal	way;	but	 that	 is	not	
always	appropriate.	Furthermore,	the	problem	does	not	only	arise	from	ACPD	by	dominant	
firms,	and	so	even	if	such	a	course	is	sometimes	possible,	it	is	not	sufficient	to	deal	with	the	
perceived	harm.	A	more	extensive	remedy	that	should	work	in	many	instances	is	a	form	of	
price	regulation,	such	as	price	caps.	These	are	controversial,	and	will	only	be	applied	where	
there	is	very	serious	and	long-standing	consumer	harm	(and	other	remedies	have	failed).	It	
may	be	that	this	is	an	area	where	there	is	a	harm,	but	no	appropriate,	widespread	remedy.	
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4. EU	Competition	Law	and	Article	102	TFEU		
Now	that	we	have	considered	the	normative	desirability	of	ACPD,	by	reference	to	the	values	
of	 economic	 efficiency	 (in	 seeking	 to	maximise	 aggregate	 consumer	welfare)	 and	 fairness,	
we	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 consider	 its	 legality,	 viewed	 primarily	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 EU	
competition	 law.	 In	 arguing	 in	 favour	 of	 a	mandatory	 disclosure	 regime	where	ACPD	 is	 in	
use,	we	have	deliberately	avoided	stipulating	whether	such	a	remedy	would	fall	within	the	
remit	of	any	particular	area	of	 law.	Possible	candidates	might	 include	consumer	protection	
law,	data	protection	 law,	 laws	concerning	e-commerce	or	 competition	 law,	but	 identifying	
which	field	of	legal	protection	provides	the	most	suitable	vehicle	for	response	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	paper.	Rather,	the	focus	of	our	analysis	is	on	how	EU	competition	law	may	be	
expected	 to	 respond	 to	ACPD,	 and	 hence	 the	 following	 discussion	 focuses	 on,	 Article	 102	
TFEU,	 which	 prohibits	 the	 abuse	 of	 a	 dominant	 position.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 EU	
competition	 cases	 dealing	 directly	with	 ACPD,	 the	 following	 discussion	 describes	 the	 case	
law	as	it	currently	stands.	We	conclude	that,	although	it	is	theoretically	possible	for	ACPD	to	
be	legally	characterised	as	abusive,	it	is	far	from	certain	that	the	EU	Courts	would	reach	this	
conclusion	 if	 called	 upon	 to	 decide	 the	 issue.	 Section	 5	 then	 asks	 how	 the	 Article	 102	
framework	 should	 be	 applied	 to	 evaluate	 the	 legality	 of	 ACPD	 in	 light	 of	 the	 values	 of	
economic	efficiency	and	fairness.		
Before	proceeding,	it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	the	legal	effect	of	Article	102	can	be	
highly	intrusive	in	the	commercial	decisions	of	dominant	firms,	affecting	the	price	that	they	
can	 charge,	 and	 even	who	 they	 can	 contract	 with.	 Advocate	 General	 Jacobs	warned	 that	
caution	is	needed	when	interfering	in	the	commercial	decisions	of	dominant	firms:	
“…the	right	to	choose	one's	trading	partners	and	freely	to	dispose	of	one's	property	
are	generally	recognised	principles	in	the	laws	of	the	Member	States…Incursions	on	
those	 rights	 require	 careful	 justification.	 Secondly,	 the	 justification	 in	 terms	 of	
competition	 policy	 for	 interfering	 with	 a	 dominant	 undertaking's	 freedom	 to	
contract	often	requires	a	careful	balancing	of	conflicting	considerations.”114	
Although	Advocate	General	Jacob’s	comments	related	to	legally	requiring	dominant	firms	to	
provide	 competitors	 with	 access	 to	 their	 facilities,	 which	 is	 not	 the	 problem	 that	 ACPD	
creates,	 his	 warning	 is	 nonetheless	 worth	 bearing	 in	 mind	 when	 applying	 Article	 102	 to	
ACPD.	
4.1	 The	Article	102	prohibition	on	abuse	of	dominance	
Article	 102	 TFEU	 seeks	 to	 ensure	 that	 particularly	 powerful	 (‘dominant’)	 firms	
(‘undertakings’)	do	not	abuse	their	market	power	within	the	EU.	It	provides	that:	
“Any	abuse	by	one	or	more	undertakings	of	a	dominant	position	within	the	internal	
market	 or	 in	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	 it	 shall	 be	 prohibited	 as	 incompatible	 with	 the	
internal	market	in	so	far	as	it	may	affect	trade	between	Member	States.”	
Dominance	 is	 a	 level	 of	 economic	 strength	 such	 that	 the	 firm	 concerned	 can	 prevent	 the	
maintenance	 of	 effective	 competition	 “…by	 affording	 it	 the	 power	 to	 behave	 to	 an	
appreciable	 extent	 independently	 of	 its	 competitors,	 its	 customers	 and	 ultimately	 of	
																																								 																				
114	Case	C-7/97	Oscar	Bronner	GmbH	&	Co.	KG	v	Mediaprint	Zeitungs-	und	Zeitschriftenverlag	GmbH	&	
Co.	KG,	Mediaprint	Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft	mbH	&	Co.	KG	and	Mediaprint	Anzeigengesellschaft	
mbH	&	Co.	KG	[1998]	ECR	I-7791,	the	Opinion	of	Advocate	General	Jacobs,	paras	56-7.	In	this	case,	the	
question	was	whether	the	refusal	by	a	dominant	newspaper	publisher	in	Austria	(Mediaprint)	to	allow	
a	rival	newspaper	publisher	access	to	Mediaprint’s	home	delivery	newspaper	distribution	system	was	
abusive	conduct	in	violation	of	Article	102.	
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consumers.”115	Not	many	firms	have	a	dominant	position.116	Because	the	focus	of	this	paper	
is	on	whether	ACPD	constitutes	an	‘abuse’,	we	will	assume	that	all	other	Article	102	criteria,	
including	 dominance,	 have	 been	 fulfilled.	 The	 fact	 that	 relatively	 few	 firms	 are	 dominant	
does	not	diminish	the	relevance	of	our	paper.	The	ECJ	has	held	that	the	goals	of	Article	102	
(abuse	 of	 dominance)	 are	 the	 same	 as	 those	 of	 Article	 101	 (anti-competitive	
arrangements).117	As	 a	 result,	 our	 conclusions	 about	 ACPD	 should	 be	 equally	 relevant	 in	
Article	101	too,	which	is	a	much	more	commonly	used	provision.	A	similar	point	applies	to	
EU	merger	control.	
There	 is	no	case	 law	 that	directly	addresses	 the	 legality	of	ACPD	under	Article	102.	This	 is	
unsurprising,	given	our	inability	to	engage	in	personalised	pricing	at	scale	until	the	relatively	
recent	emergence	of	Big	Data	technologies.	Although	there	is	a	substantial	body	of	EU	case	
law	concerned	with	price	discrimination,	it	has	focused	on	price	discrimination	occurring	at	
the	 business-to-business	 level.	 One	 example	 is	 the	 United	 Brands	 case,	 in	 which	 a	 firm	
supplying	 bananas	 to	 Member	 States	 at	 different	 prices	 was	 held	 to	 have	 abused	 its	
dominant	position	because	the	bananas	were	essentially	identical	and	the	costs	of	shipping	
them	basically	 the	same.118	In	contrast,	very	 few	competition	cases	even	 indirectly	address	
the	 practice	 of	 direct	 sales	 to	 retail	 consumers,	 let	 alone	 price	 discrimination	 directed	
towards	them.		
One	final	point	needs	to	be	raised	before	we	start	this	analysis.	Section	2.6	noted	that	where	
a	monopolist	uses	ACPD,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 reduce	 aggregate	 consumer	 surplus.	 Some	 seem	 to	
assume	 that	 price	 discrimination	 is	 only	 important	 in	 competition	 law	where	 a	 seller	 has	
substantial	 market	 power.119 	In	 relation	 to	 ACPD,	 this	 assumption	 seems	 legally	 and	
empirically	 misplaced.	 Two	 issues	 must	 be	 separated	 here,	 the	 empirical	 reality,	 and	 the	
legal	test.	In	relation	to	empirical	reality,	Section	2	argued	that	we	must	identify	whether	the	
ACPD	 relates	 to	 best	 response	 asymmetry	 (brand	 preference	 or	 switching	 costs)	 in	which	
case	price	discrimination	tends	to	intensify	competition,	or	best	response	symmetry	(search	
costs),	in	which	case	price	discrimination	tends	to	weaken	competition.	Market	power	does	
not	always	seem	necessary	to	generate	welfare	losses	under	ACPD,	but	the	literature	is	too	
undeveloped	 to	 generate	 further	 generalizable	 presumptions.	 In	 other	 words,	 ACPD	 may	
(sometimes)	 have	 adverse	 consequences	 for	 consumer	 welfare	 even	 where	 firms	 lack	
market	power;	further,	even	where	firms	do	have	market	power,	ACPD	can	improve	welfare.	
One	 must	 assess	 the	 dominant	 firm’s	 behaviour	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 relevant	 legal	 and	
economic	context.	
In	relation	to	the	legal	test	of	abuse	and	the	way	in	which	the	courts	apply	it,	we	know,	for	
example,	that	firms	that	are	not	dominant	are	legally	free	to	engage	in	practices	that	would	
be	 unlawful	 if	 undertaken	 by	 a	 firm	 occupying	 a	 dominant	 position.	 If	 relevant	 actual	 or	
																																								 																				
115	Case	 85/76	Hoffmann-La	 Roche	&.	 Co.	 AG	 v	 Commission	 [1979]	 ECR	 461,	 para	 38.	 It	 does	 not	
preclude	some	competition	being	present,	para	39.	
116	Examples	of	firms	that	have	been	held	to	be	dominant	include:	British	Airways	(UK	market	for	the	
procurement	of	air	travel	agency	services),	Deutsche	Post	(collection,	carriage	and	delivery	of	mail	in	
Germany),	 Michelin	 (new	 replacement	 tyres	 for	 heavy	 vehicles	 in	 the	 Netherlands)	 and	Microsoft	
(personal	 computer	 operating	 software	 systems).	 Respectively,	 Case	 T-219/99	British	 Airways	 plc	 v	
Commission	 [2003]	 ECR	 II-5917,	 paras	 189-225;	 Case	 C-147/97	Deutsche	 Post	 AG	 v	Gesellschaft	 für	
Zahlungssysteme	 mbH	 GZS	 [2000]	 ECR	 I-825,	 paras	 37-8;	 Case	 322/81	 NV	 Nederlandsche	 Banden	
Industrie	Michelin	v	Commission	[1983]	ECR	3461,	paras	53-61;	and	Case	T-201/04	Microsoft	Corp.	v	
Commission	[2007]	ECR	II-3601,	paras	30-5.	
117	Case	 6/72	Europemballage	 Corporation	 and	 Continental	 Can	 Company	 Inc.	 v	 Commission	 [1973]	
ECR	215,	paras	24-5.		
118	Case	27/76	United	Brands	v	Commission	[1978]	ECR	207,	paras	204-34.	
119	Ezrachi	and	Stucke,	Virtual	Competition,	221	hints	at	this.	
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potential	 harm	 (be	 that	 consumer	welfare	 loss,	 or	 something	 else)	 caused	 by	 a	 dominant	
undertaking	can	be	demonstrated,	is	that	enough	to	constitute	an	abuse	for	the	purposes	of	
Article	 102?	 Or,	 do	 we	 need	 to	 show	 that	 this	 harm	 was	 only	 possible,	 or	 made	 worse,	
because	 of	 this	 dominance?	 From	 a	 legal	 perspective,	 although	 the	 dominance	 and	 the	
abuse	must	exist	on	 the	same	 (or	a	 related)	 relevant	market;120	it	 is	questionable	whether	
the	 abuse	 must	 only	 be	 possible,	 or	 problematic,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 having	 market	
power.121	As	the	EU	Courts	have	explained,	Article	102	must	be	interpreted	in	the	light	of	its	
object	and	purpose,	regardless	of	the	reasons	why	a	firm	is	dominant.	A	firm	in	this	position	
has:	
“…a	 special	 responsibility	 not	 to	 allow	 its	 conduct	 to	 impair	 genuine	 undistorted	
competition	on	 the	 common	market,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 general	 objective	 set	
out	 in	Article	3(f)	of	the	Treaty	as	 it	was	then	worded	[Section	5.1	discusses	a	new	
object	 and	 purpose].	 Thus	 Article	 86	 [now	 Article	 102]	 covers	 all	 conduct	 of	 an	
undertaking	 in	a	dominant	position	which	 is	 such	as	 to	hinder	 the	maintenance	or	
the	growth	of	the	degree	of	competition	still	existing	in	a	market	where,	as	a	result	
of	the	very	presence	of	that	undertaking,	competition	is	weakened...”122	
In	other	words,	under	EU	competition	law,	dominant	firms	have	a	special	responsibility	not	
to	allow	their	conduct	to	impair	(fair)	competition	on	the	relevant	market	because	the	very	
presence	 of	 market	 dominance	 weakens	 competition.	 So,	 discrimination,	 by	 a	 dominant	
undertaking,	 might	 be	 considered	 problematic	 if	 it	 has	 relevant	 negative	 consequences,	
even	if	those	consequences	are	not	generated,	or	made	worse,	by	the	dominance	itself.	
4.2	 Does	ACPD	fall	within	the	definition	of	‘abuse’	under	Article	102?	
The	meaning	 of	 the	 term	 ‘abuse’	within	 Article	 102	 cannot	 be	 readily	 discerned	 from	 the	
text	of	Article	102.	Its	meaning	must	therefore	be	ascertained	by	reading	the	text	of	Article	
102	 in	the	 light	of	 its	 interpretation	by	the	EU	Courts.	The	following	discussion	adopts	this	
approach	in	order	to	identify	whether	ACPD	could	be	regarded	as	falling	within	the	scope	of	
Article	102.	An	obvious	place	to	start	our	inquiry	is	by	examining	the	open	list	of	examples	of	
abuse	 that	are	explicitly	mentioned	 in	Article	102.123	We	start	by	 looking	at	Article	102(a),	
unfair	pricing,	and	then	we	turn	to	Article	102(c),	discriminatory	pricing.	Finally,	we	discuss	
discrimination	as	a	more	general	form	of	abuse.	
Article	 102(a)	 explicitly	 refers	 to	 unfair	 pricing	 as	 a	 possible	 abuse.	 Several	 cases	 have	
considered	this	provision.	They	provide	clear	support	that	charging	an	amount	that	bears	no	
reasonable	 relation	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 product	 (or	 its	 costs?)	 is	 abusive.124	This	 may	 be	
																																								 																				
120	Case	C-333/94	P	Tetra	Pak	International	SA	v	Commission	[1996]	ECR	I-5951,	para	27.	
121	Joined	Cases	6	and	7/73	ICI	and	CSC	v	Commission	[1974]	ECR	I-223,	para	22.	
122	Case	T-83/91	Tetra	Pak	International	SA	v	Commission	[1994]	ECR	II-755,	para	114;	confirmed	on	
appeal,	Case	C-333/94	P	Tetra	Pak	International	SA	v	Commission	[1996]	ECR	I-5951,	paras	21-33	(by	
implication).	See	also	Case	85/76	Hoffmann-La	Roche	v	Commission	[1979]	ECR	461,	para	91	
123	Article	102	provides	that	 ‘…abuse	may,	 in	particular,	consist	 in:	 (a)	directly	or	 indirectly	 imposing	
unfair	purchase	or	selling	prices	or	other	unfair	trading	conditions;	(b)	limiting	production,	markets	or	
technical	development	to	the	prejudice	of	consumers;	(c)	applying	dissimilar	conditions	to	equivalent	
transactions	 with	 other	 trading	 parties,	 thereby	 placing	 them	 at	 a	 competitive	 disadvantage;	 (d)	
making	 the	 conclusion	 of	 contracts	 subject	 to	 acceptance	 by	 the	 other	 parties	 of	 supplementary	
obligations	which,	 by	 their	 nature	 or	 according	 to	 commercial	 usage,	 have	 no	 connection	with	 the	
subject	of	such	contracts.’	
124	Case	26/75	General	Motors	v	Commission	[1976]	ECR	1367,	para	12;	Case	27/76	United	Brands	v	
Commission	 [1978]	 ECR	 207,	 paras	 250-66;	 Case	 226/84	 British	 Leyland	 v	 Commission	 [1986]	 ECR	
3263,	 paras	 27-30;	 Case	 66/86	 Ahmed	 Saeed	 Flugreisen	 and	 others	 v	 Zentrale	 zur	 Bekampfun	
Unlauteren	Wettbewerbs	 [1989]	 ECR	 803,	 paras	 42-4;	 Case	 C-179/90,	Merci	 convenzionali	 porto	 di	
Genova	 SpA	 v	 Siderurgica	Gabrielli	 SpA	 [1991]	 ECR	 I-5889,	 paras	 18-9;	 Case	C-323/93	Société	 Civile	
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relevant	 when	 evaluating	 ACPD,	 because	 it	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	
reasonable	 relation	 between	 the	 value	 of	 the	 product	 and	 the	 multiple,	 different,	 prices	
offered.		
Article	 102(c)	 provides	 a	 further	 example	 of	 abusive	 conduct	 in	 terms	 of	 “…applying	
dissimilar	 conditions	 to	equivalent	 transactions	with	other	 trading	parties,	 thereby	placing	
them	at	a	competitive	disadvantage…”		
All	 three	of	Article	102(c)’s	 conditions	must	be	 satisfied.	First,	does	 the	practice	entail	 the	
application	of	dissimilar	 conditions	 to	 ‘equivalent	 transactions’	with	other	 trading	parties?	
Clearly,	 this	 condition	 is	met	 if	 two	 transactions	 are	 identical	 (i.e.	 the	 same	 quantity	 and	
quality	 of	 the	 same	 good	 or	 service).125	Furthermore,	 ‘equivalence’	 must	 extend	 beyond	
‘identical’	transactions,	yet	it	is	unclear	how	far	‘equivalence’	can	be	stretched.126	Is	a	small	
café	 latte	 equivalent	 to	 a	 large	 café	 latte?	 What	 if	 two	 transactions	 appear	 identical	 in	
outward	appearance,	but	 the	 context	 in	which	 they	occur	differs?	For	example,	 local	 laws	
might	 increase	 the	 cost	 of	 selling	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 item.	 Charging	 different	 prices	 to	
reflect	 this	 extra	 cost	 does	 not	 appear	 problematic,	 because	 the	 price	 difference	 is	 cost	
justified. 127 	These	 equivalent	 transactions	 must	 be	 with	 other	 ‘trading	 parties’.	 Are	
consumers	 ‘trading	 parties’?	 Some	Treaty	 language	 versions	 imply	 that	 this	means	 buyers	
must	 be	 engaged	 in	 trading	 (e.g.	 the	 French	 version	 reads	 ‘partenaires	 commerciaux’).	
Others	 are	not	 so	demanding	 (e.g.	 the	 Spanish	 version	 reads	 ‘terceros	 contratantes’).	 The	
interpretation	that	the	EU	Courts	ultimately	adopt	may	affect	the	relevance	of	ACPD	under	
Article	102(c).		
Secondly,	the	conditions	must	be	‘dissimilar.	In	other	words,	are	the	prices	that	A	and	B	pay	
to	the	dominant	firm	for	their	equivalent	transactions,	dissimilar?128	The	test	is	wide	enough	
to	include	other	(non-price)	issues	too,	such	as	product	quality	and	service.129		
Thirdly,	 the	 dissimilar	 conditions	 for	 equivalent	 transactions	must	 result	 in	 a	 ‘competitive	
disadvantage’.	Is	a	consumer	who	pays	more	for	the	same	item	as	another	consumer	placed	
at	a	disadvantage	vis-à-vis	that	other?	And	is	that	disadvantage	properly	characterised	as	a	
‘competitive’	 disadvantage?	Where	buyers	 from	 the	dominant	 firm	are	direct	 competitors	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
Agricole	du	Centre	d'Insémination	de	la	Crespelle	v	Coopérative	d'Elevage	et	d'Insémination	Artificielle	
du	 Département	 de	 la	 Mayenne	 [1994]	 ECR	 I-5077,	 paras	 25-7;	 Case	 C-242/95	 GT-Link	 A/S	 v	 De	
Danske	Statsbaner	(DSB)	[1997]	ECR	I-4449,	para	39;	Case	T-151/01	Der	Grüne	Punkt	-	Duales	System	
Deutschland	GmbH	v	Commission	 [2007]	ECR	 II-1607,	paras	121-39,	not	considered	on	appeal,	Case	
385/07	P	Der	Grüne	Punkt	-	Duales	System	Deutschland	GmbH	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	I-6155;	Case	
T-306/05	Isabella	Scippacercola	and	Ioannis	Terezakis	v	Commission	[2008]	ECR	II-4,	paras	102-5,	and	
Case	C-159/08	P	 Isabella	Scippacercola	and	 Ioannis	Terezakis	v	Commission	 [2009]	ECR	I-46	(Order),	
paras	44-9;	and	Case	C-52/07,	Kanal	5	Ltd,	TV	4	AB	v	Föreningen	Svenska	Tonsättares	Internationella	
Musikbyrå	(STIM)	upa	[2008]	ECR	I-9275,	paras	29-36.	
125	Case	27/76	United	Brands	v	Commission	[1978]	ECR	207,	paras	224-5;	and	Case	C-95/04	P	British	
Airways	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	I-2331,	para	134	(by	implication).		
126	Case	 T-301/04,	Clearstream	Banking	AG	 v	Commission	 [2009]	 ECR	 II-3155,	 paras	 73	 and	172-80;	
and	Case	C-163/99,	Portuguese	Republic	v	Commission	[2001]	ECR	I-2613	(by	implication),	paras	51-4.	
127	Case	 T-168/01	Glaxo	 v	 Commission	 [2006]	 ECR	 II-2969	 (nothing	 on	 appeal),	 para	 179.	 This	 is	 an	
Article	101	case	(anti-competitive	arrangements).	In	any	event,	Article	101(d)	and	Article	102(c)	have	
the	same	wording.	The	court	implies	that	the	content	of	the	provisions	is	similar,	paras	174-7.		
128	Case	 27/76	United	 Brands	 v	 Commission	 [1978]	 ECR	 207,	 para	 224;	 and	 Case	 C-95/04	 P	British	
Airways	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	I-2331,	para	134	(agreed	by	parties).	In	contrast,	see	Case	322/81,	
NV	Nederlandsche	Banden	Industrie	Michelin	v	Commission	[1983]	ECR	3461,	para	90,	this	may	have	
been	about	objective	justifications	(no	comment	from	the	Advocate	General).	
129	Respectively,	Case	T-228/97,	Irish	Sugar	v	Commission	[1999]	ECR	II-2696,	para	147	(sugar,	but	not	
guaranteed	of	beet	origin,	so	no	EU	storage	rebate);	and	Commission	decision,	Deutsche	Post	AG,	OJ	
2001	L331/40,	paras	127-8	(slower	delivery	times).	
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(e.g.	retail	shops	selling	bottled	water),	if	they	pay	different	prices	this	clearly	places	the	firm	
paying	a	higher	price	for	the	same	goods	at	a	competitive	disadvantage.130	However,	it	does	
not	 fall	within	 the	natural	English	meaning	 to	say	 that	a	 final	consumer	has	a	 ‘competitive	
disadvantage’	 vis-à-vis	 another	 final	 consumer.	 That	 said,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 hypothesise	
examples	of	interdependence	between	consumers131	and	some	language	versions	of	the	EU	
Treaties	are	wide	enough	to	include	retail	level	consumers	in	this	definition.	In	any	event,	as	
we	 explain	 in	 Section	 5,	 literal	 methods	 of	 interpretation	 are	 not	 critical	 in	 EU	 law.	 The	
Commission,	for	example,	argues	that	Article	102(c)	should	apply	to	final	end	consumers132	
and	this	would	allow	Art	102(c)	to	incorporate	ACPD.	
Surprisingly,	despite	the	explicit	wording	of	Article	102(c),	the	case	law	suggests	that	it	might	
not	be	necessary	to	show	disadvantage.	 In	some	cases,	a	dominant	 firm	has	discriminated	
between	firms	that	do	not	compete	with	each	other	(e.g.	one	firm	in	France	and	the	other	in	
Sweden,	 where	 these	 are	 different	 relevant	 geographic	 markets)	 and	 thus	 suffer	 no	
competitive	disadvantage.	Yet	such	discrimination	has	been	held	to	constitute	an	abuse.133	
Sometimes,	 the	 EU	 Courts	 ask	 whether	 the	 entity	 that	 was	 charged	 a	 higher	 price	 was	
disadvantaged	 vis-à-vis	 how	 it	 would	 have	 been	 charged	 had	 it	 paid	 the	 same	 price	 as	
other(s).134	If	the	latter	test	is	used,	then	it	may	be	easier	to	attack	ACPD.		
At	times,	Article	102(c)	has	been	 interpreted	so	widely	that	any	difference	 in	 treatment	to	
similar	transactions	is	discriminatory.135	In	this	case,	ACPD	should	fall	within	it.		
																																								 																				
130	A	recent	case	states	that	the	provision	only	applies	to	buyers	that	compete	with	each	other,	Case	
C-52/07,	Kanal	5	Ltd,	TV	4	AB	v	Föreningen	Svenska	Tonsättares	Internationella	Musikbyrå	(STIM)	upa	
[2008]	ECR	 I-9275,	para	46	 (also	Advocate	General	Trstenjak,	paras	113-5).	See	also,	 the	Opinion	of	
Advocate	General	Kokott,	Case	C-109/10	P	Solvay	SA	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	I-10329,	paras	104-7	
(not	discussed	on	appeal).		
131	Imagine	an	electricity	supplier	with	limited	capacity.	It	prioritises	its	scarce	resources	to	those	who	
pay	 a	 premium	 (perhaps	 it	 charges	more	 during	 the	 day,	 when	 demand	 is	 high,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	
smooth	out	demand	more,	 so	 that	new	power	 stations	do	not	need	 to	be	produced	 just	 to	 service	
peak	demand).	If	all	consumers	pay	the	premium,	one	can	see	the	interdependence	of	demand,	Jean	
Tirole,	The	Theory	of	Industrial	Organisation	(9th	edn,	The	MIT	Press	1997),	152.	See	also,	Akman,	'To	
Abuse	or	Not	to	Abuse:	discrimination	between	consumers',	498.	
132	Commission	 decision,	 Deutsche	 Post	 AG,	 OJ	 2001	 L331/40	 (not	 appealed),	 para	 133.	 See	 Liza	
Lovdahl	 Gormsen,	 A	 Principled	 Approach	 to	 Abuse	 of	 Dominance	 in	 European	 Competition	 Law	
(Cambridge	University	 Press	 2010),	 107-10;	 and	Akman,	 'To	 Abuse	 or	Not	 to	 Abuse:	 discrimination	
between	consumers',	500	(and	the	other	cases	that	they	cite).	
133	Case	C-179/90,	Merci	convenzionali	porto	di	Genova	SpA	v	Siderurgica	Gabrielli	SpA	 [1991]	ECR	I-
5889	(the	ECJ	 ignored	the	issue),	paras	18-9;	and	Case	C-163/99,	Portuguese	Republic	v	Commission	
[2001]	 ECR	 I-2613,	 para	 66	 (by	 implication).	 See	 also,	 Akman,	 'To	 Abuse	 or	 Not	 to	 Abuse:	
discrimination	 between	 consumers',	 498,	 500-2;	 and	 John	 Temple	 Lang	 and	 Robert	 O'Donoghue,	
'Defining	 Legitimate	 Competition:	 how	 to	 classify	 pricing	 abuses	 under	 Article	 82	 of	 the	 EC	 Treaty'	
(2002)	 26	 Fordham	 International	 Law	 Journal	 ,	 119.	 Alternatively,	 they	may	 take	 the	 view	 that	 the	
buyers	 compete	 more	 generally,	 Case	 C-95/04	 P	 British	 Airways	 v	 Commission	 [2007]	 ECR	 I-2331,	
paras	143-5;	and	Case	T-301/04,	Clearstream	Banking	AG	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	II-3155,	paras	192-
4.	
134	Case	T-228/97,	Irish	Sugar	v	Commission	[1999]	ECR	II-2696,	paras	143-8,	164	(by	implication,	but	
see	para	167);	and	Case	T-57/01,	Solvay	SA	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	II-4621,	para	400	(not	discussed	
on	appeal,	Case	C-109/10	P,	but	criticised	by	Advocate	General	Kokott,	see	reference	in	footnote	130.	
135	Gormsen,	 A	 Principled	 Approach	 to	 Abuse	 of	 Dominance	 in	 European	 Competition	 Law,	 105-7;	
Akman,	 'To	Abuse	or	Not	 to	Abuse:	discrimination	between	consumers',	495;	Romano	Subiotto	and	
Robert	 O'Donoghue,	 'Defining	 the	 Scope	 of	 the	 Duty	 of	 Dominant	 Firms	 to	 Deal	 with	 Existing	
Customers	under	Article	82	EC'	(2003)	24	European	Competition	Law	Review	,	685	(they	say	the	ECJ	
has	 substantially	 limited	 this	principle,	 although	 there	 is	no	discussion	of	 sales	 to	 final	 consumers);	
and	Moritz	Lorenz,	Maike	Lubbig	and	Alexia	Russell,	 'Price	Discrimination,	A	Tender	Story'	(2005)	26	
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Discriminatory	 conduct	 has	 also	 been	 challenged	 under	 Article	 102,	 without	 reference	 to	
Article	 102(c).136	On	 these	 occasions,	 the	 EU	 Courts	 have	 defined	 ‘abuse’	 in	 various	ways;	
some	are	clearly	formulated,	others	less	so.	Examples	are:	(1)	any	difference	in	treatment;137	
(2)	 any	 unfair	 discrimination,138	whatever	 ‘fairness’	 is	 understood	 to	 mean	 in	 relation	 to	
ACPD	 (perhaps	 in	 line	 with	 Section	 3,	 above);	 and	 (3)	 any	 discrimination	 contrary	 to	 EU	
principles139	(presumably	the	matters	listed	in	Article	10	TFEU	and	possibly	also	Article	21	of	
the	 Charter	 (see	 discussion	 in	 Section	 5,	 below)).	 These	 lines	 of	 cases	 potentially	 support	
characterising	ACPD	as	a	breach	of	Article	102.	 It	may	be	easier	 to	mount	a	discrimination	
argument	under	Article	 102	 generally,	 rather	 than	under	Article	 102(c),	 because	 this	 does	
not	 typically	 require	 establishing	 that	 the	 claimant	 is	 placed	 at	 a	 ‘competitive	
disadvantage’140	and	it	also	avoids	a	strained	interpretation	of	the	text.		
More	 generally,	 some	 cases	 hint	 that	 it	 is	 unacceptable	 for	 a	 dominant	 undertaking	 to	
charge	 different	 prices	 to	 consumers	merely	 because	 they	 have	 a	 different	willingness	 to	
pay.141	Sometimes	the	EU	Courts	have	sought	to	avoid	the	issue	while	142	others	hint	that	it	
might	be	acceptable.143	One	line	of	cases	even	appears	to	imply	that,	provided	the	method	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
European	Competition	Law	Review	,	355.	Lorenz	et	al	compare	this	with	the	position	 in	the	UK	and	
Germany,	where	this	does	not	happen.	See,	for	example,	Commission	decision,	Portuguese	Airports,	
OJ	(1999)	L69/31,	para	27;	Case	T-128/98	Aéroports	de	Paris	v	Commission	[2000]	ECR	II-3929,	paras	
201-2	 (not	discussed	on	appeal,	Case	C-82/01	P);	 and	Case	T-83/91	Tetra	Pak	v	Commission	 [1994]	
ECR	II-755,	para	207.	
136	Case	322/81,	NV	Nederlandsche	Banden	 Industrie	Michelin	 v	 Commission	 [1983]	 ECR	3461;	Case	
7/82,	Gesellschaft	 zur	Verwertung	 von	 Leistungsschutzrechten	mbH	 (GVL)	 v	 Commission	 [1983]	 ECR	
483,	 para	 56;	 Commission	 decision,	Deutsche	 Post	 AG,	 OJ	 2001	 L331/40	 (not	 appealed);	 and	 Case	
T-301/04,	Clearstream	Banking	AG	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	II-3155.	
137	In	 Case	 T-65/89,	BPB	 Industries	 v	 Commission	 [1993]	 ECR	 II-389,	 para	 94	 (confirmed	 on	 appeal,	
Case	C-310/93	P,	para	11).	
138	The	case	referred	to	in	the	last	footnote	is	ambiguous	and	can	be	interpreted	in	this	way	too.	
139	Case	 7/82,	 Gesellschaft	 zur	 Verwertung	 von	 Leistungsschutzrechten	 mbH	 (GVL)	 v	 Commission	
[1983]	ECR	483,	para	56;	and	the	Opinion	of	Advocate	General	Reischl,	pages	526-7.	The	focus	is	on	
the	EU	single	market	principle.	It	is	unclear	whether	the	principle,	phrased	in	general	terms,	is	wider.	
140	Commission	 decision,	 Deutsche	 Post	 AG,	 OJ	 2001	 L331/40,	 paras	 133-4;	 and	 Case	 T-301/04,	
Clearstream	Banking	AG	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	II-3155,	paras	106,	112-20,	151	and	157.		
141	Case	 T-228/97,	 Irish	 Sugar	 v	 Commission	 [1999]	 ECR	 II-2696,	 paras	 141	 and	 188-9	 (although	
compare	with	paras	146-50);	Case	C-179/90,	Merci	convenzionali	porto	di	Genova	SpA	v	Siderurgica	
Gabrielli	 SpA	 [1991]	 ECR	 I-5889,	 para	 19	 (more	 strongly,	 see	 Advocate	 General	 van	 Gerven,	 page	
5916);	 Case	 T-83/91	 Tetra	 Pak	 v	 Commission	 [1994]	 ECR	 II-755,	 paras	 163-70	 and	 207-9;	 Case	 T-
128/98	Aéroports	de	Paris	v	Commission	[2000]	ECR	II-3929,	paras	201-2	(nothing	on	appeal);	Case	C-
163/99,	 Portuguese	 Republic	 v	 Commission	 [2001]	 ECR	 I-2613,	 para	 46;	 and	 Case	 T-301/04,	
Clearstream	 Banking	 AG	 v	 Commission	 [2009]	 ECR	 II-3155,	 para	 170.	 Akman,	 'To	 Abuse	 or	 Not	 to	
Abuse:	discrimination	between	consumers',	496,	takes	this	view.	
142	Case	T-229/94	Deutsche	Bahn	AG	v	Commission	[1997]	ECR	II-1689,	para	91	(there	was	an	appeal	
Case	C-436/97	P,	but	not	on	anything	relevant).	
143	Case	 27/76	 United	 Brands	 v	 Commission	 [1978]	 ECR	 207,	 paras	 227-30	 (ambiguous,	 Gregory	
Adams,	 'European	 and	 American	 Antitrust	 Regulation	 of	 Pricing	Monopolists'	 (1985)	 18	 Vanderbilt	
Journal	of	Transnational	Law	,	31-5	argues	that	the	case	says	the	opposite,	for	example);	Case	322/81,	
NV	Nederlandsche	Banden	Industrie	Michelin	v	Commission	[1983]	ECR	3461,	para	90	(by	implication);	
Case	C-62/86	AKZO	Chemie	BV	v	Commission	 [1991]	ECR	 I-3359,	para	120;	 Joined	Cases	T-5/00	and	
6/00	Nederlandse	Federative	Vereniging	voor	de	Groothandel	op	Elektrotechnisch	Gebied	[2003]	ECR	
II-5768,	 paras	 274	 and	 277	 (oblique	 hint),	 see	 also	 Ulrich	 Springer,	 'Borden	 and	 United	 Brands	
Revisited:	a	comparison	of	the	elements	of	price	discrimination	under	EC	and	US	antitrust	law'	(1997)	
18	 European	Competition	 Law	Review	 ,	 compare	 text	 around	 footnotes	 41	 and	77;	 and	Opinion	of	
Advocate	 General	 Jacobs	 in	 Case	 395/87	 Ministère	 Public	 v	 Tournier	 [1989]	 ECR	 2521	 (ECJ	 says	
nothing	 on	 this),	 para	 67	 (willingness	 to	 pay	 may	 be	 logical,	 but	 not	 if	 need	 the	 good	 for	 your	
business).	Willingness	to	pay	might	be	acceptable	sometimes	though,	Case	C-52/07,	Kanal	5	Ltd,	TV	4	
	 38	
(calculation)	of	‘payment’	is	the	same,	then	the	amount	that	different	consumers	pay	can	be	
different.	Imagine	that	a	dominant	firm	charges	all	customers	of	its	service	a	percentage	of	
their	 income.	Those	customers	making	more	 income	pay	more	than	others	for	that	(same)	
service	 (10%	of	£100	 is	more	than	10%	of	£50)	yet	the	EU	Courts	do	not	appear	to	regard	
this	 as	 falling	 foul	 of	 Article	 102(c),	 although	 the	 point	 has	 not	 been	 specifically	 argued	
before	them.144		
In	other	words,	the	case	law	here	is	contradictory.	Some	cases	imply	that	charging	based	on	
willingness	 to	 pay	 is	 acceptable,	 other	 cases	 seem	 to	 see	 this	 as	 abusive,	 yet	 finding	 an	
answer	 to	 this	question	 is	vital	 for	our	understanding	of	 the	 legality	of	ACPD	by	dominant	
firms.145		
One	 final	 point	 might	 be	 made	 here,	 which	 affects	 our	 analysis.	 There	 has	 sometimes	
(although	not	always)	been	discussion	of	whether	the	focus	of	abuse	should	be	at	the	level	
of	 specific	 individuals	 or	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	market,	 as	 a	 whole.	 This	 matters,	 because	 it	
affects	the	perspective	of	discrimination	arguments	(discrimination	might	only	be	a	problem	
if	it	reduces	benefits,	in	the	aggregate,	to	the	whole	market).	The	EU	Courts	have	not	been	
consistent	 here	 either.	 Sometimes,	 the	 ECJ	 seems	 to	 focus	 on	 unfairness	 to	 individuals,	
rather	than	groups.	For	example,	the	ECJ	hints	at	this	in	Merci,146	where	it	seems	to	say	that	
opaque	pricing	structures	allowing	the	dominant	undertaking	to	charge	some	customers	less	
than	 the	 normal	 price,	 and	 to	 compensate	 for	 this	 by	 charging	 others	 more,	 is	 unfair.	
However,	in	other	cases,	which	did	not	focus	on	discrimination	or	fairness	in	particular,	the	
EU	Courts	 insist	 that	 the	 level	of	assessment	 is	 that	of	 the	market	as	a	whole,	 rather	 than	
looking	 at	 the	 effects	 on	 specific	 individuals	 or	 on	 groups	 of	 individuals.147	One	 possible	
explanation	of	this	inconsistency	is	that,	where	the	abuse	focuses	on	discrimination,	the	EU	
Courts	have	been	prepared	to	examine	harm	at	an	individual	level.	
4.3	 If	ACPD	is	an	‘abuse’	under	Article	102,	can	it	be	objectively	justified?	
If	there	is	an	abuse	(whether	under	Article	102(c),	or	more	generally),	the	EU	Courts	then	ask	
whether	the	relevant	behaviour	can	be	“objectively	justified”148	by	considering	whether	four	
cumulative	 conditions	 have	 been	 met:	 that	 the	 abusive	 conduct	 is	 (1)	 outweighed	 by	
benefits;	 (2)	 inures	to	the	benefit	of	consumers;	 (3)	 is	necessary	to	achieve	these	benefits;	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
AB	v	Föreningen	Svenska	Tonsättares	Internationella	Musikbyrå	(STIM)	upa	[2008]	ECR	I-9275,	para	36	
(no	explanation	of	why,	but	here	was	music	copyright,	so	hard	to	value	it	on	costs,	says	the	ECJ).	
144	Case	 T-128/98	 Aéroports	 de	 Paris	 v	 Commission	 [2000]	 ECR	 II-3929	 (although	 note	 different	
inference	 above);	 and	 Case	 C-52/07,	 Kanal	 5	 Ltd,	 TV	 4	 AB	 v	 Föreningen	 Svenska	 Tonsättares	
Internationella	Musikbyrå	(STIM)	upa	[2008]	ECR	I-9275,	paras	44-5.	
145	If	the	dominant	firm	could	show	that	the	costs	of	precision	significantly	outweigh	the	gains	from	
outlawing	 ‘discrimination’,	 then	 an	 objective	 justification	 might	 be	 available,	 see	 below.	 This	 last	
argument	might	provide	some	room	for	prices	that	do	not	perfectly	reflect	costs.	However,	while	this	
kind	of	argument	may	be	used	to	justify	charging	the	same	prices,	even	if	there	are	not	identical	costs	
of	supply,	one	wonders	whether	it	would	be	equally	acceptable	as	a	justification	for	charging	different	
prices,	where	the	costs	of	supply	are	the	same,	or	largely	similar.	
146	Case	C-179/90	Merci	 convenzionali	porto	di	Genova	SpA	v	Siderurgica	Gabrielli	 SpA	 [1991]	ECR	 I-
5889,	para	19.	
147	For	 example,	 in	 relation	 to	 arguments	 for	 exemption	 of	 anti-competitive	 arrangements	 under	
Article	101(3),	the	EU	Courts	have	implied	that	it	is	the	effect	on	consumers	overall	that	is	important,	
it	is	not	relevant	if	some	individuals	are	worse	off,	Case	T-131/99	Michael	Hamilton	Shaw	and	Timothy	
John	Falla	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	II-2023,	para	163;	and	Case	C-238/05	Asnef-Equifax,	Servicios	de	
Información	sobre	Solvencia	y	Crédito,	SL	v	Asociación	de	Usuarios	de	Servicios	Bancarios	[2006]	ECR	I-
11125,	paras	67-70.	
148	‘Objective	justifications’	do	not	appear	in	Article	102’s	text.	The	EU	Courts	added	them.		
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and	 (4)	 does	not	 eliminate	 effective	 competition.149	The	Commission	 focuses	on	economic	
criteria	in	the	interpretation	of	each	of	these	conditions.	One	can	imagine	firms	claiming	that	
the	practice	ACPD	enables	them	to	increase	output,	for	example,	and	this	results	in	benefits	
to	many	consumers	 (perhaps	 increasing	aggregate	consumer	welfare).	The	EU	Courts	have	
also	considered	other	issues	here,	such	as	the	impact	upon	health.150	
4.4	 Summary		
The	 EU	 courts’	 interpretation	 of	 the	 text	 of	 Article	 102	 in	 business-to-business	 price	
discrimination	appears	theoretically	capable	of	extending	to	ACPD,	although	their	approach	
might	differ	where	price	discrimination	 is	 intentionally	directed	at	final	consumers.	 In	 fact,	
given	 the	myriad	 language	 versions	 of	 the	 EU	 Treaties,	 the	 EU	Courts	 rarely	 rely	 on	 close	
textual	 interpretations.	 Nor	 does	 textual	 analysis	 illuminate	 whether	 it	 is	 normatively	
desirable	to	characterise	ACPD	as	an	abuse	of	dominance	pursuant	to	Article	102.	Section	5	
therefore	 draws	 upon	 our	 preceding	 analysis	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 fairness	 dimensions	 of	
ACPD,	 Sections	 2	 and	 3,	 above,	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 EU	 Treaties’	 framework,	 to	 consider	
whether	and	 to	what	extent	Article	102	 is	 aimed	at	maximising	 consumer	welfare,	 and/or	
ensuring	fairness	and	justice	in	order	to	identify	how	ACPD	should	be	evaluated	thereunder.		
5.	 Should	ACPD	be	considered	unlawful	under	Article	102	TFEU?	
In	 the	 preceding	 section,	 we	 argued	 that	 ACPD	 could,	 in	 theory,	 fall	 within	 Article	 102’s	
existing	case	law,	but	whether	the	EU	Courts	would	regard	ACPD	as	a	violation	of	Article	102	
is	an	open	question.	Accordingly,	 in	this	section,	we	ask	whether	ACPD	should	be	regarded	
as	a	violation	of	EU	competition	law,	and	Article	102,	in	particular.	To	answer	this	question,	
we	must	first	identify,	from	a	legal	perspective,	what	is	right,	or	appropriate,	in	the	EU	legal	
order.	We	argue	that	both	consumer	welfare	and	fairness	are	important	goals	of	the	EU	legal	
order,	 and	 that	 proper	 interpretation	 of	 the	 EU	 Treaties	 suggests	 that	 they	 are	 also	 the	
substantive	 goals	 of	 Article	 102.	 Although	 consumer	 welfare	 is	 regarded	 by	 many	
competition	 academics	 and	 practitioners	 as	 a	 valid	 and	 desirable	 goal	 for	 EU	 competition	
law,	 their	 reasons	 for	 supporting	 this	 view	are	not	primarily	 legal	 in	nature.	We	 therefore	
turn	to	the	EU	Treaties	themselves,	to	demonstrate	that	they	provide	a	legal	basis	that	relies	
upon	 teleological	 and	 contextual	methods	of	 interpretation	 to	enable	 the	 identification	of	
consumer	 welfare	 as	 one	 of	 EU	 competition	 law’s	 substantive	 goals.	 We	 then	 consider	
specific	 types	of	unfairness	 in	 the	EU	 legal	order	 (Section	5.1)	 to	demonstrate	 that	 the	EU	
Treaties	 also	 indicate	 that	 fairness	 is	 another	 substantive	 goal	 of	 EU	 competition	 law.	
Accordingly,	 in	 circumstances	where	ACPD	 enhances	 both	 fairness	 and	 consumer	welfare,	
we	argue	that	it	should	not	violate	Articles	102	or	101.	Correlatively,	in	circumstances	where	
ACPD	undermines	both	 fairness	 and	 consumer	welfare,	 then	we	 suggest	 that	 it	 should	be	
judged	unlawful	under	Articles	102	and	101.	But	what	 if	 the	effect	of	ACPD	 is	 to	enhance	
consumer	 welfare	 but	 reduce	 fairness,	 or	 vice	 versa?	 In	 other	 words,	 how	 should	 EU	
competition	 law	respond	when	consumer	welfare	and	 fairness	clash	 in	the	EU	legal	order?	
This	is	the	focus	of	the	discussion	in	Section	5.2.	Throughout	Section	5	our	focus	is	on	‘abuse’	
and	we	assume,	as	we	have	done	in	the	rest	of	this	paper,	that	all	other	parts	of	Article	102’s	
test	have	been	met.	
5.1	 Consumer	welfare	and	fairness	as	possible	substantive	goals	of	EU	competition151	
																																								 																				
149	See	Case	C-209/10	Post	Danmark	A/S	v	Konkurrencerådet	[2012]	ECR	I-172,	paras	41	and	42.	There	
is	some	debate	about	the	relevance	of	all	four	criteria,	see	footnote	189.	
150	Case	 T-30/89	Hilti	 AG	 v	 Commission	 [1991]	 ECR	 II-1439,	 para	 118;	 and	 Case	 T-83/91	 Tetra	 Pak	
International	SA	v	Commission	[1994]	ECR	II-755,	paras	83-4	and	138.	
151	Several	interconnected	issues	arise	in	identifying	whether	there	is	scope	within	EU	competition	law	
generally,	and	Article	102	in	particular,	to	consider	justice.	These	considerations	include,	for	example,	
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5.1.1	 Is	consumer	welfare	a	substantive	goal	of	EU	competition	law?	
The	EU	Courts	have	never	embraced	consumer	welfare	as	the	sole	and	exclusive	goal	of	EU	
competition	 law,	although	some	cases	hint	that	 it	might	be	a	relevant	goal.152	Despite	this,	
the	prevailing	orthodoxy	is	that	the	goal	of	Articles	101	and	102,	and	for	EU	competition	law	
generally	 (including	 the	 EU	 merger	 rules)	 is	 that	 of	 consumer	 welfare;153	a	 view	 actively	
espoused	 by	 the	 EU	 Commission	 (a	 key	 enforcer)	 and	 many	 academics	 and	 legal	
practitioners.154	Many	 commentators	 adopt	 this	 view	 based	 on	 their	 belief	 that	 effective	
competition	is	the	best	way	of	delivering	consumer	benefits	in	terms	of	lower	prices,	higher	
levels	 of	 output,	 and	 greater	 choice.	 Competition	 is	 considered	 an	 important	 driver	 of	
productivity155	and	 economic	 efficiency	 more	 generally,	 helping	 to	 allocate	 our	 scarce	
resources	 to	 those	 that	 value	 them	 the	most.	 Yet	 the	 consumer	welfare	 standard	 can	 be	
problematic.	For	example,	 it	 is	debatable	whether	 it	provides	a	consistent	and	predictable	
framework	 of	 assessment	 and	 provides	 simplicity	 of	 enforcement156	given	 that	 there	 are	
many	theoretical	disagreements	in	economics	which	affect	the	framework	of	assessment.157	
For	 example,	 many	 disagree	 about	 where	 how	 much	 innovation	 maximises	 welfare	 in	
different	markets.	Standards	of	measurement	are	also	prone	to	vagueness	and	are	based	on	
contestable	 assumptions.	 For	 example,	 the	 conventional	 economic	 standard	 collapses	 the	
distinction	 between	 those	with	 the	 capacity	 to	 pay	 for	 goods	 or	 services,	 and	 those	who	
desire	goods	or	services	but	lack	the	capacity	to	pay	for	them.	Other	problems	arise	because	
real	markets	often	do	not	 reflect	 the	demanding	pre-requisites	of	 the	neo-classical	model:	
markets	may	be	affected	by	factors	such	as	the	market	power	of	firms;	imperfect	knowledge	
of	purchasers;	 irrational	market	actors;	 insufficient	numbers	of	buyers	and	sellers;	barriers	
to	 entry	 in	 the	 market,	 or	 exit.158	Despite	 this,	 there	 are	 practical	 reasons	 in	 favour	 of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
issues	of	 informational	 privacy,	 Costa-Cabral	 and	 Lynskey,	 'The	 Internal	 and	External	 Constraints	 of	
Data	Protection	on	Competition	 Law	 in	 the	 EU'.	 Some	 see	no	place	 for	 privacy	 in	 competition	 law,	
even	if	it	is	a	parameter	of	non-price	competition,	Sokol	and	Comerford,	'Does	Antitrust	Have	a	Role	
to	Play	 in	Regulating	Big	Data?',	17.	Some	ignore	privacy	saying	that	competition	and	privacy	harms	
are	distinct,	Kochelek,	'Data	Mining	and	Antitrust',	520.	While	we	believe	that	they	could	be	relevant	
in	 Article	 102,	 we	 leave	 informational	 privacy	 issues	 on	 one	 side	 because,	 while	 related	 to	 our	
discussion,	they	are	not	the	main	focus	of	our	paper.	
152	The	only	EU	competition	cases	that	explicitly	mention	consumer	welfare	directly	are:	Case	C-23/14	
Post	Danmark	A/S	v	Konkurrencerådet	ECLI:EU:C:2015:651,	para	49	(consumer	welfare	is	relevant	 in	
objective	justification);	Case	C-382/12	P	MasterCard	Inc.	v	Commission	ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201,	para	29,	
as	 well	 as	 para	 186	 of	 the	 General	 Court	 judgment,	 Case	 T-111/08	 (summarising	 the	 applicant’s	
arguments);	 Case	 C-209/10	 Post	 Danmark	 A/S	 v	 Konkurrencerådet	 [2012]	 ECR	 I-172,	 para	 42	
(consumer	welfare	is	relevant	in	objective	justification);	Case	C-501/06,	etc.	GlaxoSmithKline	Services	
Unlimited	 v	 Commission	 [2009]	 ECR	 I-9291,	 paras	 62-4	 (no	need	 to	 show	consumer	welfare	 loss	 to	
find	a	breach	of	Article	101);	and	Case	T-201/04	Microsoft	Corp	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	II-3601,	para	
41	(summarising	Commission’s	arguments	in	its	decision).	
153	Some	argue	 that	we	should	 focus	on	 the	efficiency	effects	on	consumers,	others	 that	we	should	
look	 at	 the	 effects	 on	 producers,	 and	 some	 for	 a	mixture	 of	 these	 effects.	We	 focus	 on	 consumer	
welfare,	as	this	 is	overwhelmingly	supported	in	the	EU	context,	and	limited	space	means	we	cannot	
fully	explore	the	topic.	See,	for	example,	Motta,	Competition	Policy:	theory	and	practice,	17-22.	
154	Commission,	Guidelines	on	 the	application	of	Article	81(3)	of	 the	Treaty	 (2004),	para	13;	Richard	
Whish	and	David	Bailey,	Competition	Law	(Eighth	edn,	Oxford	University	Press	2015),	20;	and	Alison	
Jones	and	Brenda	Sufrin,	EU	Competition	Law	(Fifth	edition	edn,	Oxford	University	Press	2014),	18.	
155	For	a	 review	of	 the	 theoretical	and	empirical	 relationship	between	competition	and	productivity	
see,	“Productivity	and	Competition:	A	Summary	of	the	Evidence”,	CMA	45,	July	2015.		
156	Compare,	 Frederic	 Jenny,	 'Competition	 and	Efficiency'	 (1993)	 Fordham	Corporate	 Law	 Institute	 ,	
197;	and	Christopher	Townley,	Article	81	EC	and	Public	Policy	(Hart	2009),	232-8,	for	example.		
157	See,	 the	 various	 economic	models	 in	 Ha-Joon	 Chang,	 Economics:	 a	 user's	 guide	 (Penguin	 Books	
Limited	2014),	for	example.	
158	See,	for	example,	Whish	and	Bailey,	Competition	Law,	chapter	1.	
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adopting	this	standard:	many	competition	authorities	around	the	world	have	now	embraced	
a	consumer	welfare	standard,	so	that	its	adoption	by	the	EU	might	encourage	co-operation	
between	competition	authorities,	thus	bolstering	effective	enforcement	action.	It	would	also	
reduce	 legal	 costs	 for	 companies	operating	 in	multiple	 jurisdictions.	 Yet	 the	adoption	of	 a	
common	 standard	 may	 reduce	 the	 space	 for	 regulatory	 experimentation	 and	 might	 thus	
reduce	 the	prospects	of	developing	a	 ‘better’	 rule,	and	a	more	variegated	approach	might	
better	 reflect	 the	 competition	 law	 goals	 of	 particular	 states	 to	 their	 preferred	 variety	 of	
capitalism.159	
The	preceding	arguments	which	favour	a	consumer	welfare	goal	for	EU	competition	law	are	
based	primarily	on	economic	 reasoning	and	 the	practicalities	of	 implementation.	 Yet	 legal	
arguments	can	also	be	mounted	in	favour	of	a	consumer	welfare	approach,	drawing	on	the	
text	of	 the	EU	Treaties,160	although	 they	do	not	explicitly	 refer	 to	 consumer	welfare.	 First,	
although	 Articles	 101	 (restriction	 of	 competition)	 and	 102	 (abuse	 of	 dominance)	 do	 not	
explicitly	refer	to	consumer	welfare,	the	wording	of	these	provisions	seems	broad	enough	to	
encompass	 this	 standard.	 Secondly,	 the	 EU	 Courts	 often	 adopt	 a	 more	 teleological	 and	
contextual	approaches	to	the	interpretation	of	the	EU	Treaties,	regarding	them	as	a	web	of	
inter-linked	provisions.	As	Bengoetxea	has	observed:	
“[T]he	court	[ECJ]	usually	has	recourse	to	three	types	of	first-order	criteria	in	typical	
hard	 case	 situations:	 (i)	 semiotic	or	 linguistic	arguments;	 (ii)	 systemic	and	context-
establishing	 arguments;	 and	 (iii)	 teleological,	 functional,	 or	 consequentialist	
arguments	–	and	that	preference	is	usually	given	to	systemic	functional	criteria.”161	
In	 our	 view,	 the	 EU	 Courts’	 teleological	 approach	 demands	 that	 specific	 treaty	 provisions	
(like	Articles	101	and	102)	be	 interpreted	 in	accordance	with	 the	EU	Treaties’	overarching	
goals.	 The	 Preamble	 to	 the	 TFEU	 calls	 the	 essential	 objective	 of	 the	 EU	 Treaties	 “…the	
constant	 improvement	of	 the	 living	 and	working	 conditions	of…”	 the	 EU’s	 peoples.	 This	 is	
clearly	wide	enough	to	support	a	consumer	welfare	goal	in	EU	competition	law.		
One	example	of	 the	teleological	approach	being	used	 in	EU	competition	 law	relates	to	the	
so-called	‘single	market	imperative’.162	It	is	generally	accepted	that,	since	the	earliest	cases,	
																																								 																				
159	Christopher	 Townley,	 'Co-ordinated	 Diversity:	 revolutionary	 suggestions	 for	 EU	 competition	 law	
(and	 EU	 law	 too)'	 in	 Piet	 Eeckhout	 and	 Takis	 Tridimas	 (eds),	 Yearbook	 of	 European	 Law,	 vol	 33	
(Yearbook	of	European	Law,	Oxford	University	Press	2014);	and	Christopher	Townley,	A	Framework	
for	European	Competition	Law:	co-ordinated	diversity	(Hart	Publishing	2018),	forthcoming.	
160	Although,	see	Okeoghene	Odudu,	The	Boundaries	of	EC	Competition	Law:	the	scope	of	Article	81	
(OUP	 2006),	 chapter	 7;	 Okeoghene	 Odudu,	 'The	 Wider	 Concerns	 of	 Competition	 Law'	 (2010)	 30	
Oxford	 Journal	 of	 Legal	 Studies	 ;	 and	 Pinar	 Akman,	 The	 Concept	 of	 Abuse	 in	 EU	 Competition	 Law	
(Bloomsbury	2015),	parts	I	and	II.	For	replies	see	Townley,	Article	81	EC	and	Public	Policy;	Christopher	
Townley,	 'Is	There	(Still)	Room	for	Non-Economic	Arguments	 in	Article	101	TFEU	Cases?'	 in	Caroline	
Heide-Jørgensen	and	others	 (eds),	Aims	and	Values	 in	 EU	Competition	 Law	 (Aims	and	Values	 in	 EU	
Competition	 Law,	 DJØF	 Publishing	 2013);	 and	 Giorgio	 Monti,	 EC	 Competition	 Law	 (Cambridge	
University	Press	2007),	chapters	1-4.	
161	J	Bengoetxea,	The	Legal	Reasoning	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(Clarendon	Press	1993),	233-4.	
See	also,	Case	283/81	Srl	CILFIT	and	Lanificio	di	Gavardo	SpA	v	Ministry	of	Health	 [1982]	ECR	3415,	
paras	16-20.	Similar	interpretative	principles	should	apply	for	the	Merger	Regulation	(Council,	on	the	
control	of	concentrations	between	undertakings),	see	Case	149/10	Zoi	Chatzi	v	Ypourgos	Oikonomikon	
[2010]	ECR	I-8489,	para	43	(by	implication).	
162	The	single	market	goal	(or	imperative),	in	the	context	of	EU	competition	law,	rests	on	the	idea	that	
the	“…Treaty,	whose	preamble	and	content	aim	at	abolishing	the	barriers	between	states,	and	which	
in	several	provisions	gives	evidence	of	a	stern	attitude	with	regard	to	their	reappearance,	could	not	
allow	 undertakings	 to	 reconstruct	 such	 barriers.	 Article	 85(1)	 [now	 Article	 101(1)]	 is	 designed	 to	
pursue	 this	aim,	even	 in	 the	case	of	agreements	between	undertakings	placed	at	different	 levels	 in	
the	 economic	 process.”,	 Joined	 Cases	 56	 and	 58/64	 Établissements	 Consten	 S.à.R.L.	 and	 Grundig-
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one	of	Articles	101	and	102’s	main	aims	has	been	to	prohibit	arrangements	that	perpetuate	
national	 divisions	 in	 trade	 between	 Member	 States	 even	 though	 nothing	 in	 the	 text	 of	
Articles	 101-102	 refers	 to	 single	 market	 integration.	 Recently,	 the	 ECJ	 reaffirmed	 the	
importance	 of	 this	 goal	 as	 consistent	 with	 the	 EU	 Treaties’	 “…objective	 of	 achieving	 the	
integration	 of	 national	 markets	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 single	 market”	 while	
emphasising	that	single	market	 integration	 is	not	a	mere	proxy	 for	consumer	welfare.163	In	
so	 doing,	 the	 Court	 thereby	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 teleological	 approach	 in	 EU	
competition	 law.	The	case	also	clearly	demonstrates	that	consumer	welfare	 is	not	the	sole	
and	exclusive	goal	of	Articles	101	and	102.164	
In	addition	to	literal	and	teleological	methods	of	interpretation,	the	EU	Courts	also	rely	on	a	
third	 approach,	 the	 contextual	 approach.	 For	 example,	 Article	 12	 TFEU	 requires	 that	
consumer	 protection	 “…requirements	 shall	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 defining	 and	
implementing	 Union	 policies	 and	 activities.”	 EU	 competition	 law	 is	 a	 Union	 policy.	 Article	
169	TFEU	explains	 that	 consumer	protection	 includes	 taking	 into	account	 the	 “…economic	
interests	of	consumers,	as	well	as…promoting	their	right	to	information…”	Once	again,	this	is	
wide	enough	to	support	a	consumer	welfare	goal	in	EU	competition	law.165		
The	 Commission,	 and	many	 academics	 and	 practitioners,	 often	 go	 further	 and	 claim	 that	
consumer	welfare	should	be	the	only	goal	of	these	EU	competition	provisions166	leaving	no	
room	 for	 fairness	 or	 equity.	We	disagree.	 Firstly,	 it	 conflicts	with	 the	 EU	Courts’	 case	 law	
with	many	 recent	 cases	 reaching	 precisely	 the	 opposite	 conclusion	 by167	reaffirming	 that,	
single	 market	 integration	 is	 a	 distinct	 goal	 of	 the	 EU	 competition	 provisions	 so	 that	 the	
promotion	of	 consumer	welfare	 is	not	 their	only	goal.	 Secondly,	 such	a	narrow	 reading	of	
the	substantive	goals	of	EU	competition	law	does	not	comport	with	a	proper	interpretation	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
Verkaufs-GmbH	 v	 Commission	 [1966]	 ECR	 299,	 340.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 Article	 102,	 given	 their	
common	goals,	see	text	around	footnote	117.	
In	 addition,	 many	 other	 public	 policy	 goals	 have	 been,	 and	 should	 be,	 considered	 relevant	 in	 EU	
competition	law,	given	the	wider	EU	Treaties’	framework.	The	relevance	of	wider	public	policy	goals	is	
not	the	focus	of	this	paper,	and	is	not	discussed	further	here.	For	a	further	discussion	of	these	issues	
see	 Townley,	 Article	 81	 EC	 and	 Public	 Policy;	 Townley,	 'Is	 There	 (Still)	 Room	 for	 Non-Economic	
Arguments	in	Article	101	TFEU	Cases?';	and	Monti,	EC	Competition	Law,	chapter	4.	
163 	Joined	 Cases	 56	 and	 58/64	 Établissements	 Consten	 S.à.R.L.	 and	 Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH	 v	
Commission	 [1966]	ECR	299,	340;	and	C-501/06	P	GlaxoSmithKline	Services	Unlimited	v	Commission	
[2009]	 ECR	 I-9291,	 paras	 61-3	 (which	 also	 explains	 that	 the	 single	market	 initiative	 and	 consumer	
welfare	 do	 not	 always	 overlap).	 The	 single	market	 objective	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 a	 key	motivation	
under	Article	102	in	Case	27/76	United	Brands	v	Commission	[1978]	ECR	207,	para	232,	for	example.	
See	also,	Whish	and	Bailey,	Competition	Law,	221.	
164	That	said,	as	David	Elliott	points	out,	the	single	market	 imperative	often	works	against	consumer	
welfare.	Where	firms	have	to	recover	fixed	costs,	for	example,	R&D,	the	single	market	says	you	must	
charge	the	uniform	price	to	recover	the	profit	required	to	meet	fixed	costs.	Economic	theory	tells	us	
that	the	best	solution	(with	straight	line	demand	curves)	is	to	allow	third	degree	price	discrimination	
between	 different	 countries	 with	 different	 willingness	 to	 pay.	 Aggregate	 consumer	 surplus	 will	
typically	be	higher	than	that	under	the	uniform	price	case.	Of	course,	there	will	be	winners,	(perhaps	
Greece	with	 low	prices)	and	 losers	 (Germany	and	UK,	with	high	prices),	which	can	make	 this	 cross-
subsidisation	politically	unpopular.	So,	the	single	market	objective	may	outweigh	aggregate	consumer	
surplus.	
165	Townley,	Article	81	EC	and	Public	Policy,	 chapter	2;	 and	Townley,	 'Is	 There	 (Still)	Room	 for	Non-
Economic	Arguments	in	Article	101	TFEU	Cases?'.	
166	See	references	at	footnote	154.	
167	See	references	at	footnote	163.	
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of	the	EU	Treaties,	given	that	the	teleological	and	contextual	methods	of	interpretation	are	
also	important	in	the	interpretation	of	EU	(competition)	law,	see	above.168		
But	is	the	promotion	of	fairness	and	justice	also	a	substantive	goal	of	EU	competition	law?	In	
the	 following	 discussion,	 we	 apply	 literal,	 contextual	 and	 teleological	 interpretative	
techniques	 to	 the	 EU	 Treaties	 to	 argue	 that	 fairness	 and	 justice	 are	 also	 legitimate	
substantive	goals	underpinning	the	proper	interpretation	and	application	of	EU	competition	
law.	
5.1.2	 Is	fairness	and	justice	a	substantive	goal	of	EU	competition	law?	
In	 Section	 3,	we	 examined	 the	 implications	 of	 ACPD	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 fairness	 and	
justice.	These	normative	values	constitute	 important	goals	 that	animate	 the	 interpretation	
and	application	of	the	EU	Treaties.	For	example,	the	Preamble	to	the	TFEU	recognises	“…that	
the	 removal	 of	 existing	 obstacles	 calls	 for	 concerted	 action	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 steady	
expansion,	balanced	trade	and	fair	competition…”	(our	emphasis).	Within	the	text	of	Article	
102,	 itself,	 Article	 102(a)	 explicitly	 states	 that	 charging	 ‘unfair	 prices’	 is	 abusive.169	In	
addition,	 the	 EU	 Treaties’	 competition	 provisions	 are	 intended	 to	 help	 facilitate	 the	
achievement	of	the	EU	internal	market,170	which	is	itself	informed	by	a	concern	for	fairness	
understood	as	collective	justice.	Article	3(3)	TEU	describes	the	aims	of	the	internal	market	in	
terms	of	 aiming	 to	 ‘combat	 social	 exclusion	and	discrimination’,	 to	 ‘promote	 social	 justice	
and	protection…and	solidarity	between	generations’	as	well	as	promoting	‘solidarity	among	
Member	 States’.	 These	 normative	 goals	 are	 concerned	with	 securing	 fairness	 and	 justice,	
and	cannot	be	accurately	described	solely	in	terms	of	the	promotion	of	aggregate	economic	
welfare.171		
The	 importance	of	fairness,	understood	as	collective	 justice,	can	also	be	found	 in	other	EU	
Treaty	provisions,	which	provide	the	 larger	 interpretative	context	for	Articles	101	and	102.	
For	example,	the	EU	Treaties	prohibit	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	various	legally	protected	
grounds.	We	suggest	 that	ACPD	 is	more	 likely	 to	be	 found	unjust	or	unfair,	and	 thus	even	
more	 likely	 to	 infringe	 EU	 competition	 law,	 when	 it	 entails	 unlawful	 discrimination.	 For	
example,	located	in	a	part	of	the	EU	Treaties	entitled	‘provisions	having	general	application’,	
Article	10	TFEU	stipulates	that:	
“In	 defining	 and	 implementing	 its	 policies	 and	 activities,	 the	 Union	 shall	 aim	 to	
combat	 discrimination	 based	 on	 sex,	 racial	 or	 ethnic	 origin,	 religion	 or	 belief,	
disability,	age	or	sexual	orientation.”	
																																								 																				
168	Those	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 sole	 consumer	welfare	 goal	 for	 EU	 competition	 law	 are	 not	 immune	 from	
raising	 other	 considerations	 themselves.	 For	 example,	 freedom	 of	 contract	 is	 often	 pleaded	 as	 a	
relevant	consideration,	Subiotto	and	O'Donoghue,	'Defining	the	Scope	of	the	Duty	of	Dominant	Firms	
to	Deal	with	Existing	Customers	under	Article	82	EC',	683-4.	This	is	relevant,	but	then	we	do	not	agree	
with	a	sole	consumer	welfare	objective.	
169	The	 EU	 Treaties	 go	 even	 further	 in	 limited	 areas.	 For	 example,	 the	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	
explicitly	 outlaws	 all	 discrimination	 between	 consumers	 and	 producers,	 Article	 40(2)	 TFEU.	 Is	 this	
wide	enough	to	outlaw	ACPD	when	we	apply	the	normal	EU	competition	rules	in	agricultural	areas?	If	
so,	this	could	help	to	protect	vulnerable	consumers	in	this	area.	
170	Protocol	27	annexed	to	the	TFEU	states	“…the	internal	market	as	set	out	in	Article	3	TEU	includes	a	
system	 ensuring	 that	 competition	 is	 not	 distorted…”	 Undermining	 market	 integration,	 in	 terms	 of	
discriminating	between	nationals	from	different	Member	States	(unless	based	on	objective	factors)	is	
generally	prohibited	in	Article	102,	see	the	discussion	around	footnote	163.	
171	Article	 2	 TEU	adds	 “The	Union	 is	 founded	on	 the	 values	of	 respect	 for	 human	dignity,	 freedom,	
democracy,	 equality,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 respect	 for	 human	 rights,	 including	 the	 rights	 of	 persons	
belonging	 to	 minorities.	 These	 values	 are	 common	 to	 the	 Member	 States	 in	 a	 society	 in	 which	
pluralism,	 non-discrimination,	 tolerance,	 justice,	 solidarity	 and	 equality	 between	 women	 and	 men	
prevail.”	ACPD	can	undermine	many	of	these	values,	including	solidarity.	
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As	we	have	 seen,	Article	 12	 TFEU	has	 an	 equivalent	 provision	 for	 consumer	protection.172		
Article	18	TFEU	also	appears	to	hardwire	a	prohibition	on	discrimination	on	the	grounds	of	
nationality	 in	a	similar	way	by	stating	that,	within	 the	scope	of	application	of	 the	Treaties,	
“…any	discrimination	on	grounds	of	nationality	shall	be	prohibited.”	Neither	of	these	Treaty	
articles	allows	any	form	of	defence.173	Accordingly,	by	interpreting	Article	102	in	the	light	of	
Articles	 10	 and	 18	 TFEU,	 ACPD	 by	 a	 dominant	 firm	 that	 entails	 discrimination	 on	 legally	
protected	 grounds,	 (especially	 discrimination	 on	 nationality	 that	 segments	 the	 single	
market),	is	likely	to	be	regarded	as	a	violation	of	the	Article	102	prohibition,	although	a	case-
by-case	analysis	 is	nevertheless	required	to	 identify	whether	ACPD,	 in	fact,	produces	these	
consequences.174	Again,	the	view	that	multiple	policy	goals	underpin	EU	competition	 law	is	
supported	by	the	EU	Courts’	case	law,	which	displays	a	strong	commitment	to	taking	these	
goals	into	account	when	interpreting	EU	competition	law	provisions,	unless	the	EU	Treaties	
very	clearly	indicate	a	contrary	intent,	rather	than	merely	focusing	on	the	goal	of	aggregate	
consumer	welfare.175	
5.2.	 The	interaction	between	efficiency	and	fairness	evaluations		
As	 the	 preceding	 analysis	 demonstrates,	 literal,	 teleological	 and	 contextual	 approaches	 to	
interpretation	of	the	EU	Treaties	suggest	that	both	consumer	welfare	and	the	promotion	of	
fairness	and	 justice	are	 substantive	goals	of	EU	competition	 law,	 in	addition	 to	 the	aim	of	
securing	single	market	integration.	Accordingly,	we	suggest	that	Articles	102	and	101	should	
be	 interpreted	 in	 light	of	all	of	 these	goals,	and	are	 therefore	 relevant	 to	an	evaluation	of	
whether	 ACPD	 violates	 EU	 competition	 law.	 Leaving	 aside	 single	 market	 integration	
concerns,	we	now	map	out	the	various	possible	interactions	between	the	consumer	welfare	
and	 fairness	 effects	 of	 ACPD	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 whether	 such	 practices	 should	 be	
considered	 a	 violation	 of	 EU	 competition	 law.	 We	 show	 that	 there	 are	 four	 possible	
situations	 to	 consider	 in	 relation	 to	 how	 they	 interact	 in	 a	 specific	 case,	 in	 two	 they	 are	
aligned,	 and	 in	 the	 other	 two,	 they	 conflict.	 Then,	we	 place	 these	 four	 scenarios	 into	 the	
Article	102	framework,	putting	forward	our	proposals	for	how	these	clashes	should	be	dealt	
with	thereunder.	
5.2.1	 Where	efficiency	and	fairness	considerations	are	aligned	
In	Section	2,	we	showed	how	ACPD	by	a	dominant	firm	might	either	increase,	or	decrease,	
consumer	 welfare,	 depending	 on	 the	 specific	 facts	 of	 the	 case;	 while	 in	 Section	 3,	 we	
showed	how	ACPD	might	be	evaluated	from	the	perspective	of	different	understandings	of	
																																								 																				
172	See	the	text	around	footnote	165.	
173	Article	21	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	is	even	wider,	in	terms	of	the	grounds	that	cannot	be	
employed	as	a	basis	for	discrimination,	“1.	Any	discrimination	based	on	any	ground	such	as	sex,	race,	
colour,	 ethnic	 or	 social	 origin,	 genetic	 features,	 language,	 religion	 or	 belief,	 political	 or	 any	 other	
opinion,	membership	of	a	national	minority,	property,	birth,	disability,	age	or	sexual	orientation	shall	
be	prohibited.	2.	Within	the	scope	of	application	of	the	Treaties	and	without	prejudice	to	any	of	their	
specific	 provisions,	 any	 discrimination	 on	 grounds	 of	 nationality	 shall	 be	 prohibited.”	 Once	 again,	
there	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 an	 explicit	 effort	 made	 to	 incorporate	 this	 prohibition	 against	
discrimination	 on	 protected	 grounds	 into	 provisions	 throughout	 the	 EU	 Treaties.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	
understand	 why	 this	 would	 not	 be	 effective	 in	 relation	 to	 competition	 law	 and	 Article	 102.	 The	
implication	of	Article	51	of	the	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	seems	to	be	that	these	rights	should	
be	considered	throughout	the	EU	Treaties,	including	Article	102	TFEU.	
174	The,	more	 recent,	 Lisbon	Treaty	 takes	 the	 role	and	 importance	of	 contextual	 interpretation	 to	a	
new	 level.	 We	 now	 have	 a	 new	 Article	 7	 TEU,	 which	 demands	 consistency	 between	 policies	 and	
activities.	This	seems	to	demand	that	all	 implementing	provisions	take	account	of	the	goals	of	other	
provisions.	 Article	 7	 reads:	 “The	Union	 shall	 ensure	 consistency	 between	 its	 policies	 and	 activities,	
taking	all	of	its	objectives	into	account	and	in	accordance	with	the	principle	of	conferral	of	powers.”	
175	See,	Townley,	Article	81	EC	and	Public	Policy,	Chapter	1,	section	3,	and	Chapter	2,	section	2.	
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fairness.	 If,	 consumer	 welfare	 and	 justice	 are	 aligned,	 either	 because,	 in	 the	 particular	
circumstances,	 ACPD	 increases	 consumer	 welfare	 and	 promotes	 fairness	 and	 justice,	 or	
because	it	adversely	impacts	upon	both	normative	goals,	then	the	policy	implications	of	this	
are,	theoretically,	straightforward:	assuming	that	no	other	relevant	goals	are	affected,	then	
if	 aggregate	 consumer	 welfare	 is	 enhanced	 by	 ACPD	 and	 such	 practices	 do	 not	 generate	
significant	fairness	concerns	(as	in	the	case	of	status	based	price	discounting	where	status	is	
a	reasonable	proxy	for	willingness	to	pay,	or	in	cases	of	price	discounting	in	cases	of	excess	
supply	 in	order	to	alleviate	waste),	then	such	practices	should	be	 legally	permissible	under	
Article	 102.	 Conversely,	 in	 circumstances	 where	 ACPD	 both	 reduces	 aggregate	 consumer	
surplus	 and	 also	 generates	 fairness	 concerns,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ACPD	 by	 a	 single	 firm	
monopolist	 (where	 this	 monopoly	 cannot	 be	 easily	 challenged),	 then	 Article	 102	 should	
apply	in	order	to	proscribe	discriminatory	pricing	practices	of	this	kind.	
5.2.2	 What	if	the	efficiency	and	fairness	dimensions	of	ACPD	are	in	conflict?	
Difficulties	 arise,	 however,	 when	 the	 consumer	 welfare	 and	 fairness	 dimensions	 of	 ACPD	
come	 into	 conflict.	 How	 should	 Article	 102	 be	 applied	 if	 there	 is	 either	 an	 increase	 in	
consumer	welfare	and	a	reduction	in	fairness,	or	vice	versa,	resulting	from	ACPD?	Consider,	
for	example,	situations	in	which	ACPD	may	lead	to	an	overall	increase	in	consumer	surplus,	
but	this	is	achieved	at	the	expense	of	elderly	and	infirm	consumers	who,	due	to	their	lack	of	
digital	 literacy,	 fail	 to	 shop	 around	 and	 switch	 to	 a	 provider	 who	 could	 satisfy	 their	
consumption	 preferences	 at	 a	 lower	 price.	 Or,	 conversely,	 consider	 the	 case	 of	 a	 retailer	
who	sells	razors	to	men	and	women	at	the	same	price	(which	may	promote	fairness	in	terms	
of	 gender	 equality)	 even	 though	 ACPD	 potentially	 may	 have	 led	 to	 lower	 average	 prices	
being	paid	by	consumers	and	a	higher	consumer	surplus.176		
In	applying	Article	102	to	these	cases,	we	will	 suggest	 that	consumer	welfare	provides	 the	
primary	focus	of	our	analysis,	but	with	the	goals	of	fairness	and	justice	playing	a	significant,	
but	 nonetheless	 secondary	 role,	 to	 orient	 the	 analysis.	 This	 hierarchy	 of	 values	 in	 EU	
competition	 law	 can	 then	 assist	 in	 determining	 whether	 the	 pricing	 practice	 in	 question	
constitutes	 an	 ‘abuse’	 of	 market	 power;	 and	 secondly,	 whether	 practices	 that	 might	
otherwise	 be	 regarded	 as	 abuses,	 might	 be	 objective	 justification	 (‘defences’);	 although,	
strictly	speaking,	objective	justification	forms	a	part	of	the	‘abuse’	assessment.	
a)	 Abuse	
In	this	section,	we	offer	a	sketch	of	our	proposed	approach,	suggesting	that	whether	ACPD	
constitutes	an	‘abuse’	should	depend	on	whether	it	 is	 likely	to	reduce	aggregate	consumer	
welfare,	but	allows	matters	of	fairness	to	be	considered	at	the	level	of	objective	justification.	
While	 we	 have	 argued	 that	 consumer	 welfare	 and	 fairness	 are	 both	 relevant	 substantive	
goals	 of	 EU	 competition	 law,	 the	 EU	 Treaties	 provide	 little	 assistance	 allocating	 their	
normative	 goals	 to	 the	 Treaties’	 implementing	 provisions,	 or	 to	 ranking	 their	 relative	
importance	 and	 how	 they	 should	 apply	 to	 various	 legal	 elements	 of	 specific	 Treaty	
provisions.	We	offer	an	approach	in	which	the	notion	of	‘abuse’	is	interpreted	exclusively	by	
reference	 to	 consumer	 welfare,	 finding	 evidence	 to	 support	 our	 approach	 in	 the	 form	 of	
both	positive	legal	arguments	(the	location	of	the	competition	rules	in	the	EU	Treaties,	hints	
from	the	Council	procedural	regulation,	the	current	mainstream	conception	of	competition	
law’s	 aims,	 as	well	 as	 further	 efficiency	 benefits	 generated	 by	 approximating	 competition	
law	 goals	 worldwide),	 and	 negative	 legal	 arguments	 (it	 is	 sufficient,	 from	 an	 EU	 law	
perspective,	 to	 consider	 fairness	 later).	We	 then	 discuss	 the	 importance	 of	 inter-personal	
effects	 in	 consumer	 welfare	 analysis,	 drawing	 on	 insights	 from	 behavioural	 economics	 in	
																																								 																				
176	Mark	Leftly,	'Tesco	Cuts	Price	of	Women's	Razors	So	They	Cost	the	Same	as	Men's'	The	Guardian	(1	
January	2017)	
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order	 to	 argue	 for	 a	 widening	 of	 the	 conventional	 understanding	 of	 aggregate	 consumer	
welfare.	 We	 also	 provide	 a	 concrete	 example,	 to	 illustrate	 how	 our	 suggested	 approach	
might	operate.	
Four	 legal	arguments	are	offered,	 suggesting	 that	an	exclusive	 focus	on	consumer	welfare	
effects	 should	 be	 required	 when	 interpreting	 whether	 a	 particular	 course	 of	 conduct	
constitutes	an	‘abuse’	for	the	purposes	of	Article	102.	First,	Article	102	is	located	in	a	part	of	
the	TFEU	entitled	‘Rules	on	competition’.	The	overwhelming	(although	not	exclusive)	view	in	
competition	 circles	 worldwide	 is	 that	 consumer	 welfare	 should	 be	 a	 (if	 not	 the)	 primary	
substantive	 goal	 of	 EU	 competition	 law.177	Second,	 recital	 9	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003,	 the	
implementing	regulation	for	Articles	101	and	102,	explicitly	states	that	Articles	101	and	102	
“…have	as	their	objective	the	protection	of	competition	on	the	market.”178	This	also	hints	at	
a	 consumer	welfare	 approach,	with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 competition	within	 a	market.	 So,	we	
suggest	that	competition	and	the	promotion	of	aggregate	consumer	welfare	should	be	the	
core	 focus,	 at	 least	 when	 interpreting	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘abuse’.179	Finally,	 this	 has	 the	
additional	benefit	of	further	aligning	competition	laws	worldwide;	which	should	reduce	the	
legal	compliance	costs	for	multi-nationals,	while	still	achieving	an	important	EU	goal.180	
Our	 proposed	 approach	 would	 mark	 a	 change	 of	 emphasis	 in	 the	 EU	 Courts’	 current	
approach	 to	Article	102,	by	 strongly	prioritising	 the	pursuit	 of	 consumer	welfare	over	 and	
above	the	other	goals,	such	as,	freedom	to	compete,	protecting	the	structure	of	the	market,	
market	 integration,	 and	 so	 forth,	 that	 the	 courts	 have	 hitherto	 considered	 relevant	 to	 its	
interpretation.181	However,	 for	 the	 above	 reasons,	 we	 support	 the	 emphasis	 placed	 by	
competition	scholars	today	on	consumer	welfare	as	a	primary	goal	of	Article	102;	relegating	
fairness	 considerations	 to	a	 secondary	 role	 that	enters	 into	 the	 legal	 application	of	Article	
102	at	the	stage	of	‘defences’.182	This	approach	may	also	provide	more	freedom	for	national	
systems	to	select	their	preferred	local	balance	of	substantive	goals.183	
Critics	might	respond	that	our	proposed	approach	fails	to	give	sufficient	weight	to	the	Treaty	
provisions	outlawing	discrimination	on	protected	grounds	in	light	of	the	EU	Treaties’	goal	of	
social	inclusion,	claiming	that	concerns	of	this	kind	ought	properly	to	be	taken	into	account	
in	 identifying	 what	 constitutes	 an	 ‘abuse’	 under	 Article	 102.	 Although	 there	 is	 scope	 for	
reasonable	 disagreement	 about	 this	 matter,	 we	 think	 it	 preferable	 if	 fairness	 based	
objections	to	algorithmic	practices,	including	ACPD,	be	primarily	protected	via	legal	regimes	
that	 are	 directly	 concerned	 with	 the	 goals	 of	 ensuring	 collective	 fairness	 and	 distributive	
justice,	 such	 as	 equality	 legislation	 that	 is	 aimed	 at	 securing	 the	 protection	 of	 historically	
disadvantaged	 and	 which	 could	 then,	 if	 considered	 appropriate,	 be	 extended	 to	 include	
other	social	groups	considered	 in	need	of	special	 legal	protection.	One	exception	to	this	 is	
the	goal	of	single	market	 integration,	which	the	Member	States	do	not	 typically	protect	 in	
																																								 																				
177	See	text	around	footnotes	154	and	166.	
178	This	Council	regulation	was	made	further	to	Article	103(2)(b)	TFEU.	
179	Fairness	considerations	may,	however,	be	relevant	at	the	level	of	objective	justification.	
180	See	text	around	footnote	159.	
181	See,	 the	 cases	 referenced	 in	 footnote	 163;	 Stavros	Makris,	 'Applying	 Normative	 Theories	 in	 EU	
Competition	 Law:	 exploring	 Article	 102	 TFEU'	 (2014)	 3	UCL	 Journal	 of	 Law	 and	 Jurisprudence	 ,	 30;	
Gormsen,	A	Principled	Approach	 to	Abuse	of	Dominance	 in	European	Competition	Law;	Odudu,	The	
Boundaries	of	EC	Competition	Law:	the	scope	of	Article	81;	Monti,	EC	Competition	Law,	chapter	4;	and	
Townley,	Article	81	EC	and	Public	Policy,	chapters	3	and	4.	
182	See	 the	 discussion	 around	 footnote	 155,	 for	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 many	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 a	
consumer	welfare	approach.	For	similar	arguments	 in	relation	to	Article	101	TFEU	(anti-competitive	
arrangements),	see	Townley,	Article	81	EC	and	Public	Policy,	231-41.	
183	See,	Townley,	 'Co-ordinated	Diversity:	 revolutionary	suggestions	 for	EU	competition	 law	 (and	EU	
law	too)'.	
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their	 national	 legal	 orders	 (unlike	 the	 other	 grounds	 of	 collective	 fairness	 highlighted	 in	
Section	5.1).	As	a	consequence,	it	is,	in	our	view,	appropriate	to	maintain	the	single	market	
imperative	as	a	basis	for	abuse	(in	addition	to	consumer	welfare).	
There	are	two	foreseeable	objections	to	excluding	fairness	from	the	definition	of	‘abuse’	for	
Article	102	purposes.	First,	the	current	political	climate	seems	to	demonstrate	a	widely	held	
view	that	the	benefits	of	economic	growth	have	been	appropriated	by	the	already	well	off,	
widening	 income	and	wealth	 inequality.184	If	 so,	now	may	not	be	a	 good	 time	 to	 focus	on	
aggregate	 consumer	 welfare,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 more	 re-distributive	 goals,	 especially	
collective	fairness,	which	might	particularly	benefit	the	vulnerable.	Nonetheless,	in	our	view	
the	 best	way	 to	 protect	 these	 re-distributive	 goals	 is	 to	 increase	 their	 protection	 through	
legislation	 that	 is	more	explicitly	 redistributive	 in	 its	 aim	 (such	as	 consumer	protection,	or	
tax	 legislation,	 for	 example),	 and	 to	 increase	 the	 resources	 for	 enforcing	 these	 legislative	
instruments.	A	narrower	focus	for	the	competition	rules	is	also	beneficial	in	several	respects,	
making	 them	easier	and	cheaper	 to	enforce;	providing	more	 legal	 certainty	 for	 firms	 (as	a	
limited	number	of	goals	 in	any	part	of	a	test	reduces	complexity,	even	though	a	consumer	
welfare	standard	 is	admittedly	 far	 from	straightforward	 to	apply);	and	 the	EU	competition	
rules	would	have	a	narrower	remit.	 If	the	range	of	social	goals	and	values	that	 informs	the	
interpretation	 of	 competition	 policy	 is	 drawn	 too	 widely,	 competition	 provisions	 may	 be	
unwieldy	and	unpredictable.	Secondly,	the	Commission	appears	keen	to	focus	on	economic	
efficiency	 in	 objective	 justifications,	which	might	 hint	 that	 this	 is	 not	 the	primary	 focus	of	
‘abuse’	 and	 the	 EU	 Courts’	 case	 law	 provides	 some	 support	 for	 this	 view	 (see	 Section	 4	
above).	 However,	 the	 older	 case	 law	 that	 provides	 support	 for	 this	 view	 preceded	 the	
contemporary	 emphasis	 on	 economic	 reasoning	 in	 EU	 competition	 law	 with	 its	 focus	 on	
consumer	welfare	and,	we	therefore	suggest	that	the	time	is	ripe	for	fundamental	reform	to	
reduce	the	lack	of	clarity	that	currently	persists.185	
Thirdly,	although	we	have	argued	for	a	narrower	interpretation	of	‘abuse’	 in	one	sense	(by	
confining	it	to	conduct	which	reduces	the	aggregate	consumer	welfare	or	undermines	single	
market	 integration),	 we	 suggest	 that	 it	 should	 be	 expanded	 in	 another	 sense,	 by	
incorporating	 insights	 from	 behavioural	 economics	 to	 supplement	 conventional	 economic	
understandings	of	aggregate	consumer	welfare.	In	standard	analyses,	the	individual	surplus	
enjoyed	by	a	 consumer	depends	only	upon	how	much	of	 the	good	 they	consume	and	 the	
price	 that	 they	 pay.	 But	 as	we	 saw	 in	 Section	 3.2.1,	 insights	 from	 behavioural	 economics	
suggest	 that	 the	value	of	an	 item	to	consumers	may	also	be	partially	dependent	upon	the	
price	paid	by	others.	For	example,	 if	 I	pay	£100	for	a	widget	 today,	but	 then	discover	 that	
you	only	 paid	 £60	 for	 exactly	 the	 same	widget	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 I	may	 revise	 the	 value	 I	
obtained	 from	my	 purchase	 (and	 so	 might	 you),	 and	my	 consumer	 surplus	 will	 be	 lower	
(while	yours	may	be	higher).	In	conventional	economic	analysis	(while	accepted	as	relevant),	
these	 inter-personal	 effects	 on	 valuation	 are	 routinely	 ignored	 to	 simplify	 the	 consumer	
welfare	 assessment.186	Yet,	 Section	 3.2.1	 argued	 that	 these	 effects	 are	 relevant	 to	 an	
evaluation	of	aggregate	consumer	welfare,	and	so	should	form	part	of	the	 legal	evaluation	
of	 ACPD	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 102.	 By	 reinterpreting	 how	 aggregate	 consumer	 welfare	 is	
determined,	 which	 allows	 for	 inter-personal	 effects	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account,	 the	
perspectives	of	economics	and	fairness	can	be	partially	integrated,	rather	than	being	posed	
																																								 																				
184	See	for	example,	Jonathan	Baker	and	Steven	Salop,	'Competition,	Antitrust	and	Inequality'	(2015)	
104	Georgetown	Law	Journal	1.	
185	An	alternative	 is	 to	allow	different	areas	 to	 interpret	abuse	and	objective	 justification	 in	diverse	
ways,	unless	and	until	 the	EU	Courts	more	precisely	define	 them,	Townley,	 'Co-ordinated	Diversity:	
revolutionary	suggestions	 for	EU	competition	 law	(and	EU	 law	too)';	and	Townley,	A	Framework	 for	
European	Competition	Law:	co-ordinated	diversity,	forthcoming.	
186	See	reference	at	footnote	96.	
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in	 opposition	 to	 each	 other.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 avoids	 the	 need	 to	 establish	 an	
independent	normative	 foundation	 in	order	 to	provide	a	 legal	basis	by	and	 through	which	
subjective	 perceptions	 of	 pricing	 fairness	 can	 be	 made	 legally	 relevant	 when	 evaluating	
ACPD	under	EU	competition	law.	
Accordingly,	where	ACPD	enhances	aggregate	consumer	welfare,	it	should	not	constitute	an	
‘abuse’	for	the	purposes	of	Article	102,	irrespective	of	its	implications	for	fairness.	Although	
Article	102(c)	prohibits	applying	dissimilar	conditions	to	equivalent	 transactions	with	other	
trading	 parties	 thereby	 placing	 them	 at	 a	 disadvantage,	 we	 believe	 that	 this	 prohibition	
should	 apply	 only	 in	 the	 business-to-business	 context	 in	 circumstances	 where	 a	 supplier	
distorts	 competition	 by	 charging	 different	 prices	 to	 two	 downstream	 firms	 that	 compete	
with	each	other.	In	contrast,	ACPD	is	aimed	at	final	end	users,	individual	consumers,	rather	
than	firms	in	competition	with	each	other.	Consumers	might	cause	each	other	disadvantage,	
where	there	is	true	scarcity.	This	is	rare,	and	even	then,	it	is	hard	to	see	it	as	a	competitive	
disadvantage.	 This	 is	 the	 assumption	 of	many	 commentators187	and	 some	 support	 for	 this	
view	can	be	found	in	the	ECSC	Treaty.188		
To	 illustrate	 our	 suggested	 approach,	 consider	 a	 scenario	 in	 which	 men	 have	 a	 higher	
willingness	to	pay	for	a	particular	kind	of	good	than	women	–	such	as	razors.	Let	us	assume	
that	 razors	 sold	 to	men	and	women	 form	part	 of	 the	 same	 relevant	market,	 and	 that	 the	
dominant	 firm	 supplying	 razors	 is	 a	monopolist.	Accordingly,	 this	 firm	could	 set	 a	uniform	
price	P	for	razors,	sold	to	both	men	and	women.	Alternatively,	it	could	sell	razors	at	higher	
price	Pm	 to	men	and	 lower	price	Pw	 to	women,	discouraging	arbitrage	by,	 say,	making	 the	
cheaper	women’s	 razors	pink	and	 released	 in	more	 feminine	packaging.	 In	 this	way,	ACPD	
might	 allow	 the	 dominant	 firm	 to	 price	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 enhances	 total	 consumer	
welfare.	If,	under	a	uniform	pricing	regime	of	P,	very	few	women	would	be	willing	to	pay	for	
razors,	 then,	by	 engaging	 in	 price	 discrimination,	 the	 dominant	 firm	may	 be	 able	 to	 raise	
consumer	welfare	across	 the	 two	groups.	Accordingly,	ACPD	would	not	 then	constitute	an	
‘abuse’	 because	 the	 overall	 effect	 is	 to	 increase	 total	 consumer	 surplus,	 even	 if	men	 pay	
more	than	they	otherwise	would	under	a	uniform	price	regime,	where	women	get	a	product	
that	they	would	not	otherwise	get,	or	get	it	more	cheaply.	
Yet	 this	example	entails	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	gender,	which	 is	a	 legally	protected	
ground	 under	 EU	 anti-discrimination	 law,	 and	 it	would	 remain	 open	 to	 legal	 challenge	 on	
that	 basis.	 In	 other	words,	ACPD	 in	 these	 circumstances	may	 generate	 a	 conflict	 between	
consumer	welfare	 (which	 is	 enhanced)	 and	 fairness	 understood	 in	 the	 equal	 treatment	 of	
men	 and	 women	 (which	 is	 undermined).	 In	 our	 view,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 that	 is	
appropriately	resolved	by	competition	law,	but	must	be	dealt	with	at	a	more	general	level	in	
the	interplay	between	anti-discrimination	law,	on	the	one	hand,	and	competition	law	on	the	
other,	 consideration	 of	which	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	
competition	 law	 alone,	 these	 prima	 facie	 gender-based	 discrimination	 entailed	 by	 APCD	
should	 not,	 in	 our	 view,	 bear	 upon	 whether	 the	 practice	 counts	 as	 an	 ‘abuse’	 for	 the	
purposes	of	Article	102.	
																																								 																				
187	Robert	O'Donoghue	and	Jorge	Padilla,	The	Law	and	Economics	of	Article	102	TFEU	(2nd	edn,	Hart	
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Our	interpretive	aim	in	seeking	to	apply	Article	102	to	ACPD	in	this	way	is	to	ensure	that	its	
primary	 concern	 is	 promoting	 aggregate	 consumer	 welfare	 (and	 the	 single	 market).	
Nevertheless,	 the	 EU	 Treaties	 demand	 that	 fairness	 and	 justice	 should	 inform	 the	
interpretation	of	Article	102,	but	the	legally	appropriate	place	for	this	arises	at	the	stage	of	
objective	justification.	
b)	 Objective	Justification	(defences)	
What	about	the	converse	situation,	that	is,	circumstances	in	which	ACPD	may	be	prima	facie	
consumer	welfare	reducing,	but	might	nevertheless	be	regarded	as	fairness-enhancing?	For	
example,	 drawing	on	 the	 preceding	 example,	 let	 us	 imagine	 that	 this	monopolist	 at	 some	
later	 date	 decides	 to	 stop	 discriminating	 between	 men	 and	 women,	 and	 –	 for	 whatever	
reason,	now	 takes	 the	view	 that	 it	would	be	more	profitable	 to	 charge	a	uniform	price	 to	
both	men	 and	women,	with	 the	 effect	 that	 aggregate	 consumer	welfare	 is	 reduced.	 Such	
conduct	 would	 therefore	 be	 abusive	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 102.	 However,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	
practice	 is	 to	 eliminate	 gender	 discrimination,	 thus	 enhancing	 the	 fairness	 of	 the	
monopolist’s	pricing	practices.	In	our	suggested	approach,	this	fairness-enhancing	effect	can	
be	taken	 into	account	at	the	stage	of	objective	 justifications	for	conduct	that	constitutes	a	
prima	 facie	 abuse	 of	 Article	 102.	 Depending	 upon	 the	 facts	 in	 the	 specific	 case,	 these	
fairness	benefits	might	outweigh	the	consumer	welfare	(or	single	market)	loss.189		
In	 both	 scenarios	 where	 a	 change	 in	 the	 price	 of	 razors	 is	 contemplated,	 efficiency	 and	
fairness/justice	 come	 into	 conflict.	Because	 the	main	purpose	of	 the	EU	competition	 rules	
should	be,	 in	our	 view,	 to	 enhance	 aggregate	 consumer	welfare	 (and	market	 integration),	
we	think	that	ACPD	or	other	discriminatory	practices	resulting	in	consumer	welfare/	market	
integration	gains	should	not	constitute	a	prima	facie	violation	of	Article	102,	(provided	that	
consumer	welfare	 is	 interpreted	widely	to	 include	 interpersonal	effects)	regardless	of	their	
impact	 upon	 fairness.	However,	 if	 this	 conduct	 decreases	 aggregate	 consumer	welfare	 (or	
the	single	market)	and	therefore	constitutes	a	prima	facie	abuse	under	Article	102,	 it	may,	
nevertheless,	be	objectively	justified	on	grounds	of	fairness	and	equity.		
In	 conclusion,	 consumer	 welfare	 (including	 inter-personal	 effects)	 should	 be	 the	 primary	
substantive	 goal	 of	 EU	 competition	 law	 (with	 the	 single	 market	 initiative)	 and	 corrective	
fairness	 relevant	 as	 a	 secondary	 goal.	 This	 means	 that,	 where	 ACPD	 enhances	 consumer	
welfare	 (or	 the	 single	market),	 but	 fairness	 is	 undermined,	 we	 would	 not	 consider	 this	 a	
matter	for	the	competition	rules,	but	something	to	be	dealt	with	more	specifically	in	the	EU	
Treaties’	 provisions	 that	 are	directly	oriented	 towards	promoting	equality	 and	 fairness	 (or	
their	national	equivalent,	as	appropriate).	Where	ACPD	reduces	consumer	welfare,	however,	
then	we	believe	that	fairness	gains	should	be	allowed	to	outweigh	this	competition	harm,	as	
recognised	 by	 the	 EU	 Treaties,	 and	 in	 Article	 102	 itself.	 Accordingly,	 if	 ACPD	 involves	
discrimination	 on	 legally	 protected	 (ie	 nationality,	 sex,	 racial	 or	 ethnic	 origin,	 religion	 or	
religious	belief,	disability,	age	or	sexual	orientation)	then	this	can	only	be	considered	within	
Article	102	if	ACPD	also	reduces	consumer	welfare.	In	the	same	way,	where	a	measure	by	a	
dominant	 firm	 reduces	 discrimination,	 this	 may	 be	 relevant	 as	 a	 ‘defence’	 to	 consumer	
welfare	 loss.	 Finally,	 as	we	 noted	 in	 Section	 3,	 a	 lack	 of	 transparency	 about	 the	 fact	 that	
firms	are	using	ACPD,	as	well	as	the	basis	of	their	discriminatory	pricing,	particularly	 in	the	
																																								 																				
189	In	 these	 circumstances,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 dominant	 firm	 to	 show	 “…that	 its	 conduct	 is	 objectively	
necessary	(see,	to	that	effect,	Case	311/84	CBEM	 [1985]	ECR	3261,	paragraph	27)...”,	Case	C-209/10	
Post	 Danmark	 A/S	 v	 Konkurrencerådet	 [2012]	 ECR	 I-172,	 paras	 41-2.	 This	 case	 hints	 that	 the	
cumulative	 criteria	 in	 objective	 justification	 (benefit	 outweighs	 the	 harm,	 conduct	 is	 necessary	 to	
achieve	the	gains	and	does	not	eliminate	effective	competition)	only	apply	to	efficiency	benefits	and	
not	those	based	on	other	grounds.	So,	we	ignore	them	here.	However,	they	might	also	be	relevant,	in	
which	case	they	would	also	need	to	be	applied.	In	principle,	this	is	possible.	
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current	social	context	in	which	many	consumers	continue	to	assume	that	uniform	pricing	is	
in	operation,	risks	generating	so	many	mistakes	by	consumers	that	their	aggregate	welfare,	
collective	 justice	and/	or	corrective	 justice	could	also	be	undermined	for	 this	 reason.	So,	a	
lack	of	 transparency	by	dominant	 firms	engaging	 in	ACPD	should	also	be	 treated	as	prima	
facie	 abusive,	 generating	 a	 rebuttable	 presumption	 that	 such	 practices	 reduce	 consumer	
welfare	and	undermine	fairness.190		
6.	 Conclusion	
This	paper	has	examined	whether	ACPD	should	be	unlawful	under	EU	competition	 law.	To	
answer	 this	 question,	 we	 have	 considered	 the	 desirability	 of	 ACPD	 by	 reference	 to	 two	
normative	 values,	 economic	 efficiency	 (focusing	 on	 its	 effects	 on	 aggregate	 consumer	
surplus)	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 conventional	 economic	 analysis,	 and	 by	 reference	 to	
fairness	 or	 justice,	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 consumers’	 subjective	 perceptions,	 as	 unfair	
dealing,	 and	 in	 terms	of	 its	 potential	 unfairness	 to	 social	 groups	 (collective	 justice).	 Taken	
together,	 both	 these	 normative	 perspectives	 highlight	 concerns	 associated	 with	 the	
information	asymmetry	that	Big	Data	analytic	techniques	make	possible	and	reinforce,	and	
which	 ACPD	 seeks	 to	 harness.191	Because	 online	 retailers	 can	 observe	 individual	 online	
behaviour	at	a	highly	granular	 level,	but	 individual	 consumers	are	unable	 to	 scrutinise	 the	
pricing	behaviour	of	online	retailers	at	the	same	level	of	detail,	this	places	consumers	at	risk	
of	exploitation,	often	feeling	that	they	have	been	unfairly	treated	(even	assuming	that	they	
are	 aware	 that	 ACPD	 is	 taking	 place).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 ACPD	 may	 also	 intensify	
competition	 (and	 provide	 a	 more	 personalised	 shopping	 experience),	 from	 which	 many	
individual	consumers	may	benefit	(although	some	may	not),	and	which	may	be	beneficial	to	
consumers	in	the	aggregate.	Although	the	focus	of	our	legal	analysis	has	been	on	Article	102	
TFEU	 (the	prohibition	on	 the	 abuse	of	 dominance),	 our	 conclusions	 are	 relevant	 for	many	
major	 competition	 law	 provisions,	 including	 anti-competitive	 arrangements	 under	 Article	
101	TFEU,	and	mergers.		
Economic	 analysis	 suggests	 that,	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ACPD	 by	 a	 single	 firm	monopolist	
which	 is	 likely	 to	diminish	overall	 consumer	 surplus	 and	which	we	 therefore	argue	 should	
give	 rise	 to	a	 rebuttable	presumption	 that	 it	 violates	Article	102,	 the	effects	on	 consumer	
welfare	are	ambiguous.	We	have	argued	that,	because	the	predominant	concern	of	Article	
102,	today,	is	to	promote	economic	efficiency,	understood	in	terms	of	maximising	consumer	
welfare,	ACPD	should	not	constitute	a	per	se	violation	of	Article	102.	Rather,	case	by	case	
examination	is	required	to	determine	the	effects	of	ACPD	on	consumer	welfare,	and	this	 is	
likely	 to	 depend	 upon	 whether	 the	 market	 is	 characterised	 by	 best-response	 asymmetry	
(e.g.	where	sellers	price	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	brand	preference	or	switching	costs)	or	
best-response	 symmetry	 (where	 price	 discrimination	 is	 based	 on	 search	 costs).	 In	 the	
former,	 price	 discrimination	 tends	 to	 intensify	 competition,	 but	 in	 the	 latter,	 it	 tends	 to	
weaken	competition.	However,	a	 finding	 that	ACPD	 tends	 to	 reduce	consumer	welfare	 (or	
the	 single	market)	 on	 a	 conventional	 economic	 analysis	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 it	
should	be	regarded	as	unlawful	under	Article	102,	because	we	have	suggested	that	it	might	
nonetheless	 be	 objectively	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	 promotes	 equity	 and	 justice	 by	
avoiding	 discrimination	 on	 legally	 protected	 grounds.	 Similar	 findings	 should	 apply	 under	
Article	101	and	the	Merger	Regulation.	
																																								 																				
190	There	 is	 some	 support	 in	 the	 case	 law	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 lack	 of	 pricing	 transparency	 that	
facilitates	discrimination	between	customers	is	abusive,	although	it	 is	far	from	clear;	Case	C-179/90,	
Merci	convenzionali	porto	di	Genova	SpA	v	Siderurgica	Gabrielli	SpA	[1991]	ECR	I-5889,	para	20,	and	
Advocate	 General	 van	 Gerven,	 para	 19.	 This	 might	 be	 particularly	 the	 case	 where	 vulnerable	
consumers	bear	this	extra	burden.	
191	Although	see,	America,	Big	Data	and	Differential	Pricing,	13-5.	
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Conversely,	 even	 if	 conventional	 economic	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 a	 given	 case	 of	 ACPD	
enhances	 consumer	 welfare,	 we	 believe	 that	 a	 more	 wide-reaching	 consumer	 welfare	
analysis	must	 be	 undertaken.	 First,	 insights	 from	 behavioural	 economics,	 which	 draws	 on	
findings	 from	 experiments	 in	 cognitive	 psychology	 that	 systematically	 demonstrate	 that	
people	 frequently	 make	 sub-rational	 decisions	 owing	 to	 various	 cognitive	 heuristics	 and	
decision-making	 flaws,	 may	 reverse	 this	 finding.	 In	 particular,	 an	 individual	 consumer’s	
failure	 to	 switch	providers	who	offer	 cheaper	prices	or	better	quality	does	not	necessarily	
indicate	that	the	consumer	has	a	preference	for	the	services	offered	by	her	existing	supplier:	
rather,	 it	may	 be	 that	 the	 individual	 is	 simply	 unaware	 of	 the	 alternative	more	 attractive	
offers,	or	fails	to	switch	suppliers	due	to	inertia	or	worries	about	the	level	of	personal	effort	
and	 anxiety	 associated	 with	 navigating	 and	 transacting	 in	 the	 online	 market	 place.	
Accordingly,	charging	such	a	consumer	a	higher	price	might	be	more	accurately	understood	
as	 a	 form	 of	 exploitation	 of	 the	 vulnerability	 and	 ignorance	 of	 certain	 kinds	 of	
unsophisticated	 consumers.	 Thus,	 the	 behavioural	 economics	 perspective	 shares	 common	
ground	 with	 the	 collective	 fairness	 (distributive	 justice)	 perspective,	 which	 reveals	 how	
ACPD	may	lead	to	distributive	injustice,	 in	which	certain	social	groups	suffer	discrimination	
in	 terms	of	 the	 inferior	prices	and	service	quality	 in	online	markets	 relative	 to	other	more	
digitally	savvy	groups.	Proposing	solutions	is	difficult	here.	One	problem	is	that	sellers	may	
not	 be	 able	 to	 distinguish	 between	 these	 vulnerable	 consumers	 and	 consumers	 positively	
demonstrating	brand	preference;	observationally,	 these	 two	groups	of	consumers	 respond	
in	 the	same	way.	We	may	want	 to	 intervene	 to	protect	 the	vulnerable,	but	not	 the	 latter.	
One	possibility	is	to	define	a	separate	market	for	these	vulnerable	consumers	and	then	apply	
Article	102	in	the	normal	way	(we	even	saw	some	support	in	the	case	law	for	the	idea	that	a	
lack	of	pricing	transparency	that	facilitates	discrimination	between	customers	is	abusive;	this	
might	be	even	worse	where	vulnerable	consumers	bear	 this	extra	burden);	but	 that	 is	not	
always	appropriate.	Furthermore,	the	problem	does	not	only	arise	from	ACPD	by	dominant	
firms,	and	so	even	if	such	a	course	is	sometimes	possible,	it	is	not	sufficient	to	deal	with	the	
perceived	harm.	A	more	extensive	remedy	that	should	work	in	many	instances	is	a	form	of	
price	regulation,	such	as	price	caps.	These	are	controversial,	and	will	only	be	applied	where	
there	is	very	serious	and	long-standing	consumer	harm	(and	other	remedies	have	failed).	It	
may	be	that	this	is	an	area	where	there	is	a	harm,	but	no	appropriate,	widespread	remedy.	
Secondly,	behavioural	economics	also	allows	scope	for	consumers’	subjective	perceptions	of	
relative	pricing	fairness	to	be	taken	into	consideration.	There	is	a	long	tradition	of	these	and	
similar	types	of	inter-personal	effects	being	incorporated	into	models	of	consumer	decision	
making	and	economic	welfare.	 It	 is	however	difficult	 to	estimate	 these	effects	empirically,	
so,	 it	 is	 conventionally	assumed	 that	 the	 fact	 that	one	consumer	does	not	 know	 the	price	
that	other	consumers	obtain	 is	 irrelevant:	efficiency	 is	enhanced	 in	circumstances	 in	which	
consumers	are	able	 to	acquire	 the	good	at	 their	highest	willingness	 to	pay.	Accordingly,	 if	
two	 consumers	 pay	 different	 prices	 for	 the	 same	 good,	 this	may	 be	 efficiency	 enhancing.	
But,	 we	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 price	 one	 consumer	 obtains	 provides	 an	 anchor	 by	 which	
another	 consumer	 assesses	 the	 value	 of	 a	 product.	 This	 may	 affect	 both	 consumers’	
assessments	 of	 the	 product’s	 value.	 On	 this	 understanding,	 ACPD	 may	 reduce	 consumer	
welfare	 (efficiency)	 more	 than	 current	 economic	 analyses	 suggest.	 By	 recognising	 that	
consumers	may	make	mistakes	when	making	purchasing	decisions,	behavioural	economics	
also	 reflects	 concerns	 that	 ACPD	may	 be	 unfair,	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 unfair	 dealing.	 In	
particular,	 if	 consumers	 assume	 that	 uniform	 pricing,	 which	 typically	 applies	 when	
purchasing	 goods	 and	 services	 in	 the	 off-line	 environment,	 also	 applies	 in	 the	 on-line	
environment,	 this	 this	 may	 undermine	 the	 consensual	 basis	 of	 the	 transaction	 if	 the	
consumer	would	have	arrived	at	a	different	(lower)	valuation	of	the	relevant	product	if	she	
had	known	that	the	same	retailer	was	willing	to	sell	the	product	to	others	at	a	lower	price.	In	
other	words,	if	consumers	have	imperfect	information	they	make	mistakes	and	this	reduces	
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economic	 welfare.	 ACPD	 can	 induce	mistakes:	 if	 an	 individual	 consumer’s	 utility	 depends	
upon	knowing	not	only	the	price	she	is	offered	but	also	the	price	that	other	consumers	are	
offered,	but	she	does	not	have	access	to	this	 information,	then	some	consumers	will	make	
mistakes	 (some	benefit	 too).	 In	 these	circumstances,	ACPD	 is	 to	blame.	This	 is	particularly	
relevant	 today.	 Many	 consumers	 are	 not	 even	 aware	 that	 ACPD	 is	 being	 employed	 to	
personalise	online	prices.	If	the	counterfactual	is	that	all	consumers	are	paid	the	same	price,	
then	 all	 consumers	 are	 perfectly	 informed	 of	 the	 available	 price.	 So,	 if	 the	 distribution	 of	
prices	affects	individual	utility,	then	ACPD	induces	mistakes,	and	these	mistakes	give	rise	to	
inefficient	outcomes.	In	these	circumstances,	we	suggest	that	the	appropriate	legal	response	
is	to	introduce	a	mandatory	disclosure	regime	to	ensure	that	on-line	consumers	are	properly	
informed	that	the	pricing	of	products	by	dominant	firms	may	vary	for	different	consumers,	
and	of	the	variables	that	affect	the	price	at	which	goods	or	services	are	offered.	In	fact,	we	
believe	 that	 this	 sort	 of	 transparency	 is	 so	 important	 that	 a	 more	 general	 consumer	
protection	requirement	is	needed,	mandating	disclosure	by	all	firms	(not	just	for	dominant	
firms)	that	engage	in	ACPD	in	order	to	protect	the	integrity	of	the	market.	
We	 have	 therefore	 considered	 one	 way	 in	 which	 the	 so-called	 Big	 Data	 revolution	 is	
transforming	the	consumer	retail	sector.	These	technologies	enable	online	sellers	to	engage	
in	highly	granular	 tracking	of	 the	online	browsing	and	purchasing	behaviour	of	consumers,	
employing	 sophisticated	 data	 mining	 techniques	 to	 estimate	 each	 individual	 consumer’s	
willingness	 to	 pay	 while,	 crucially,	 enabling	 online	 retailers	 to	 personalise	 price	 offers	
accordingly	 because	 the	 on-line	 consumer	 sees	 only	 his	 or	 her	 individualised	 digital	
shopfront.	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 enable	 firms	 to	 conceal	 the	 actual	 prices	 that	 individual	
consumers	 are	 offered	 from	each	 other,	 but	 it	 enables	 them	 to	 ‘segment’	 customers	 into	
groups	 based	 on	 perceived	 willingness	 to	 pay.	 In	 short,	 the	 core	 concerns	 which	 ACPD	
generates	 spring	 from	 the	 information	asymmetry	 that	Big	Data	 analytic	 techniques	make	
possible	 and	 exacerbate	 by	 rendering	 consumers	 relatively	 powerless	 vis-à-vis	 online	
retailers	-	they	cannot	choose	which	information	about	their	identity	to	'reveal'	to	suppliers,	
because	online	retailers	now	have	extremely	powerful	 (and	relatively	 inexpensive)	tools	to	
glean	 information	 about	 not	 just	 consumers’	 past	 purchasing	 behaviour,	 but	 also	 their	
tendency	to	avail	themselves	of	'flash	sales',	multi-buy	discounts,	targeted	advertising,	when	
they	are	most	 likely	 to	be	 tempted	to	make	online	purchases,	etc.	 -	but	because	 this	 is	all	
highly	opaque,	 there	may	be	 relatively	 little	 that	 consumers	 can	do	 in	 response,	 and	 they	
may	therefore	be	largely	at	the	mercy	of	sellers	in	their	on-line	dealings.	On	the	other	hand,	
we	have	also	seen	how	competition	between	rival	retailers	may	offer	consumers	significant	
protection	 against	 exploitation	 by	 retailers,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 ACPD	may	 in	 some	 circumstances	
intensify	competition	between	rivals,	with	resulting	benefits	to	consumers	in	the	aggregate	
(although	 not	 all	 consumers	 benefit	 equally).	 	 Because	 no	 systematic	 attempts	 have	 yet	
been	 made	 evaluate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 ACPD	 is	 occurring,	 there	 is	 an	 urgent	 need	 for	
systematic	empirical	 research	to	generate	a	solid	evidence	base	 from	we	can	then	seek	to	
assess	 its	 effects,	 including	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 it	 may	 perpetuate	 social	 injustice	 and	
therefore	warrants	substantive	legal	intervention.	
The	 information	 asymmetry	 story	 that	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 our	 analysis192	suggests	 that	
competition	 law	 and	 policy	 may,	 in	 some	 respects,	 be	 well-suited	 to	 respond	 to	 societal	
concerns	 about	 ACPD	 because	 its	 overarching	 concern	 is	 that	 of	 aggregate	 consumer	
welfare,	but	 it	nevertheless	allows	some	scope	for	considerations	of	fairness	and	justice	to	
be	taken	into	consideration.	However,	we	believe	that	this	response	of	EU	competition	law	
to	these	concerns	should	be	relatively	limited:	not	because	a	legal	response	is	unwarranted,	
but	rather	because	EU	competition	law	in	general,	and	Article	102	in	particular,	may	not	be	
the	most	suitable	legal	form	for	fashioning	an	appropriate	response.	
																																								 																				
192		 See	also	Ezrachi	and	Stucke,	Virtual	Competition,	113.	
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Our	 analysis	 is	 important	 because	 it	 subjects	 an	 increasingly	 important	 and	 ubiquitous	
practice	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 on-line	 world	 to	 critical	 scrutiny,	 and	 can	 be	 understood	 as	
contributing	 to	several	 strands	of	academic	 literature.	At	 its	 simplest,	 it	 contributes	 to	our	
understanding	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 fairness	 implications	 of	 ACPD	 and	 how	 they	 may	 be	
evaluated	from	the	perspective	of	EU	competition	law.	But	our	analysis	can	also	be	situated	
within	 the	 broader	 socio-technical	 context	 in	 which	 ACPD	 takes	 place,	 pointing	 to	 the	
challenges	 associated	 with	 securing	 ‘algorithmic	 accountability’	 and	 the	 large	 challenges	
associated	with	understanding	and	evaluating	the	economic,	social	and	ethical	 implications	
of	the	algorithmic	turn	across	all	sectors	of	society	and	the	economy.193	At	the	same	time,	it	
can	 also	 be	 understood	 as	 contributing	 to	 a	 growing	 interest	 in	 ‘law	 and	 technology’,	 by	
exploring	the	challenges	for	law	in	responding	to	new	technological	developments	within	an	
ambiguous	moral	framework	and	an	exploration	of	alternative	ways	in	which	law	might	best	
respond	to	those	challenges.194		
Although	we	have	critically	examined	the	implications	of	ACPD	for	economic	efficiency	and	
for	fairness	and	equity,	what	remains	unknown	is	the	extent	to	which	firms	actually	engage	
in	ACPD.	We	believe	that	ACPD	is	likely	to	be	attractive	to	online	retailers,	because	it	enables	
them	to	compete	more	effectively	vis-à-vis	their	rivals,	 in	order,	ultimately,	 to	try	to	boost	
their	 profit.	 Although	 we	 have	 shown	 that	 ACPD	 often	 provides	 economic	 benefits	 to	
consumers	 in	 the	aggregate	and	 thus	 to	 society	 in	general,	we	have	also	noted	 that	 these	
benefits	may	not	be	equally	distributed,	 thereby	generating	concerns	 for	collective	 justice.	
And	 in	 some	 circumstances,	 the	 only	 beneficiaries	 are	 the	 powerful	 on-line	 retailers	
themselves.	 Given	 its	 potential	 to	 impact	 the	 market	 mechanism	 in	 both	 positive	 and	
negative	ways,	ACPD	is	a	fascinating	vehicle	for	examining	the	limits	of	competition	law	as	a	
device	 for	 constraining	 new	 behavioural	 techniques	 which	 Big	 Data	 analytics	 and	 the	
computational	turn	makes	possible,	fuelled	by	the	market-driven	logic	of	global	capitalism.	
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